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 ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines three issues relating to the role of remittances in the process of 
economic development: the impact on economic growth, the implications of 
remittances on the real exchange compared to other forms of financial inflows, and 
the impact of remittances on expenditure patterns of households in a major remittance-
dependent country, Nepal. The issues are addressed in three self-contained essays, 
with a stage-setting introductory chapter and a concluding chapter which summarises 
the key findings. The essays are mainly empirical, but well informed by the relevant 
analytical literature. The empirical analysis makes use of the latest econometric 
techniques.  
Chapter 2 examines the debate on the impact of remittances on economic growth 
using a new panel dataset covering 74 developing countries over the period 1976–
2010.The novelty of the analysis is that it probes possible nonlinearity and lagged 
effect of the hypothesized impact of remittances on economic growth using alternative 
specifications. The results suggest that remittances have a positive impact on growth, 
with the magnitude of the impact declining beyond a remittance-GDP ratio of 7 to 9 
percent. But the marginal impact is not statistically significant. There is also no 
evidence to suggest that the impact of remittances on growth depends on financial 
deepening as some previous studies have suggested.  
Chapter 3 examines the impact of remittances on real exchange rate (RER) using 
the standard dependent economy model to derive the estimation equation. The analysis 
is based on a new panel dataset covering 105developing countries during 1980-2011. 
A key novelty of the paper is the use of a theoretically consistent new real effective 
rate (REER) index as the dependent variable.   The index uses the wholesale price 
index (WPI) to measure foreign prices and the GDP deflator as the measure of 
domestic prices whereas the REER index of the IMF, which has been commonly used 
in in the previous studies, uses CPI to measure both prices. 
The results reveal that remittances lead to significant appreciation of RER, and 
the magnitude of appreciation depends on the nature of the exchange rate policy 
regime.  One percentage point increase in the remittance to GDP ratio leads to an 
appreciation of RER by 0.5 percent and 1.08 percent in the countries with the fixed 
vi 
 and flexibles exchange rates, respectively. However, the impact is not statistically 
significant under both exchange rate regimes when the IMF index is used as the 
alternative measure of RER. There is also evidence that the degree of appreciation 
associated with remittance inflow is significantly higher compared to the inflows of 
official development assistance and foreign direct investment. 
The fourth chapter examines the impact of remittances on the expenditure 
patterns of households in Nepal using a panel dataset constructed from three rounds 
of the Nepal Living Standard Survey (1995, 2003 and 2010). The findings reveals that, 
contrary to popular perception about unproductive use of remittances, remittance-
receiving households spend a higher proportion of total consumption expenditure on 
education and health. 
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 Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Context 
Remittances are generally defined as the sum of three components in the current 
account of the balance of payments statistics: workers’ remittances, compensation of 
employees, and migrants’ transfers (International Monetary Fund 1993).1During the 
past three decades or so, inward remittances have emerged as a significant source of 
financial inflows to many developing countries. Officially recorded remittance inflows 
to developing countries reached US $404 billion in 2013, up from about US $200 
billion in 2003, and are predicted to reach US$ 516 billion in 2016(The World Bank 
2012, 2014). Since 2005 remittance inflows have exceeded private capital inflows and 
official development assistance (ODA) to these countries (Figure 1.1). For many 
developing countries remittances have emerged as a significant source of funds to 
finance the current account deficit. Total remittances cover more than 20 percent of 
imports, and this is equivalent to more than 30 percent of exports for the top twenty 
remittance-receiving countries in terms of the remittance to GDP ratio (The World 
Bank 2014).  
  
1The standard source of remittances data is the Balance of Payments Yearbook published by the 
International Monitory Fund (IMF). ‘Compensation of employees’ comprises wages, salaries, and other 
benefits earned by individuals—in economies other than those in which they are residents—for work 
performed for and paid for by residents of those economies. ‘Workers’ remittances’ cover current 
transfers by migrants who are employed in new economies and considered residents there. Migrants’ 
transfers refers to the flows of goods and changes in financial items that arise from the migration on 
individuals from one economy to another (International Monetary Fund 1993).  
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 Figure 1.1 Remittances and other resource flows to developing countries (in US 
$ billion) 
 
 
Source: The World Bank (2014) 
Among the developing countries, remittance receipts are spread out across different 
regions: East Asia and the Pacific and South Asia account for around 50 percent of 
total remittance inflows. (Figure 1.2).  
Figure 1.2 Remittance inflows in developing countries in 2012 (US $ billion) 
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 Table 1.1 shows remittance inflows to the top 30 remittance recipient countries, as a 
percentage to their respective GDP. Most of the high remittances recipient countries 
fall under low and lower middle-income country groups according to the World Bank 
classification. Figure 1.3 reveals that average growth rates of the top 30 remittance 
recipient economies (in percent of GDP) are lower than the total developing countries 
in most of the regions except in the Middle East and North Africa, and slight deviation 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
Similarly, figure 1.4 depicts the per capita real GDP growth rates of the top 30 
remittance-recipient countries and the growth rates of developing countries excluding 
the remittance-dependent economies over the period from 1980 to 2011.2 The figure 
reveals that during most of this period, the average per capita GDP growth rates of 
high remittance receiving countries are lower than rest of the developing countries, 
except for the brief period in the late 1990s. The average per capita growth rate is 
negative for high remittance receiving countries for most of the period from 1980 to 
early 1990s, and also it is more volatile than rest of the developing countries.   
 
 
2 The developing countries here refer to the low, lower-middle and upper-middle-income countries 
definition by the World Bank.  
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 Table 1.1 Classification of the top 30 remittance recipient (as share of GDP) countries by income groups (2012) 
 
Low-Income Lower-middle-Income Upper-middle-income High-income 
(1) Tajikistan (47%) (5) Moldova (23%) (9) Lebanon (18%) (14) Jamaica (14 %) 
(2) Liberia (31%) (7) Samoa (21%) (12) Jordan (16 %)   
(3) Kyrgyz Republic (29% ) (10) Kosovo (18%) (15) Bosnia and Herzegovina (13 %)   
(4) Lesotho (27%) (11) El Salvador (16%) (19) Albania (11 %)   
(6) Nepal (22%) (18) Philippines (12 %) (16) Serbia (13 %)   
(8) Haiti (21%) (21) Nicaragua (10 %) (27) Grenada (9 %)   
(17) Bangladesh (12 %) (22) Guatemala (10 %) (30) Dominican Republic (7 %)   
(20) Togo (10%) (25) Senegal (9 %)    
(24) Guinea-Bissau (9 %) (26) Armenia (9 %)     
(29) Gambia, The (8 %) (28) Sri Lanka (8 %)     
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2013.  
Notes. The World Bank classification of the countries is based on the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita, current US dollars (Atlas method). There are four groups:low 
income (less than $1025), lower-middle-income (between $1026 and $4035), upper-middle (between $4036 and $12475) and high-income (above $12475)—based on 2011 
GNI per capita (http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications). The first figure in the parentheses indicates the ranking according to remittance to GDP ratio and the 
second figure indicates the ratio of remittance inflows to GDP.  
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 Figure 1.3 Average growth rates of all developing countries and major 
remittance receiving countries by region (1980-2011) 
  
Source: Computed from the World Development Indicators (2013).3  
Figure 1.4 Growth of high remittance-receiving countries vs other developing 
countries 
 
3 The data from 1980 are not available for some countries. 
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Table 1.2 shows the dates of ‘graduation’ of the major remittance recipient countries 
from low to lower-middle income group and from lower-middle to upper- middle 
income. Most of these countries have graduated only during the last decade or so from 
the low income to the lower middle income group. Similarly, among the few upper-
middle income countries group, most of these countries have graduated from lower 
middle income in last 5 years or so (Table 1.2). 
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 Table 1.2 Major remittance receiving countries: Year of graduation according to 
income categories 
Country 
Year  
From low-income to 
low-middle-income 
From lower-middle-income 
to upper-middle-income 
Indonesia 2004   
Philippines 1995   
Moldova NA   
El Salvador 1992   
Vietnam 2009   
Samoa 1995   
Tonga 1988   
Armenia 2004   
Ukraine 2004   
Guatemala 1992   
Guyana 2005   
Honduras 2001   
Nicaragua 2004   
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1996   
Morocco 1991   
India 2008   
Pakistan 2010   
Lesotho 2009   
Nigeria 2009   
Senegal 2009   
China 2002 2010 
Albania 2000   
Mexico 1974 1993 
Sri Lanka 2004   
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1997 2008 
Russian Federation  2005 
Serbia  2007 
Romania  2006 
Brazil 1975 1996 
Colombia 1979 2007 
Dominican Republic 1979 2007 
Grenada NA 2001 
Jordan NA 2010 
Lebanon NA 1998 
Source: Author’s compilation based on World Bank classification of countries.  
Notes. The World Bank classification of the countries is based on the Gross National Income (GNI) per 
capita, current US dollars (Atlas method). There are four groups: low- income (less than $1025),  
lower-middle income (between $1026 and $4035), upper-middle (between $4036 and $12475) and 
high-income (above $12475) based on 2011 GNI per capita (http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
classifications). 
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 1.2 Preview 
What is the impact of remittances on economic growth of the receiving countries? 
Multilateral development agencies, in general, regard remittances as an important and 
stable source of external financing to developing countries which helps to reduce 
poverty and promote growth (Fajnzylber & Lopez 2008; Maimbo & Ratha 2005; The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2005; The World 
Bank 2006; Vargas-Silva et al. 2009). Moreover, many countries regard migration and 
the consequent remittance inflows as a source for development. Since the mid-1990s, 
the number of developing countries adopting policies to encourage emigration has 
increased steadily (United Nations 2013).  
However, the role of remittances in reducing structural poverty and their impact 
on long-term economic development remains debatable. Many studies argue that 
remittances act as an important source of external finance to developing countries, 
helping to alleviate poverty and inequality, promote human and physical capital 
accumulation, and create favourable multiplier effects in the economy. On the other 
hand, some studies contend that remittance is detrimental to economic growth citing 
several reasons such as moral hazard problems at both the household and government 
levels; conspicuous consumptions and higher imports; inflationary pressure in the 
economy; currency appreciation; and perpetuation of migration.4 
Though the above analyses points to a negative or lack of, correlation between 
remittances and economic growth, they do not necessarily imply that remittances 
causes lower economic growth. High remittances may simply reflect the consequence 
of low economic growth and high migration in the source countries. Another 
possibility is that in the absence of remittance, growth might have been lower.  
In this context, Chapter 2 presents the new empirical evidence on remittances-
growth relationship debate using a new panel dataset focussing on 74developing 
countries over the period 1976–2010. This chapter draws on the literature of both 
economic growth and remittance-growth nexus. The empirical model is based on the 
reduced form of the Solow-Swan growth model. This model examines several 
4 See Russell (1986), McKenzie (2005), Chami et al. (2008),  Rappoport & Docquier (2006), Yasser 
et al. (2008), Barajas et al. (2009) and Barajas et al. (2011) for surveys of the relevant literature.  
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 alternative specifications with regard to the possible nonlinear and lagged effect of 
remittances, the role of investment, financial deepening and level of education. The 
empirical estimation also addresses the potential endogeneity of remittances.  
The empirical results of Chapter 2 suggests that there is no evidence to support 
the view that remittances exert a significant impact on economic growth.  However, 
there is some weak evidence that the impact of remittance on growth declines after 
remittance-to-GDP passes a threshold of about 7–9 per cent of GDP. There is also no 
evidence to suggest that the impact of remittances on growth depends on financial 
deepening, as some previous studies have suggested. The estimations are robust to 
different estimation time periods, selection of countries and omitting influential 
observations in the data.  
Chapter 3 explores one of the possible channels through which remittances 
impact on economic growth: appreciation of the real exchange rate (RER). Under 
several plausible assumptions, the ‘Australian model’ (or the dependent economy 
model), postulates that a resource inflow (remittance inflows, in this case) would cause 
appreciation of the RER with adverse implications for tradable goods production and 
growth in the economy (Salter 1959; Swan 1960). Despite this theoretical postulate, 
the available empirical evidence on the impact of remittances on the RER is mixed. 
The literature reports the conflicting findings ranging from real exchange rate 
appreciation, ranging from no effects to real exchange rate depreciation (Amuedo-
Dorantes & Pozo 2004; Barajas et al. 2011; Lopez et al. 2007; Rajan & Subramanian 
2005). 
 The analysis in Chapter 3 is based on a new panel dataset covering 
105developing countries during 1980-2011.  The chapter, first formulates an analytical 
framework for examining the impact of remittances on real exchange rate drawing on 
the standard Dutch disease literature.  It then construct real exchange rate index which 
differs from the standard International Monetary Fund’s REER index used in the 
earlier studies  The IMF index uses the consumer price index to measure both the price 
level of a given country and that of its trading partners. For constructing REER index 
used in this chapter, I use the wholesale price index (WPI) as a proxy for foreign price 
and a GDP deflator for the domestic price. The WPI is a better proxy for the price of 
tradable goods and the GDP deflator better captures the domestic prices of nontradable 
9 
 goods.  Thus, the REER index used here is more consistent with the theoretical concept 
of the real exchange rate (relative price of tradable prices to non-tradable prices) 
compared to the IMF index   to (Athukorala & Rajapatirana 2003; Lane & Milesi-
Ferretti 2004).   
The findings from Chapter 3 suggest that remittances induce a significant 
appreciation of REER compared to the official development assistance. The 
alternative specifications suggest that a one percentage point increase in remittances 
leads to about 0.5 and 1.08 unit increase in the real exchange index in countries with 
fixed exchange rate and flexible exchange rate, respectively.  The analysis also 
suggests that that the impact depends on the exchange rate regime. For countries 
adopting a fixed exchange rate regime, the impact mostly falls on the domestic price, 
whereas for countries adopting the flexible exchange rate regimes, the impact is 
mainly on the nominal exchange rate appreciation. Interestingly, the choice of a 
particular REER index affects the significance of the results. I failed to find a statically 
significant effect of remittances (or other capital inflows) on the real exchange rate 
when the IMF index is used as an alternative measure of the real exchange rate. 
The third paper (Chapter 4) examines the impact of remittances on household 
consumption patterns in Nepal. The impact of remittances on the recipient country 
depends crucially on how these transfers are utilized by the households. Nepal is one 
of the top five remittance-receiving countries in the world, with a remittance to GDP 
ratio of around 23 per cent. For Nepal, the inflow of remittances has been a major 
source of foreign exchange, accounting for around 60 percent of total current account 
receipts and is equivalent to three times the country’s exports. Remittances are a major 
source of income for many households in Nepal. The Central Bureau of Statistics 
(2011) estimates that around 56 percent households receive either internal or external 
remittances. About 12 percent of the poorest quintile households receive remittances, 
while around 31 percent of the richest quintile household receive remittances. 
In this context, Chapter 4 presents the first empirical evidence on whether the 
expenditure patterns are differently shaped for households receiving remittances in 
Nepal. I first compute major household consumption items disaggregated into eight 
major categories from three rounds of the Nepal Living Standard Surveys (Central 
Bureau of Statistics 1996, 2004, 2011). An empirical analysis is then undertaken to 
10 
 quantify the differences in the expenditure patterns of remittance-receiving 
households and other households. The analysis addresses the possible endogeneity of 
remittances using an instrumental variable approach. The findings suggest that 
remittances-receiving households spend a smaller share of total consumption on staple 
food items, but a higher proportion of total consumption on education, durable goods 
and health. The preferred estimations show that controlling for total consumption, 
households with remittances spend around a four per cent less share on food items and 
spend about 0.9 percent, 0.6 percent and 0.7 percent shares more on education, durable 
goods and health. The magnitudes, though modest, suggest that remittances can induce 
behavioural changes in households that are independent of total consumption.  
  
11 
 Chapter 2 
Remittances and economic growth: A multi-country 
panel data analysis 
Summary 
During the past three decades, inward remittances—generally defined as the 
transfers in cash, or in kind, from a migrant to household residents in the country 
of origin—have emerged as a significant source of financial inflow for many 
developing countries. However, the impact of remittances on long-term economic 
growth of recipient countries remains debatable. This chapter revisits this debate 
using a panel dataset covering 74 developing countries over the period  
of 1976–2010 by examining the possible nonlinear and lagged effect of the 
hypothesized impact of remittances on economic growth. The results suggest that 
remittances have a positive impact on growth, with the magnitude of the impact 
declining beyond a threshold of 7 to 9 percent. But the marginal impact is not 
statistically significant. There is also no evidence to suggest that the impact 
depends on the level of financial deepening or the education level in the recipient 
countries.  
2.1 Introduction 
Remittances, generally defined as the transfers in cash or in kind from a migrant to 
household residents in the country of origin, have emerged as a significant source of 
financial inflows to many developing countries. Remittance inflows have exceeded 
private capital flows and official development assistance for most of these countries, 
and have helped to finance the current account deficits and provide a steady source of 
foreign exchange (The World Bank 2012, 2014).  
One of the major features of migration after the Second World War is a large 
flow of people from developing countries to advanced economies (Szirmai 2015). 
Since the mid-1990s, the proportion of governments encouraging emigration has 
increased steadily (United Nations 2013). Given this increasing international trend, 
remittances are likely to continue to increase in future. Despite this, the role of 
remittances in reducing structural poverty and their effects on long-term economic 
development are debatable. Of primary interest in this chapter is the impact of 
remittances on the economic growth of the receiving countries. Multilateral 
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 developmental agencies, in general, regard remittances as an important and stable 
source of external financing to developing countries which helps to reduce poverty 
and promotes growth (see for example: The World Bank (2006), OECD 
(2005),Fajnzylber and Lopez (2008), Vargas-Silva (2009)). For example, to quote The 
World Bank (2006):  
“Remittances have a large positive effect on national income in many developing 
countries…in economies where the financial system is underdeveloped, remittances 
appear to alleviate credit constraints and may stimulate growth” (The World Bank 
2006, p. 86).  
However, in the literature there are contradictory results ranging from positive 
to negative or no impacts on economic growth. For example, one of the recent papers 
argues that:  
“Remittances do not seem to make a positive contribution to economic 
growth…Perhaps the most persuasive evidence in support of this finding is the lack of 
a single example of a remittances success story: a country in which remittance-led 
growth contributed significantly to its development” (Barajas et al. 2009, p. 16). 
Remittances affect the consumption, saving and investment behaviour of the 
households which in turn has an impact on economic growth (Ashraf et al. 2011; Chin 
et al. 2010; Rapoport & Docquier 2005; Yang 2008). Remittances are private transfers 
and the recipient households make the decision on how to spend them. However, 
despite the private nature of remittance inflows, policymakers and economists 
increasingly regard these as a potential source of development finance (Barajas et al. 
2009), so much so that developing countries encourage emigration as a source of 
remittances to repay foreign debts, finance trade deficits, and improve the balance of 
payments (Hugo & Stahl 2004).  
The empirical evidence on the role of remittances on economic growth can guide 
the policymakers to formulate policies regarding migration and the use of remittances. 
Specifically, an understanding as to whether remittances can contribute to the long run 
growth or are detrimental to growth can inform policymakers whether the beneficial 
effects of remittances in the long-run are truly warranted or not, and when to take 
necessary steps to mitigate the negative effects.  
13 
 This paper is motivated by the concern that the findings of the existing studies 
remain inconclusive, possibly because of limitations relating to model specification 
and the econometric methodology. In particular, it aims to contribute to the debate on 
the impact of remittances on growth in the following ways. First, I estimate a non-
linear relationship and lagged effect between remittance and growth to take account 
of the possible non-monotonic and delayed impact of remittances on growth. I use 
several alternative specifications, along with different sample sizes and periods to 
allow for any possible country heterogeneity and the consequent impact of remittances 
on economic growth. Second, I utilize the most recent data available for remittances, 
covering the longest period available and a broad set of developing countries. Third, 
the possible endogeneity of the relationship between remittances and growth is 
addressed by using an estimation method which specifies instrumental variables 
within the model, rather than using theoretically questionable external instruments 
(Clemens et al. 2012). Several robustness checks are performed to test the validity of 
the results. 
The results suggest that the null of no impact of remittances on economic growth 
cannot be rejected. In other words, there is no sufficient evidence to suggest that in 
general remittances have a significant impact on growth. The results, however, provide 
some weak evidence of a negative impact of remittances on growth as the remittances-
GDP ratio increases beyond a threshold of about 7 to 9 percent    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a 
literature review focussing on the theoretical underpinning and empirical evidence of 
remittance-growth nexus. Section 2.3 discusses the theoretical framework and the 
model specification, followed by a description of data sources in Section 2.4. Section 
2.5 discusses the estimation method, followed by the results in Section 2.6. Section 
2.7 presents several robustness checks and Section 2.8 concludes.  
2.2 Remittances Inflow and Economic Growth: Theory and 
Evidence 
Remittances exert various macroeconomic impacts on the economy through various 
channels including labour supply, consumption, investment, exchange rates, trade, 
fiscal revenue, financial development, poverty, inequality, institutions and governance 
14 
 (Barajas et al. 2009; McKenzie & Sasin 2007; Rapoport & Docquier 2005; Russell 
1986). Since remittances can have both positive and negative effects on these 
variables, the overall impact on the economy, or on economic growth, is ambiguous. 
The complex and the multiplier effects generated by the inflow of remittances, 
therefore, is not easily amenable to theoretical analysis. 
2.2.1 Remittance and Growth: Theory 
This section explores the possible theoretical links or the channels through which 
remittances impact economic growth. Kireyev (2006) discusses the four theoretical 
approaches on the impact of remittances. The first is the familiar Keynesian approach, 
which regards remittances as an injection to the economy similar to exports or 
investment. Remittance increases both injection, and the withdrawal through an 
increase in savings and imports. The final level of equilibrium depends on the 
magnitude of marginal propensities to save and import. The second possible approach 
uses the Mundell-Fleming model. In this framework, the impact of a nominal shock 
on the economy depends on the degree of capital mobility and exchange rate regimes. 
Remittances can be treated as an increase in money supply: the remittance inflows 
cause a domestic currency to appreciate, thus causing the trade balance and balance of 
payments to deteriorate, resulting in a decline in output. If the exchange rate is fully 
flexible, then the output is unaffected by international transfers as the level of GDP is 
determined fully on the money market (Rapoport & Docquier 2005, pp. 49-50).   
The third approach is based on modified Hecksher-Ohlin theorem and the 
Rybczynski effect. A remittance increase caused by increased labour emigration, has 
an ambiguous effect on capital–on the one hand, less capital is needed to produce 
labour intensive good, and on the other hand, the associated new inflow of capital can 
substitute for the declining factor. Thus, the impact of remittances on growth is 
ambiguous depending on the behaviour of other factors and the degree of 
substitutability among them. The fourth approach, suggested by Kireyev (2006), is 
based on the national income accounting. As remittances are private transfers, they 
increase private consumption and investment directly. The higher consumption will 
either be supported by an increase in domestic output and/or higher imports. Thus, 
remittances increase the private component of the aggregate demand. The inflow of 
remittances will either be consumed, saved, invested or some combinations of those. 
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 Chami et al. (2008) provide a framework for the short-run and long-run 
implications of remittances on the recipient economies. The short-run macroeconomic 
impact of remittances depends on the assumption as to whether remittance is 
considered exogenous or endogenous to the macroeconomic variables of the recipient 
economy (Chami et al. 2008).If the labour supply is exogenous, and assuming the 
uncovered interest parity condition holds, an exogenous increase in remittances causes 
the real appreciation of the domestic currency, due to the reallocation of resources 
(induced by the higher demand) away from the tradable sector to non-tradable sector. 
Thus, the trade balance deteriorates by amount equal to remittance inflows, and thus 
the country’s current account balance remains unchanged after the increase in 
remittances. In this simple case, the distribution of welfare gains among the recipient 
households depends on the allocation of remittances, and the consumption pattern 
favours the households whose consumption is oriented towards traded goods. 
In the second case, the paper assumes that the utility of a household depends on 
the consumption of traded and non-traded goods and leisure (Chami et al. 2008). Thus, 
an increase in remittances leads to an increase in the consumption of both goods and 
leisure. The increase in consumption however, is less than the increase in the 
remittance inflow due to intertemporal budget constraints imposed on the households. 
Also, due to the reduction in labour supply and real appreciation, the current account 
balance remains unchanged and the trade deficit increases by the same amount (since 
the change in remittances is same compared to the first case). Thus, in the second case, 
remittances are countercyclical, with the direction of causation running from higher 
remittances to lower output due to a reduced labour supply (Chami et al. 2008).  
In the third case, Chami et al. (2008) drop the assumption of uncovered interest 
parity and instead assume that the country risk premium is inversely related to the 
inflow of remittances in the recipient economy. Thus, an exogenous increase in 
remittances decreases the domestic interest rate and as a result households shift away 
from future consumption to present consumption in contrast to previous cases. This 
has two implications: first, consumption increases by more than the inflow of 
remittances, thus widening the current account deficit since the households need to 
borrow internationally to support the consumption in the short run; second, the 
demand for nontraded goods rise is higher than in the previous cases, therefore, 
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 causing a greater appreciation of the exchange rates. Thus, if the risk premium is 
endogenous, then the contraction of real domestic output is higher than when this is 
not the case. However, household welfare increases despite the reduction in output.  
In a recent study, using the “growth accounting” framework, Barajas et al. 
(2009)consider the three main channels through which remittances potentially affect 
economic growth: capital accumulation, labour force growth and total factor 
productivity (TFP). First, remittances can provide an additional resource for 
investment for households, especially in the face of credit constraints. Remittances 
also tend to reduce output volatility and improve the creditworthiness of domestic 
investors, and this fosters higher investment. Second, remittances can have a negative 
effect on labour force participation if the households decide to substitute unearned 
remittance income for labour income. Remittances can also induce moral hazard 
problems among the recipient households. Third, remittances may affect the TFP 
through efficiency of investment by changing the quality of domestic financial 
intermediation and affecting the formal financial system to allocate capital. In 
addition, remittances can generate dynamic production externalities in the economy 
by appreciating the equilibrium exchange rate, or through broader political economy 
effects.  
2.2.2 Empirical evidence on remittances and economic growth 
The empirical literature on the macroeconomic impact of remittances on economic 
growth in recipient countries can be broadly classified into two groups. One group of 
literature analyses the impact of remittances on economic growth using reduced form 
equation, following the tradition of the economic growth literature. The second group 
examines the impact of remittances on a particular determinant of growth such as 
exchange rate, investment, financial development, savings, and institutions. This paper 
focuses to the first strand of literature. The cross-country literature on the impact of 
remittances on economic growth is relatively sparse compared to the literature on the 
effects of remittances on a particular growth channel, such as financial development, 
exchange rates or institutions.5 
5There are several studies which examine the impact of remittances on the economic growth of a 
particular country or group of countries e.g.Mundaca (2008)in case of Latin America and Caribbean 
countries, Gupta (2005) in case of India, and Glytos (2001) in case of Egypt. 
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 The cross-country empirical evidence on the impact of remittances on economic 
growth is mixed. First, several studies find that remittances act as an important source 
of external finance to developing countries, helping to alleviate poverty and inequality, 
promote human and physical capital accumulation, and create favourable multiplier 
effects in the economy. Second, some studies have found that the remittances’ impact 
on growth depends on certain conditions prevailing in the receiving country, such as 
policy environment or the extent of institutional or financial development. Third, there 
are studies which find that remittances are harmful for growth. These studies argue 
that remittances create moral hazard problems, both at the household and government 
levels; they encourage conspicuous consumption and higher imports, and induce 
currency appreciation, inflationary pressure in the economy, and dependence on 
emigration.  
Table 2.1 briefly summarizes the major literature on the remittances and 
economic growth focussing on the coverage, methodology and findings of the study.  
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 Table 2.1 Summary of literature on remittance and growth 
 
Study Sample coverage, 
dates 
Methods/Instruments Findings 
Chami et al. (2003) 111 countries for 
cross-section and 
48 countries for 
annual panel, 
1970–1998 
Fixed and random effects and using instrumental variables.  
Instruments: 1) ratio of country’s income to US income, 2) country’s real 
interest rate to the US real interest rate 
Remittances have a negative 
effect on economic growth 
International 
Monetary Fund 
(2005) 
101 countries for 
annual panel, 
1970–2003 
Fixed effects, instrumental variables: Instruments: 1) the geographic distance 
between the remittance receiving country and major migrants’ destination 
country, 2) the presence of a common language in home and host countries 
No statistically significant 
direct link between real per 
capita output 
growth/investment and 
remittance  
The World Bank 
(2006) 
67 countries 
(21 Latin American 
and Caribbean) for 
annual panel, 
1991–2005 
Fixed effects and instrumental variables. Instruments:1) average output per 
capita of the top country destination for migrants across the world weighted 
by the inverse of the distance between the remittance-sender and the 
remittance-recipient country, 2) average output per capita of the top five 
country destinations for migrants in the OECD weighted by the share of 
migrants of the recipient country in each of these five destinations 
Remittances have a positive 
and significant impact on 
growth 
Giuliano and Ruiz-
Arranz (2009) 
73 developing 
countries for annual 
panel, 1975–2002 
Generalized methods of moments Remittance promote growth in 
less financially developed 
countries 
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 Table 2.1 Summary of literature review on remittance and growth (continued) 
 
Study Sample 
coverage/dates 
Methods/Instruments Findings 
Ramirez and 
Sharma (2009) 
23 Latin American 
and Caribbean 
countries, 1990–
2005 
Panel cointegration and fully-modified OLS Remittances have a positive 
and significant effect on 
economic growth 
Singh et al. (2009) 36 Sub-Saharan 
African countries, 
1990–2005 
Panel fixed effects and fixed effect two-stage least squares Remittances have a negative 
impact on growth, while the 
effect tends to positive in 
countries with better 
institutions 
Catrinescu et al. 
(2009) 
89 countries, 
annual panel, 
1970–2003 
Fixed effects and GMM. Remittances exert a weakly 
positive impact on long-term 
growth and the impact is 
increased in the presence of 
sound economic policies and 
institutions 
Barajas et al.( 2009) 
 
 
59 countries, 5-year 
panel, 1970–2005  
Fixed effects and instrumental variables. Instrument: ratio of remittances to 
GDP of all other recipient countries 
Remittances have no impact 
on economic growth 
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Table 2.1 Summary of literature review on remittance and growth(continued) 
 
Study Sample 
coverage/dates 
Methods/Instruments Findings 
Rao and Hassan 
(2011) 
20 Sub-Saharan 
African countries, 
annual panel, 
1980–2007 
Panel data estimation using the modified specification and system GMM Remittances do not exert 
significant impact on 
economic growth 
Ziesemer (2010) 52 developing 
countries, annual 
panel, 1971–2005 
Error correction model and dynamic panel method Remittances have positive 
direct and indirect effects on 
GDP per capita 
Ahmada and 
Coulibaly (2013) 
20 Sub-Saharan 
African countries, 
annual panel data, 
1980-2007 
Granger Causality test based on seemingly unrelated regression  
System 
 
No causal relation between 
remittance and growth 
 
Feeny et al. (2014) 25 Small Island 
Developing States 
(SIDS), annual 
panel, 1971–2010 
OLS and GMM Remittances have positive 
impact on growth in Small 
Island Developing States but 
no impact on rest of the 
developing countries 
Source: Author’s compilation. The actual number of countries in the sample varies for the different estimations. The numbers are taken from the authors’      
preferred estimates. 
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 The mixed empirical evidence on the impact of remittances on growth can be 
attributed to the different definitions of remittances, country coverage, period and 
averaging method, the choice of control variables and the tackling of the endogeneity 
problem (Barajas et al. 2009; Clemens & McKenzie 2014).Endogeneity of remittances 
can arise from the reverse causality running from growth to remittances, and/or due to 
a third factor such as governance and the economic growth of the remittance-sending 
countries affecting both remittances and growth(Barajas et al. 2009; Clemens & 
McKenzie 2014). Remittances can affect growth through various microeconomic as 
well as macroeconomic channels, whereas growth can also affect remittances through 
the migration, altruism, or investment motives of migrants. 
There are three methods used in the literature to address the endogeneity 
problems: using a set of instrumental variables; using different sets of explanatory 
variables; and using a different methodology. Most of the instrumental variables for 
remittances used in the literature are macroeconomic in nature, except Barajas et al. 
(2009). It is, therefore, hard to satisfy the exclusion restriction. In other words, the 
instruments that are correlated with remittances may also affect growth via other 
channels. Moreover, there are no robust tests available to test for the strength of the 
instruments in the context of dynamic panel GMM regressions (Bazzi & Clemens 
2013).  
In a recent paper, Clemens and McKenzie (2014) argue that the divergent results 
in the literature (specifically the negative impact obtained about the remittances-
growth relationship), can be attributed to three additional factors. First, the 
measurement problem in remittances has inflated the actual amount of remittances.6 
They contend that due to changes in the measurement methodology and reporting, 
remittances figures in recent years do not reflect actual changes in real financial flows. 
Second, even if the figures represent the true financial flows, a cross-country 
regression would have too little power to detect their effects on growth. Third, due to 
higher migration there is an offsetting impact on the domestic economy due to a 
6 However, due to the high cost, slow transfer service and lack of access to financial services render 
the informal money transfer more attractive to migrants. Hence, the true figure of remittances might 
be higher (Buencamino & Gorbunov 2002).  
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 reduced labour supply. Hence, the consequent increase in remittances has an 
opportunity cost in the domestic economy in terms of reduced output.  
2.3 Theoretical framework and model 
The model specification is based on the augmented Solow-Swan growth model, which 
incorporates the human capital, apart from the inputs of labour and physical capital 
(Decker & Lim 2008; Mankiw et al. 1992; Spolaore & Wacziarg 2013). The empirical 
literature on growth distinguishes two types of determinants or sources of growth: 
proximate and deep. Following the neo-classical model, per capita growth of output 
can be expressed in terms of three proximate determinants: (a) physical capital 
deepening; (b) human capital accumulation; and (c) productivity growth (Rodrik 
2003).  
In recent times the empirical literature on growth has moved from the 
‘proximate’ determinants to ‘deep’ determinants (Spolaore & Wacziarg 2013). ‘Deep’ 
determinants of growth focus on various factors which impact on the resource 
endowment and productivity growth. Rodrik (2003) classifies the deep determinants 
of growth into three categories relating to (a) geography; (b) trade integration; and (c) 
institutions. In this study, I include remittances as one of the deep determinants of 
growth.  
The next important question is concerning the choice of the other explanatory 
variables. The empirical studies on remittance and growth utilize a different set of 
explanatory variables compared to those used in the cross-country growth literature 
(Barro 1997; Bosworth & Collins 2003; Durlauf et al. 2004; Sala-i-Martin 1997). I 
follow the remittance growth literature in selecting the explanatory variables in order 
to increase the comparability of the results with those in the existing literature.7 The 
reduced form of the full growth equation takes the following form: 
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1= 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2 +
𝛾𝛾3𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜷𝜷𝑿𝑿′𝒊𝒊,𝒕𝒕 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖 +    𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡    ,         (2.1) 
7In addition, in the robustness check, I include the term incorporating the population growth, growth 
rate of technical change and depreciation of physical and human capital to conform to the Solow model. 
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 where, 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=real GDP per capita growth (average over 5-year period), i=1, 2,…, N 
is the country, and t= 1, 2,..,7 is the 5 year time period average from 1976 to 2010, 
𝑿𝑿′𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the vector of other explanatory variables containing both the proximate and 
deep determinants of growth, 𝜑𝜑i are country-specific effects, τt are period specific 
effects, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the error term. The variables are listed below, with the postulated 
signs of the regression coefficients for the explanatory variables in parentheses.  
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (+ or -)  Remittance inflows in percent of GDP at period t 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡2 (+ or -) Remittance-to-GDP (squared)  
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 (+ or -) Remittance-to-GDP lagged by one period 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 (-)  Initial real GDP per capita of the relevant period (in log) 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (+)  Investment to GDP (per cent)  
𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (+)  Life expectancy  
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(+)  Institutional quality (ICRG index) 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (-)  Inflation rate (measured by the consumer price index) 
𝑟𝑟2𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (+ or -) Broad and quasi money as percent of GDP 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(-)   Dummy for Sub-Saharan African countries 
𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 (+)  Dummy for East Asian countries 
𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (+ or -) Openness (the ratio of total trade to GDP) 
Equation (2.1) represents the dynamic panel data model where the lagged 
dependent variable appears as the explanatory variable in order to capture the dynamic 
effects (Bond et al. 2001, p. 15).  
The model includes the quadratic term for remittances in order to examine the 
possible non-linearity in the relationship between remittances and growth. 
Remittances can increase the welfare of the recipients by increasing the consumption 
of essential goods, improving the nutrition and health conditions, and ameliorating the 
credit constraints.  However, in the medium and long-run, as the dependence on 
24 
 remittances increases, it can create undesirable macroeconomic effects such as 
exchange rate appreciation, inflation, and the deterioration of domestic institutions.8 
Investment ratio is also included as an explanatory variable—as the majority of 
the studies argue that it is the only variable found to be robust in most of the empirical 
growth literature. The investment variable is used as an explanatory variable in several 
other remittance growth studies (Chami et al. 2005; Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz 2009; 
Mankiw et al. 1992; Singh et al. 2010). Thus, controlling for investment means that 
remittances capture only that subset of growth effects which do not pass through 
investment (Clemens & McKenzie 2014). I estimate the regressions excluding the 
domestic investment variable to see if this alter the results for the remittance 
coefficient.  
Most of the studies on the impact of remittances on economic growth have 
analysed the effect on contemporaneous growth. However, it can be argued that it 
might takes time for remittances to have any effect on growth. For example, the 
microeconomic impact of remittances on households’ behaviour (such as higher 
investment in children’s health and education) will take a long time to affect the 
output. Thus, remittances can affect growth with a time lag, as it takes time for 
remittances to be channelled into productive investment or impact the economy 
through various multiplier effects (Glystos 2005).  
In alternative specifications, I also include the interaction terms of remittance 
and financial deepening and the level of education. Some earlier studies have shown 
that countries with a higher level of financial development can better utilize 
remittances, and thus they affect growth (Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz 2009). In addition, 
the level of education can also potentially affect the utilization of remittances by 
households. For example, households with better-educated members are able to make 
better use of remittances. Thus I test for the possible interaction between remittance 
and education levels—something not done in earlier studies. 
The other explanatory variables are standard in the empirical growth literature. 
The initial level of per capita GDP captures the conditional ‘convergence effect’. The 
8 See for example, Russell (1986), Chami et al. (2008) and Rapoport and Docquier (2005) for a 
literature review on the macroeconomic impact of remittances. 
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 coefficient of initial per capita GDP is expected to be negative because convergence 
hypothesis postulates that richer countries tend to grow more slowly compared to 
poorer countries. Similarly, life expectancy and years of schooling capture the levels 
of human capital. Several empirical studies have emphasized the role of institutions in 
economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 2005). I use the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) institution quality index to capture the effect of institution on growth. 
Trade openness has also been widely used in the empirical literature as one the 
determinants growth. However, trade openness, as measured by the total trade to GDP 
ratio, has shortcomings compared to the effective rate of protection (Athukorala & Hill 
2010; Krugman 1995). In the absence of detailed data on the effective rate of 
protection, I employ the trade openness ratio (total trade to GDP ratio) as a proxy for 
trade liberalization. Recently, the quality of institutions and governance have received 
a lot of attention as crucial determinants of growth. Therefore, institutional quality 
index is included as an explanatory variables.9 Similarly, inflation is the proxy for the 
overall macroeconomic situation and the theory points to the detrimental effects of 
inflation on economic growth. The role of financial development on economic growth 
is proxied by the broad money to GDP ratio. As remittances affect both inflation and 
money supply, it is important to control for these macroeconomic variables (Barajas 
et al. 2009).   
2.4 Data sources 
The data set covers 74 developing countries with five-year period averages from 1976 
to 2010— that is a seven period panel data set.10 The averaging, using 5-year annual 
data, is done to mitigate the business cycle effects (Barajas et al. 2009; Barro 1991). 
The choice of the period is dictated by data availability for remittances. Details on 
variable definitions and data sources for each variable are given in Appendix 2.1.  
The data sources are the Penn World Tables Version 7.1 (Heston et al. 2012) for 
GDP per capita growth and initial GDP per capita. The data for remittances to GDP, 
9Similarly, the budget balance may also affect economic growth via employment, output, consumption 
and investment (Aschauer 1985; Ball & Mankiw 1995; Barajas et al. 2009; Devereux & Love 1995). 
However,owing to the limited data available, the budget balance is not included as an explanatory 
variable.  
10 Institution quality index were not available for 24 countries. An extended sample of 98 countries 
from 1976 to 2010 without including the institutional quality index, is used for robustness checks. 
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 openness, investment to GDP ratio, life expectancy, regional dummies, financial 
depth, and inflation are taken from the World Development Indicators (2013). The 
data for the time invariant variable —institutional quality— is taken from Rajan and 
Subramanian (2008) given in Clemens et al. (2012). The data for years of schooling is 
taken from Barro and Lee (2013). The data for institutional quality were not available 
for 24 countries, reducing the sample size to 74 countries. The sample of 74 and 98 
countries and the period of data availability are given in Appendix 2.2 and Appendix 
2.3 respectively.  
The data for remittance gross inflows are taken from the World Development 
Indicators. There is no single category in the balance of payment statistics which 
corresponds to remittances data. It is generally calculated as the sum of three 
components in the current account of the balance of payments: that is, workers’ 
remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants’ transfers (International 
Monetary Fund 1993; The World Bank 2011b).11Most of the empirical studies on 
remittances utilize this definition.  
However, there is disagreement as to whether the remittances figure obtained 
from summing the three components of the Balance of Payments Statistics 
overestimates or underestimates the actual flows. In particular, there is disagreement 
as to which category (or categories) best reflects the remittances data (OECD 2005). 
Due to the difficulties in compiling the data on remittances (including the ‘informal 
remittances’), the official data either overstate or understate the true values (Clemens 
& McKenzie 2014; International Monetary Fund 1993; Rienke 2007; Shonkwiler et 
11‘Compensation of employees’ comprises wages, salaries, and other benefits earned by individuals—
in economies other than those in which they are residents—for work performed for and paid for by 
residents of those economies. ‘Workers’ remittances’ cover current transfers by migrants who are 
employed in new economies and considered residents there. ‘Migrant transfers’ are contra-entries to 
the flow of goods and changes in financial items that arise from the migration of individuals from one 
economy to another. The concept of residence for households and individuals is based on their centre 
of economic interest and not on nationality (International Monetary Fund 1993; Rienke 2007). These 
data do not include remittance from informal channels such as through ‘hundi’ or personal carriage (see 
Shonkwiler et al. (2008) for the compilation issues on remittances and the effects of under-reporting on 
estimating their impacts). Several studies have shown that a significant amount of remittances is sent 
through informal channels which are not reported in the balance of payments statistics of each country. 
The data on remittances thus likely underestimate the true values. 
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 al. 2008; OECD 2005).  Moreover, countries adopt slightly different approaches while 
compiling the data and this affects the comparability across countries (OECD 2005). 
The graph in Figure 2.1 shows the remittance and GDP per capita growth based 
on the sample of countries used in the estimation. A quick inspection of the figure 
suggests that there is no relationship between remittances and economic growth 
without controlling for other explanatory variables.  
Figure 2.1 Remittance and GDP per capita growth (%) 
 
Table 2.2 gives the descriptive statistics of the major variables of interest, based 
on the sample used in the regression estimations. The maximum value of remittances 
is around 23 percent. The growth in per capita GDP also shows a minimum per capita 
growth of negative 8.3 percent and maximum growth of around 10.9 percent. 
However, I do not adopt the controversial practice of selectively deleting observations 
based on some ad hoc criterion. Instead, the possible influence of these outliers on the 
estimation results is discussed in the robustness section (Section 2.7).  
Table 2.2 Summary statistics 
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 Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Real GDP per capita growth 1.95 2.94 -8.33 10.86 
log of initial GDP per capita  8.099 0.973 5.67 10.84 
Remittance/GDP (%) 3.219 4.578 0.00175 22.76 
Investment/GDP (%) 23.02 9.46 1.53 61.52 
Life expectancy at birth 63.46 9.01 37.60 82.38 
Years of schooling 5.44 2.48 0.52 11.47 
Broad money/GDP (%) 44.74 31.57 8.72 304.30 
Inflation rate 34.55 220.1 -4.07 3358 
Institution Index 4.52 1.73 1.58 9.60 
Trade/GDP (%) 69.23 42.76 9.60 387.10 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the actual sample used in the regressions.  
2.5 Estimation method 
Of the three standard panel data estimation methods (pooled OLS, random-effects, and 
fixed-effects estimators), the fixed effect estimator is not appropriate for estimating 
the model because it contains a number of time-invariant explanatory variables. I 
therefore started with the pooled OLS estimator and the random-effects estimator 
(REE).Also, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test favoured the use of REE 
over the OLS counterpart (Breusch & Pagan 1980). 
REE is a particular case of the generalized least squares estimator, and it 
assumes that the time invariant fixed effects are uncorrelated with all explanatory 
variables.  It is generally more efficient compared to the pooled OLS estimator 
(Wooldridge 2009). However, the REE estimator can yield biased and inconsistent 
coefficient estimates if one or more explanatory variables are endogenous, that is, if 
they are jointly determined with the dependent variable. There are two such potential 
sources of endogeneity. The first is the possible reverse causation from economic 
growth to remittance inflows. Poor growth performance can act as a push factor in 
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 labour migration, resulting in an increase of remittances. Second, there can be some 
omitted variables in the model which are correlated with both remittance and growth. 
To address the potential endogeneity, system generalized method of moments 
(GMM) method is used (Anderson & Hsiao 1982; Blundell & Bond 1998).  Moreover, 
due to the presence of a lagged dependent variable, the fixed effect coefficients will 
produce a ‘dynamic panel bias’ or ‘Nickell bias’, as the lagged dependent variable 
would be correlated with the error term (Arellano & Bond 1991; Baltagi 2005; Nickell 
1981). The bias would be small if the time periods in the estimation is large (Roodman 
2009a). However, in our estimation, we have only seven non-overlapping five-year 
periods, and therefore, the bias may be large. 
Tackling the potential endogeneity bias is not easy. Several studies use 
instrumental variables for remittances. The different instrumental variables used for 
workers’ remittances are: 1) ratio of country’s income to US income; the country’s 
real interest rate to the US real interest rate, and lagged per capita growth (right hand 
variable) (Barajas et al. 2009); 2) distance between the migrants’ home country to their 
major destination country including the dummy variable if the countries shared a 
common border or not using the cross section data (Faini 2006; International Monetary 
Fund 2005);3) inverse of the distance between the migrants’ home country and the 
destination country multiplied by the GDP per capita; or GDP growth rate or the 
unemployment rate of the destination country (The World Bank 2006);4) lagged 
explanatory variables and system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
techniques (Catrinescu et al. 2009; Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz 2009).  
Barajas et al. (2009) argue that the endogeneity problem associated with 
remittances has not been adequately addressed and contend that the robust external 
instrument for remittances has not been found. Thus, my empirical approach is to (1) 
employ a five-year panel to mitigate the business cycle effects; (2) examine the 
quadratic relationship between remittances and growth; (3) include a detailed set of 
conditioning variables; and (4) use internal instruments to tackle the endogeneity 
problem. As argued forcefully by Clemens et al. (2012) in their discussion on 
empirical relationship between foreign aid and economic growth, I use the more 
transparent method of lagging and differencing as an identification strategy in the 
absence of valid and strong external instrument for remittances. 
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 It is well known that the quality and magnitude of the coefficients depend on the 
types of instruments used, and the results are quite sensitive to the choice of 
instrument. It is difficult to defend the exclusion restriction of the instruments which 
cannot be tested. In the absence of a strong instrument of remittance, I use the dynamic 
panel data method which utilizes the internal instruments from the lags of the 
explanatory variables. 
I then estimate Equation 2.1 using the system GMM regression technique 
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This involves 
differencing equation the equation by either subtracting the previous observations of 
the variables, or alternatively subtracting the variables from their means of all future 
available observations of the variables. The second method of differencing, known as 
‘forward orthogonal deviations’ is preferable when dealing with an unbalanced panel 
(Roodman 2009a). Then the differenced GDP per capita ( 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 ) can be 
instrumented by 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2 (and previous lags), as these are uncorrelated with the 
differences error terms. The difference GMM technique only utilizes this set of 
instruments. However, lagged levels of the variables are weak instruments for the first 
differences if the variable is persistent (Bond et al. 2001). The system GMM technique 
derives additional moment conditions by instrumenting 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 in the original 
level equation by its contemporaneous and lagged first differences, as these are 
uncorrelated with the level of the error term. 
The system GMM estimation has another important advantage in addition to 
allowing consistent estimation of an equation that controls for the lagged dependent 
variable. It allows the explanatory variables to be either endogenous, or weakly 
exogenous (predetermined), and deals with the problem of likely reverse causality 
from GDP per capita growth to remittances. In order to estimate the model, I impose 
the restriction that the remaining explanatory variables are exogenous. Thus, the 
system GMM technique provides us with the set of internal instruments, rather than 
the external instruments. 
The turning point implied by the remittance-growth equation is estimated and 
its significance is calculated based on the Wald test for confidence interval for a scalar 
non-linear combination of the parameters using the delta method (Cameron & Trivedi 
2010). Due to the presence of lagged and squared remittances term, the main effect or 
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 the marginal effect of remittances and its significance is also reported in the regression 
estimations.   
To check the robustness of the results, I first re-estimate the model after 
removing the outliers and influential observations using the leverage ratio method and 
Cook’s distance measure. Second, the data for the time invariant institutional quality 
was not available for 24 developing countries, resulting in the loss of observations. I 
estimate the models using the fixed effects estimations including the extended sample 
of 98 developing countries. Third, some studies have shown that the impact of 
remittances depend on the level of financial development (Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz 
2009). I also interact the financial development variable with the remittance variable 
and the years of schooling to test if the impact of remittances depends on the levels of 
financial deepening and education. Fourth, I use the annual panel and re-estimate the 
model. Finally, a simple non-parametric graph is used to see if the functional form of 
remittances in the model impacts the estimation results.  
2.6 Results 
The random effect and system GMM estimates of the growth equation are reported in 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4, respectively.  Alternative pooled OLS and fixed effects estimates 
are reported in Appendix 2.4 and 2.5 respectively. Column (1) of Table 2.3 presents 
the random effects estimation of the full model from Equation 2.1. The coefficient of 
remittances in Column (1) is not significant though its squared term is significant at 
10 per cent level.  The remittance-growth relationship derived from the two 
coefficients is significant at the 5% level and it suggest that the turning points occurs 
at a remittance-GDP ratio of around 7 per cent. Thus, there is some weak evidence of 
a diminishing effect of remittances on economic growth, but the joint effect of the 
remittance terms or the marginal effect of remittances (at its mean value) is small—
around 0.06—and not significant in this case.  
Column (2) of the table excludes the squared term of remittances, and the 
coefficient of remittance is negative and not statistically significant at 10 per cent 
level. Moreover, the main effect of remittances is also not significant. Column (3) 
excludes the investment variable from the regressions. Controlling for investment will 
estimate the impact of remittances above the fixed capital formation. The turning point 
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 implied by the remittance coefficient occurs around 8.64 per cent, and it is significant 
at 1 % level. The addition or the exclusion of investment ratio however, does not affect 
the significance of the remittances variable.12 
  
12 The inclusion of the additional lags in the regressions does not change the results very much. 
Moreover, the remittance term is not significant omitting both the lagged and squared remittances 
terms.   
33 
                                                     
 Table 2.3 Remittances and growth: Random effects estimations 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        
Remittance/GDP (%) 0.032 -0.125 0.047 
 (0.123) (0.081) (0.118) 
Remittance/GDP  squared -0.009*  -0.010* 
 (0.005)  (0.005) 
Remittance lagged 0.093 0.093 0.118 
 (0.090) (0.088) (0.090) 
Log (initial per capita GDP) -1.514*** -1.677*** -1.325*** 
 (0.304) (0.284) (0.300) 
Investment/GDP (%) 0.070*** 0.071***  
 (0.023) (0.023)  
Initial life expectancy 0.071 0.089* 0.070 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.046) 
Years of schooling 0.224** 0.213** 0.217** 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) 
Broad money/GDP (%) 0.004 0.003 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Inflation rate (%)  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institution quality (ICRG index) 0.250** 0.246** 0.285** 
 (0.110) (0.112) (0.114) 
Trade openness (%) -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
East Asian dummy 1.251 1.196 1.826* 
 (0.827) (0.773) (0.965) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -0.864 -0.889 -0.809 
 (0.729) (0.751) (0.765) 
Constant 4.762 5.236* 4.403 
 (3.000) (3.060) (3.110) 
    
Observations 317 317 317 
Number of countries 74 74 74 
Turning point 7.02**  8.64*** 
Turning point SE 3.282  2.384 
Marginal effect 0.065 -0.032 0.100 
Marginal effect SE 0.088 0.053 0.089 
Notes. Dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth (in percent). Initial per capita GDP 
and initial life expectancy refer to per capita GDP and life expectancy at birth of the first non-
missing observation of the respective 5-year period. Remittances is lagged by one period. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The regressions contain the time dummies. SE refers 
to the standard error. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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 Regarding the other explanatory variables, most of the coefficients are 
significant and have expected signs. In particular, the coefficient of the log of initial 
per capita is negative and highly significant in all specifications. This suggests that the 
countries converges to their respective steady growth also known as the conditional 
convergence. The estimation in Column (1) of Table 2.3 suggests conditional 
convergence at a rate of around 1.5 percent per year. This convergence rate is 
consistent with the estimations from empirical literature on economic growth which 
finds that the convergence rate is around 2 percent in the long-term panel (Barro 2015).  
The results from the random effects, pooled OLS and fixed effects estimations 
suggest that the null hypothesis of no impact of remittances on economic growth 
cannot be rejected. However, these estimation techniques do not account for the 
potential endogeneity of remittances. There are two potential sources of endogeneity 
in the estimation. The first is the reverse causation from economic growth to 
remittance inflows. If the growth is poor in a country, that can lead to higher migration 
and consequently higher remittance inflows. Similarly, a more robust growth is likely 
to reduce migration and hence remittances. In other words, remittances might be 
countercyclical in nature. Second, simultaneous causation by the time invariant 
omitted variable that increase remittance and lower growth might produce a 
remittance-growth correlation. To the extent remittances are endogenous to growth, 
the coefficients obtained from the country fixed effects estimation method may be 
inconsistent and biased (Barro 2015; Nickell 1981).  
Column (1) of Table 2.4 presents the results of the system GMM. In this case, 
the estimations assume that both the initial GDP per capita and the remittances are 
endogenous. To preserve the number of observations, forward orthogonal deviation 
instead of differences are used and the instrument set is collapsed as suggested by 
Roodman (2009a).  
The diagnostic tests for the system GMM indicate that the model has been 
adequately estimated. The number of instruments is only slightly higher than the 
number of countries in columns (1) and (3). The p-value of the Hansen test for over-
identifying restrictions shows that we can not reject the null hypothesis that the 
instrument set is valid at the ten percent level of significance. Also, the estimation is 
not likely to suffer from an over-fitting bias caused by over-instrumentation as the 
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 Hansen p-value is above 0.25 and not too high (Jayasuriya & Burke 2013; Roodman 
2009a). Thus, it can be argued that there is not over-instrumentation problem. The 
Arellano-Bond test for second-order correlation in differences, (that is AR(2)),  rejects 
the null hypothesis that there is no second order serial correlation in first differences 
at the five percent level of significance, which is a necessary condition for consistent 
estimation using system GMM. 
The results from Table 2.5 show that the coefficient of lagged dependent 
variable (that is, the initial GDP per capita) lies between the coefficients obtained from 
the pooled OLS and fixed effects estimation in Table 2.3 (Roodman 2009a). This 
suggests that the system GMM estimation is stable. The term is also close to 2 percent 
in the long term cross-country panel, supporting the conditional convergence 
hypothesis (Barro 2015). The turning point of remittance-growth relationship occurs 
around 6.67 in Column (1) and 9.12 per cent in Column (3) and both are statistically 
significant However, consistent with earlier findings, the main effect of remittance is 
again not significant.  
The non-significant impact of remittances on economic growth can be attributed 
to the various channels through which remittances impact growth. The literature finds 
multifarious and often contradicting effects of remittances on various macroeconomic 
variables. Thus, the possible positive effects of remittances on economic growth may 
be offset by other negative impacts. For example, remittances can have both a positive 
and negative impact on growth due its effects on labour supply, consumption, 
investment, human capital formation, institutions and other macroeconomic variables. 
Appendix 2.6 presents the summary on the possible positive and negative impacts of 
remittances on various macroeconomic variables. 
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 Table 2.4 Remittance and growth (Dynamic panel estimations) 
    
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        
Remittance/GDP (%) 0.184 -0.109 0.281 
 (0.179) (0.078) (0.201) 
Remittance /GDP squared -0.014*  -0.015* 
 (0.007)  (0.008) 
Log (initial per capita GDP) -2.314*** -2.918*** -1.429 
 (0.760) (1.097) (0.991) 
Investment/GDP (%) 0.096*** 0.101***  
 (0.021) (0.024)  
Initial life expectancy 0.102** 0.147** 0.063 
 (0.047) (0.062) (0.049) 
Years of schooling 0.317** 0.333* 0.223 
 (0.150) (0.196) (0.167) 
Broad money/GDP (%) 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Inflation rate -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade openness (%) 0.262** 0.231* 0.289** 
 (0.113) (0.121) (0.114) 
Institution quality -0.007* -0.007* -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
East Asian dummy 0.606 0.208 1.686 
 (0.833) (0.858) (1.030) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -1.064 -1.170 -1.004 
 (0.732) (0.826) (0.785) 
Constant 10.731** 13.288** 8.109 
 (4.425) (5.562) (5.897) 
    
Observations 395 395 395 
Number of countries 74 74 74 
Number of instruments 79 58 78 
AR(2) p-value 0.29 0.32 0.49 
Hansen p-value 0.551 0.301 0.494 
Turning point 6.67**  9.129*** 
Turning point SE 3.158  2.045 
Marginal effect 0.095 -0.109 0.182 
Marginal effect SE 0.134 0.078 0.148 
Estimates regard both initial GDP per capita and remittances as endogeneous and uses the 
first three lags as instruments using the forward orthogonal deviations. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. The regressions contain time dummies. SE refers to the standard 
error. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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 Regarding the coefficients of the other explanatory variables, these have broadly 
expected signs and conform to the earlier studies on growth and remittances (Barro 
1991, 2015). The proxies for human capital variable (that is, life expectancy and years 
of schooling) have a positive impact on growth. Similarly, in agreement with the recent 
emphasis by Acemoglu et al. (2005) on the importance of institutional quality on 
economic growth, the coefficients of institutional quality are positively significant and 
the magnitude is high. Trade openness is mostly positive, indicating that the more open 
the economy, the higher the economic growth per capita. The coefficient of financial 
depth (M2/GDP), is ambiguous and not significant in most of the estimations. Inflation 
on the other hand, has a negative impact on growth. With regard to the time invariant 
regressors, being a Sub-Saharan African country has a negative impact on growth, 
whereas being an East Asian country has a positive impact on growth. 
The alternative pooled OLS and fixed effects estimates (Appendices 2.4 and 2.5) do 
not alter the main inferences based on REE and system GMM estimates. The marginal 
effects of remittances in each of these cases, though positive, are not significant. 
However, the turning point of remittance-growth relationship appears within the 
meaningful range of remittance-to-GDP ratio of 7–9 per cent and are statistically 
significant at 10 per cent level. Thus, there is some weak evidence that after the 
remittances surpasses the turning point, its impact on growth decreases.   
2.7 Robustness 
In this section, I discuss estimations undertaken to test whether the results reported in 
the previous section are sensitive to the outliers, influential observations, selection of 
the time period, addition of explanatory variables and the specific functional form of 
the remittance-growth relationships. First, the detection of possible outliers is 
undertaken using the graphical leverage against residual plot (Belsley et al. 1980). 
Second, Cook’s distance is used to identify the possible influential observations. 
Based on the graphical analysis, the observations with either high leverage or Cook’s 
distance are deleted and the regressions are re-estimated (Cook 1998).  
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 Figure 2.2 Detection of outliers using leverage ratio 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the plots the leverage against residual plot. The vertical line 
shows the average value of the normalized squared residuals, and the horizontal line 
shows the average value of the leverage. A quick inspection of the graph reveals that 
several observations have high leverage and low residuals.  
Few observations with large residuals or high leverage can have affect the 
parameter estimates. Cook’s distance is often used to identify these influential 
observations. Figure 2.3 depicts the Cook’s distance against the observation 
identifiers.  
Based on the leverage value greater than 0.2 (Figure 2.2) or a Cook’s distance 
measure greater than 0.04 (Figure 2.3), I selectively delete 9 observations.13 The 
random effects regression is then re-estimated without these observations. The 
comparison of these estimates, including and excluding the outliers reveal that the 
results are similar (Appendix 2.7). 
13The countries and the period deleted are Bolivia (1980–1985),HongKong (2001–2005, 2006–
2010),Haiti (2001–2005), Jordan (1986–1990), Botswana(1986–1990), Egypt (1981–1985) and 
Philippines (1981–1985). 
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Figure 2.3 Influential observations using Cook’s distance 
 
 
One of the possible explanations for the non-significant impact of remittances is 
that the effect depends on the level of financial deepening and the education level of 
the recipient households. Several studies have found contradictory findings as to 
whether remittances act as a complement or are substitutes for financial development 
(Aggrawal et al. 2011; Chowdhury 2011; Giuliano & Ruiz-Arranz 2009). The level of 
financial development can affect the allocation and efficiency remittances use, which 
in turn affect economic growth. Similarly, education level can affect the savings and 
investment behaviour of households, and this then affects economic growth. To test 
these propositions, I interact the remittances variable with the proxy for financial 
deepening (broad money to GDP ratio) and also with the years of schooling. 
Appendix 2.8 reports the results by incorporating the interaction terms for 
remittances and its squared term with financial deepening and years of schooling 
separately. The marginal effects for remittances for these estimations are not 
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 significant, suggesting that the impact of remittances does not depend on the level of 
financial deepening or years of schooling.14 
Several previous studies have used the annual panel data to estimate the impact 
of remittances on growth (Catrinescu et al. 2009; Ramirez & Sharma 2009; Rao & 
Hassan 2011). To check the robustness of my results with the annual panel data, the 
OLS and fixed effects estimations are performed using the annual data from 1976–
2010. Specifically, the inclusion of the year dummies to account for the year specific 
business cycle effect might change the results compared to the 5-year averaged data. 
The initial GDP per capita is taken as the five-year lagged GDP per capita.15 The 
results show that the coefficient of remittances is still not significant (Appendix 2.9).  
Similarly, I include other explanatory variables: government consumption; 
population growth (n), along with the growth rate of technical change (g) and 
depreciation of physical and human capital (𝛿𝛿), to conform to the Solow model (Bond 
et al. 2001).16When these variables are included, I find that the coefficient of 
government consumption is positive and significant, though the logarithm of the term (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑔𝑔 + 𝛿𝛿)is not significant. However, the inclusion of these terms only slightly 
alter the magnitude and significance of the main variable of interest.  
Another potential concern of the growth empirics is the effect of a few influential 
observations in the data which drive the estimates. Moreover, the inclusion of the 
squared remittances term in order to capture the non-linearity may generate a spurious 
coefficient due to collinearity between the squared and linear terms. One way to 
address this issue is to estimate the regressions separately in different time intervals 
so that the influential observation in one estimation does not affect the relationship 
observed in other intervals. I re-estimate the regressions using the time period from 
1980 to 2005. The reason for this is that the 1980s was a period of low growth for 
many developing countries due to debt and the consequences of the oil crisis. 
14One of the major channels through which the levels of financial development and education affect 
the impact of remittance is through the quality and efficiency of investment. However, excluding the 
investment from the regression does not alter the broad results very much.  
15 I also used the one year lagged GDP per capita as an explanatory variable. However, the results are 
not very different.  
16 The inclusion of logarithm of the term (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑔𝑔 + 𝛿𝛿)  where n=rate of growth of the work force, 
g=growth rate of technical change (set at 2%) and 𝛿𝛿= depreciation rate of physical and human capital 
(set at 6%) according to Bond et al. (2001). 
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 Similarly, growth slowed down in many countries following the global financial crisis 
in 2007. However, the results broadly conform to earlier results and the coefficient of 
remittances does not become significant.17 
Next, I also utilize the semi-parametric plot analysis which makes no 
assumptions about the functional form of the remittance growth relationship (Clemens 
et al. 2012).  Figure 2.4 produces a graph of this partial relationship using the 
regression of column (1) from Table 2.3. I plot the residual when growth is regressed 
on all covariates except Remittance/GDP and (Remittance/GDP) squared against the 
residual when (Remittance/GDP) is regressed on all other covariates except 
(Remittance/GDP) squared. Thus, I partial out the non-remittances covariates from 
growth (vertical axis) and remittances (horizontal axis). The inspection of the 
semiparametric graph of the partial remittance-growth relationship shows no 
particular trend. This reinforces the evidence that remittances do not exert significant 
impact on economic growth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
17 The coefficient of the initial GDP per capita (convergence term) is lower in these estimates.  
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 Figure 2.4 Semiparametric graph of partial remittance-growth relationship 
 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
Though remittances have emerged as a major source of financial flows to many 
developing countries, the impact on economic growth remains unclear. This study 
investigates the remittance-growth relationship for 74 developing countries using a 
five-year averaged panel dataset from 1976 to 2010. The estimations are performed 
using the random effects and dynamic panel data methods and utilize a detailed set of 
explanatory variables. The potential non-linear impact and the lagged effect of 
remittances are also considered. I use System GMM method to address the 
endogeneity issue rather the instrumental variables approach. All of these estimations 
suggest that remittances do not exert a systematic impact on economic growth. In 
particular, the exclusion of the investment variable from the estimation does not affect 
the main results. The findings in this paper do not depend on the particular functional 
form of the remittance-growth relationship, and are not affected by several outliers. 
 The reason that the coefficient of remittance is imprecisely estimated could be 
several. First, remittances data are noisy and the countries compile the data in different 
ways. Also, a significant amount of remittances are not recorded properly (or not at 
all) if they are transferred through informal means. Second, remittances can affect 
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 growth through various macroeconomic variables such as consumption, investment 
and human capital formation. Often there can be both positive and negative impacts 
of remittances on these variables. Third, economic growth is a complex phenomenon 
and the estimations based on a multicounty study simply indicate the average 
relationship within countries. Individual country experiences could vary from this 
average due to country specific structural peculiarities not modelled in the estimation. 
Fourth, due to the unavailability of a strong external instrument it is often hard to make 
the causal inference of remittances on economic growth.  
The findings suggest that there can be a trade-off between the impact of 
remittances at the household level and economic growth. To the extent that the 
endogeneity of remittances due to reverse causation is not adequately modelled, the 
presence of high remittances due to high migration can simply reflect the poor 
economic growth of recipient economies. Thus, the optimism shared by the 
governments or policymakers regarding labour export as similar to merchandize 
exports and the role of remittances may not be warranted. Specifically, the cushion 
provided by remittance inflows can discourage the policy makers from implementing 
the longer term reforms regarding exchange rate management and their intention to 
foster conducive investment environment.   
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Appendix 2.1 Data descriptions and sources 
GDP/capita growth. Average annual growth rate of real GDP/capita from the Penn World 
Tables 7.1.  
Initial GDP per capita. Log of per capita (PPP) GDP at the beginning of the relevant time 
period, taken from Penn World Table Version 7.1.  
Remittance/GDP. Average annual remittances/GDP from 1976 to 2005, taken from the 
WDI. It is generally calculated as the sum of three components in the current account of the 
balance of payments: workers’ remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants’ 
transfers (IMF 1993; The World Bank 2011). 
Investment to GDP. Investment share of PPP converted GDP per capita at current prices 
(%). Taken from Penn World Table 7.1. 
Years of schooling. Years of schooling data taken from Barro and Lee (2010). 
Initial life expectancy. Life expectancy at birth in years at the beginning of the relevant 
time period. The first non-missing value in each five-year period total life expectancy from 
WDI 2013.  
Institutional quality. Period averages of the sum of three components (bureaucratic quality, 
rule of law and corruption) of the ICRG index. The resultant variable is normalized to one 
which ranges from 0 to 6. Data are taken from Clemens et al. 2011. The underlying data are 
obtained from the PRS Group IRIS III dataset.  
Inflation. The average annual rate of growth of CPI for the first five years of the relevant 
time period taken from WDI 2013.  
M2/GDP. The ratio of M2/GDP for the first five years of the relevant period taken from 
WDI 2013.  
Region dummies. Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia dummies obtained from WDI 2013.  
Openness. Total trade to GDP at current prices (%) obtained from Penn World Version 
Table 7.1. 
𝐥𝐥𝐥𝐥(𝒏𝒏𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 + 𝒈𝒈 + 𝜹𝜹). Population growth figure nit taken from Penn World Table 7.1 and fixing 
g=2 % and 𝛿𝛿 = 6%.  
Government consumption to GDP. Government consumption share of PPP converted 
GDP per capita at current prices (%). Taken from Penn World Table Version 7.1. 
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 Appendix 2.2 Sample of countries and period covered 
Country Period  Country Period 
Albania 1991-2010  Sri Lanka 1971-2010 
Bangladesh 1986-2010  Morocco 1971-2010 
Bolivia 1976-2010  Mexico 1976-2010 
Brazil 1981-2010  Mali 1986-2010 
Botswana 1971-2010  Mongolia 1996-2010 
Chile 2006-2010  Mozambique 1986-2010 
China 1986-2010  Malawi 1991-2010 
Cote d'Ivoire 1971-2010  Malaysia 1971-2010 
Cameroon 1976-2010  Namibia 2001-2010 
Congo, Rep. 1986-2010  Niger 1971-2010 
Colombia 1971-2010  Nicaragua 1996-2010 
Costa Rica 1976-2010  Pakistan 1976-2010 
Dominican Republic 1971-2010  Panama 1976-2010 
Algeria 1971-2010  Peru 1986-2010 
Ecuador 1976-2010  Philippines 1976-2010 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1976-2010  Papua New Guinea 1976-2010 
Gabon 1976-2005  Paraguay 1971-2010 
Ghana 1976-2010  Russian Federation 1991-2010 
Gambia, The 1976-2010  Saudi Arabia 2001-2010 
Guatemala 1976-2010  Sudan 1976-2010 
Guyana 1991-2010  Senegal 1971-2010 
Hong Kong SAR, China 1996-2010  Sierra Leone 2006-2010 
Honduras 1971-2010  El Salvador 1976-2010 
Haiti 1996-2010  Syrian Arab Republic 1976-2010 
Indonesia 1981-2010  Togo 1971-2010 
India 1971-2010  Thailand 1971-2010 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1991-2010  Trinidad and Tobago 1971-2010 
Iraq 2001-2010  Tunisia 1981-2010 
Israel 1971-2010  Turkey 1971-2010 
Italy 1971-2010  Tanzania 1991-2010 
Jamaica 1976-2010  Uganda 1996-2010 
Jordan 1971-2010  Uruguay 1976-2010 
Kenya 1971-2010  Venezuela, RB 2006-2010 
Korea, Rep. 1976-2010  Vietnam 1996-2010 
Kuwait 2006-2010  Yemen, Rep. 1991-2010 
Liberia 2001-2010  South Africa 1971-2010 
Libya 1996-2010  Zambia 2001-2010 
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 Appendix 2.3 Extended sample of countries and period 
Country  Period 
Afghanistan 2006-2010 
Armenia 1991-2010 
Burundi 2001-2010 
Benin 1991-2010 
Belize 1981-2010 
Barbados 1971-2010 
Central African Republic 1981-1995 
Fiji 1976-2010 
Croatia 1991-2010 
Kazakhstan 1991-2010 
Kyrgyz Republic 1996-2010 
Cambodia 1991-2010 
Lao PDR 1986-2010 
Lesotho 1971-2010 
Macao SAR, China 2001-2010 
Maldives 2006-2010 
Mauritania 1986-1995 
Mauritius 1991-2010 
Nepal 1991-2010 
Rwanda 1976-2005 
Swaziland 1971-2010 
Tajikistan 2001-2010 
Tonga 1986-2010 
Ukraine 1996-2010 
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 Appendix 2.4 Remittance and growth: Pooled OLS estimations 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Remittance/GDP (%) 0.036 -0.170** 0.033 
 (0.127) (0.074) (0.122) 
Remittance/GDP  squared -0.012**  -0.012** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) 
Remittance lagged 0.126 0.126 0.162 
 (0.098) (0.100) (0.101) 
Log (initial per capita GDP) -1.237*** -1.387*** -1.064*** 
 (0.286) (0.262) (0.298) 
Investment/GDP (%) 0.068*** 0.068***  
 (0.022) (0.023)  
Initial life expectancy 0.043 0.063 0.043 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.042) 
Years of schooling 0.221** 0.204** 0.217** 
 (0.097) (0.094) (0.099) 
Broad money/GDP (%) 0.010 0.009 0.012 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Inflation rate -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institution quality 0.203* 0.184* 0.239** 
 (0.103) (0.104) (0.108) 
Trade openness (%) -0.011** -0.012** -0.009* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
East Asian dummy 1.184 1.129 1.750* 
 (0.813) (0.739) (0.943) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -0.913 -0.942 -0.854 
 (0.679) (0.692) (0.710) 
 4.370 4.857* 3.980 
Constant (2.808) (2.851) (2.965) 
    
Observations 317 317 317 
R-squared 0.341 0.329 0.309 
Number of countries 74 74 74 
Turning point 6.936  8.353 
Turning point SE 2.530  2.023 
Marginal effect 0.083 -0.044 0.116 
Marginal effect SE 0.089 0.056 0.092 
Notes. Dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth (in percent). Initial per capita GDP 
and initial life expectancy refer to per capita GDP and life expectancy at birth of the first non-
missing observation of the respective 5-year period. Remittances is lagged by one period. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The regressions contain the time dummies. SE refers 
to the standard error.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
48 
     
Appendix 2.5 Remittance and growth: Fixed effects estimations 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        
Remittance/GDP (%) -0.078 -0.049 -0.014 
 (0.149) (0.061) (0.152) 
Remittance/GDP  squared 0.002  -0.000 
 (0.007)  (0.007) 
Remittance lagged 0.042 0.041 0.036 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.065) 
Log (initial per capita GDP) -5.839*** -5.792*** -5.342*** 
 (1.197) (1.110) (1.133) 
Investment/GDP (%) 0.084** 0.084**  
 (0.042) (0.042)  
Initial life expectancy 0.102 0.102 0.089 
 (0.073) (0.072) (0.067) 
Years of schooling 0.142 0.148 -0.068 
 (0.383) (0.385) (0.356) 
Broad money/GDP (%) -0.012 -0.013 -0.011 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Inflation rate -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade openness (%) 0.029* 0.029* 0.029* 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Constant 37.088*** 36.728*** 36.538*** 
 (9.929) (9.448) (9.971) 
    
Observations 317 317 317 
R-squared 0.319 0.319 0.295 
Number of countries 74 74 74 
Notes. Dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth (in percent). Initial per capita GDP 
and initial life expectancy refer to per capita GDP and life expectancy at birth of the first 
non-missing observation of the respective 5-year period. Remittances is lagged by one 
period. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The regressions contain the time dummies.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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 Appendix 2.6 Summary of literature review on macroeconomic impact of 
remittances 
Indicators Positive  Negative 
Labour supply Labour supply may actually 
increase due to higher 
demand of skills for people 
planning to migrate 
Leads to decreased labour 
supply due to moral hazard 
problems  
Consumption Increase in consumption of 
domestic goods leads to 
multiplier effects in the 
economy 
Conspicuous consumption 
and imports of status 
oriented goods leading to 
higher imports and creating 
inflationary pressures and 
‘demonstration effects’ 
Investment Increase in investment and 
entrepreneurial activities by 
increasing income and 
easing credit constraints  
Rarely used for investment 
purposes and mainly 
frittered away in 
consumption 
Financial development Acts as a substitute for low 
level of financial 
intermediation in the 
recipient economy 
May act as an disincentive to 
develop the financial 
services and creates informal 
financial market 
Foreign exchange Provides a stable source of 
foreign exchange and helps 
to finance the balance of 
payments deficit 
Causes real appreciation of 
domestic currency, loss of 
competitiveness and ‘Dutch 
Disease’ phenomenon and 
policy complacency  
Poverty Helps to reduce poverty 
directly and indirectly 
Poor people are unable to 
migrate internationally due 
to high cost 
Inequality Helps to reduce inequality 
by redistributing income in 
favour of the poor  
May exacerbate income 
equality as the migrants are 
disproportionately drawn 
from higher income groups 
Human capital formation Leads to ‘brain gain’ by 
encouraging investment in 
higher education and 
through network gain 
International migration and 
education are substitutes, 
leads to ‘brain drain’  
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 Appendix 2.6 Summary of literature review on macroeconomic impact of 
remittances (contd.) 
Indicators Positive  Negative 
 
Output volatility Are compensatory and 
countercyclical in nature 
and reduce output volatility 
Are procyclical due to moral 
hazard problems, leads to 
dispersion of firm earnings 
and wage income leading to 
increased output volatility  
Government Debt  Support higher future debt 
levels and government 
expenditure due to increase 
in consumption and trade-
based tax and stimulation of 
credit market activities due 
to increased bank deposits 
Government cannot rely on 
future remittance flows, and 
dependence on remittances 
induces business cycle 
volatility ‘imported’ from 
destination countries 
Resources Net addition to resources Replace other sources of 
income, increases 
dependency and erodes good 
working habits and 
exacerbates the potential 
negative effects of return 
migration 
Domestic institutions May exert favourable 
impact due to pressure from 
return migrants and 
diasporas communities, 
increase in government 
revenue from remittance 
induced greater tax base 
Higher ratio of remittances 
to GDP is associated with 
deterioration of institutional 
quality  
Source: Author’s compilation, drawn from Abdih et al. (2012); Barajas et al. (2009); Barajas et al. 
(2011); Chami et al. (2008); McKenzie and Sasin (2007); Rapoport and Docquier (2005); Russell 
(1986); Yasser et al. (2008).  
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 Appendix 2.7 Remittance and growth: sensitivity to outliers 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
      
Remittance/GDP (%) 0.032 -0.056 
 (0.123) (0.111) 
Remittance/GDP  squared -0.009* -0.007* 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
Remittance lagged 0.093 0.157** 
 (0.090) (0.072) 
Log (initial per capita GDP) -1.514*** -1.437*** 
 (0.304) (0.293) 
Investment/GDP (%) 0.070*** 0.079*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) 
Initial life expectancy 0.071 0.052 
 (0.052) (0.040) 
Years of schooling 0.224** 0.260*** 
 (0.106) (0.097) 
Broad money/GDP (%) 0.004 -0.000 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
Inflation rate -0.001*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Institution quality (ICRG index) -0.008 -0.010** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Trade openness (%) 0.250** 0.160* 
 (0.110) (0.094) 
East Asian dummy 1.251 1.666** 
 (0.827) (0.773) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -0.864 -1.109** 
 (0.729) (0.564) 
Constant 4.762 5.765** 
 (3.000) (2.303) 
   
Observations 317 308 
Number of countries 74 74 
Marginal effect 0.065 0.058 
Marginal effect SE 0.088 0.079 
Notes. Dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth (in percent). Initial 
per capita GDP and initial life expectancy refer to per capita GDP and life 
expectancy at birth of the first non-missing observation of the respective 5-
year period. Remittances is lagged by one period. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. The regressions contain the time dummies. SE refers to the 
standard error. Column (1) reproduces the result from Table 2.4 for 
comparison. SE refers to the standard error.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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 Appendix 2.8 Remittances and growth with interaction terms 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Remittance/GDP (%) 0.065 -0.082 0.534* 0.012 
 (0.250) (0.101) (0.320) (0.128) 
Remittance/GDP -0.010  -0.032*  
 (0.012)  (0.016)  
Broad money/GDP (%) 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Remittance/GDP*Broad money -0.001 -0.001   
 (0.004) (0.001)   
(Remittance/GDP)2 *Broad money  0.000    
 (0.000)    
Lagged remittance 0.098 0.099 0.090 0.102 
 (0.081) (0.080) (0.091) (0.090) 
Log (initial per capita GDP) -1.530*** -1.706*** -1.694*** -1.787*** 
 (0.317) (0.293) (0.315) (0.295) 
Investment/GDP (%) 0.071*** 0.073*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) 
Initial life expectancy 0.070 0.089* 0.073 0.092* 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
Years of schooling 0.233** 0.230** 0.440*** 0.330** 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.157) (0.143) 
Inflation rate -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade openness (%) -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Institution quality  0.241** 0.236** 0.276** 0.253** 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.110) (0.110) 
Remittance/GDP*Years of schooling   -0.090** -0.024 
   (0.045) (0.019) 
(Remittance/GDP)2 *Years of schooling    0.004*  
   (0.003)  
     
Observations 317 317 317 317 
Number of countries 74 74 74 74 
Marginal effects 0.068 -0.019 0.061 -.019 
Marginal effects SE 0.083 0.046 0.083 0.054 
Notes. Dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth (in percent). Initial per capita GDP and initial life 
expectancy refer to per capita GDP and life expectancy at birth of the first non-missing observation of the 
respective 5-year period. Remittances is lagged by one period. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The 
regressions contain the time dummies, regional dummies and a constant. SE refers to the standard error. The 
regressions contain the interaction terms involving both remittance and its squared terms.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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 Appendix 2.9 Robustness check with the extended sample 
  Annual sample Five-year sample 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimator FE FE FE FE 
Remittance/GDP (%) -0.033 -0.074 -0.049 -0.051 
 (0.030) (0.056) (0.047) (0.069) 
Remittance/GDPsquared  0.000  -0.002 
  (0.000)  (0.002) 
Log (initial per capita GDP) -4.263*** -4.785*** -4.730*** -5.118*** 
 (0.964) (0.898) (0.821) (0.771) 
Investment/GDP (%)  0.145***  0.136*** 
  (0.023)  (0.022) 
Initial life expectancy 0.129*** 0.071 0.087 0.032 
 (0.038) (0.045) (0.056) (0.057) 
Years of schooling 0.354 0.392** 0.217 0.271 
 (0.267) (0.177) (0.289) (0.183) 
Broad money/GDP (%) -0.011 -0.014 0.013 0.009 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Inflation rate -0.000* -0.000** -0.002* -0.002* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Trade openness (%) 0.014* 0.011 0.016* 0.014 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Constant 25.857*** 29.882*** 33.108*** 35.733*** 
 (6.527) (7.338) (6.066) (6.445) 
     
Observations 2,328 2,328 510 510 
R-squared 0.101 0.129 0.230 0.295 
Number of countries 98 98 98 98 
Notes. Dependent variable is real GDP per capita growth (in percent). FE refers to fixed effects 
estimation technique. Initial per capita GDP and initial life expectancy refer to per capita GDP and life 
expectancy at birth of the lagged 5-year observations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The 
regressions contain the time dummies. Joint p-values for the two remittances variables are 0.18 in 
column 2, 0.29 in column 3 and 0.59 in column 4. The joint p-values for remittances variables are 0.18 
in column (2) and 0.29 in column (4). The sample excludes observations for Lesotho which had 
remittances/GDP ratio exceeding 50 percent.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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 Chapter 3 
The differential impact of inward remittances and 
capital inflows on the real exchange rate 
 
Abstract 
The Dutch disease theory postulates that remittance inflows  leads to the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, with adverse implications for structural 
adjustment and growth in the recipient economies. This paper investigates the 
impact of remittances on the real exchange rate in developing countries using a 
newly constructed panel dataset. In particular, a new series of theoretically 
plausible real effective exchange rates are constructed for 115 countries from 
1980 to 2011. The analysis pays particular attention to possible difference 
between remittances and other forms of resource inflows in their impact on the 
real exchange rate. The results reveal that remittance inflow leads to a significant 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, and the magnitude of appreciation for a 
given level of remittance inflow depends on the nature of exchange rate policy 
regime. There is also evidence that the degree of appreciation associated with 
remittance inflow is significantly higher compared to that associated with official 
development assistance and foreign direct investment. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the major channels through which remittances can affect the structure and 
performance of the recipient economy is through the real exchange rate, that is, the 
price of domestic goods relative to that of foreign goods. Under several plausible 
assumptions, the standard Dutch disease model postulates that resource inflows or 
remittances causes an appreciation of the real exchange rate with adverse impact on 
the performance of tradable goods production in the economy. Despite this clear 
theoretical postulate, the empirical evidence on the impact of remittances on real 
exchange rate is mixed.  
 
The literature finds conflicting findings ranging from real exchange rate 
appreciation through to no effects on real exchange rate depreciation (Amuedo-
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 Dorantes & Pozo 2004; Barajas et al. 2011; Lopez et al. 2007; Rajan & Subramanian 
2005). All of these studies use the real effective exchange rate (REER) 18index based 
on the consumer price indices (CPI), which is the standard index employed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Though the CPI is more readily available and 
understood by people, wholesale prices better capture the prices of tradables (Lane & 
Milesi-Ferretti 2004). Moreover, the CPI based REER index is often prone to political 
manipulation by domestic authorities (Athukorala & Rajapatirana 2003). The model 
formulation in these studies has also generally ignored the role of the exchange rate 
regime and/or the role of central bank intervention in determining the impact of 
remittances inflows on the real exchange rate (RER).  
This paper examines the debate on the impact of remittances on the real 
exchange rate. It aims to broaden our understanding of the issue at hand in the 
following ways. First, an analytical framework is developed and the estimation 
equation is derived drawing on the Dutch disease model (now become the standard 
model for analysing the macroeconomic impact of resource inflows). Second, I use a 
new dataset for 115 countries covering the period 1980-2011. The key feature of the 
data base is a theoretically consistent real exchange rate index. The newly constructed 
REER series better reflects the prices of tradables compared to the CPI based REER 
indices. Third, I estimate the regression using the appropriate transformation of the 
remittances and other capital inflow variables to take into account the effect of the 
nominal exchange rate. Fourth, I include several categories of de facto exchange rate 
regimes (as opposed to a binary de jure classification of exchange rate) as explanatory 
variables in the model.  
The findings suggest that the use of a theoretically consistent REER index 
substantially affects the results. There is strong empirical evidence from my analysis 
that remittance inflows lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. However, 
interestingly, when the IMF’s REER index is used, I fail to find any statistically 
significant impact. This result may also help to explain the ‘puzzling’ result obtained 
by Rajan and Subramanian (2005) that remittances do not give rise to adverse 
competitiveness effects similar to aid inflows (Rajan & Subramanian 2005, p. 20).  
18 REER is weighted average of the bilateral RER. The definition and computation of REER series are 
given in Section 4.5.  
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 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2providesthe 
analytical framework of the dependent economy model the empirical evidence on the 
relationship between remittances and REER. Section 3.3 discusses the model, 
followed by the data sources and variables construction in Sections3.4. Section 3.5 
discusses the estimation method and the results. Section 3.5 discusses the estimation 
technique and the results and Section 3.6 provides the robustness checks of the results. 
After a brief discussion about endogeneity in Section 3.7, Section 3.8 concludes. 
3.2 Remittance inflows and real exchange rate 
Real exchange rate has been defined principally two ways : 1) in external terms as the 
nominal exchange rate adjusted for the price differences between countries in line with 
the purchasing parity theory; and 2) in internal terms as the ratio of domestic prices of 
tradable to non-tradable goods (Hinkel & Nsengiyumva 1999, p. 41). These two 
definitions usually give different measures of RER. However, due to various statistical 
problems in constructing the internal RER, an external RER is often used as a proxy 
for internal RER (Hinkel & Nsengiyumva 1999, p. 120).  
3.2.1 Analytical framework 
The Australian model or the ‘dependent economy’ model provides the analytical 
framework to trace the impact of the real exchange rate arising from a resource boom 
or capital inflows on the domestic sectors of an economy (Salter 1959; Swan 1960). 
The model assumes a small, open economy with two sectors: tradables and 
nontradables. The price of tradables (exports and importables) is determined in the 
world market. Prices of non-tradable goods (that is, those that are not traded 
internationally due to high transportation costs or restrictive trade measures) are 
determined solely by domestic supply and demand. Any excess demand or supply of 
nontradables is mitigated through adjustment of prices and quantities in the domestic 
market.19 
 
Figure 3.1 Capital inflows and real exchange rate 
19 The real exchange rate can also be defined as the ratio of price of tradables to nontradables. 
However, to be consistent with definitions later, I define the RER as the ratio of prices of 
nontradables to tradables. Figure 3.1 is drawn based on Warr (2006) and Snape (1977) 
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In Figure 3.1, the NT curve shows the production possibility frontier for the 
tradable and non-tradable goods. The curve OZ, which is obtained by joining the 
points on the possibility frontier and the highest attainable social indifference curve, 
traces out the pattern of demand between tradables and nontradables as expenditure 
changes. This curve can be interpreted as the demand curve for different levels of 
expenditure. It is upward sloping as both goods are assumed to be normal. At point A, 
where U1 is tangent to NT, the economy is at both internal and external equilibrium. 
In other words, domestic demand and supply for both goods are equal. The economy 
is in internal equilibrium as it is producing in its production possibility frontier, and in 
external equilibrium, due to a zero trade balance. The slope of the price line Pa which 
is tangent to NT at A, indicates the domestic relative price of tradables to nontradables, 
(that is, the RER) which is consistent with the internal and external balance.  
The remittance inflow is characterized as an increment in the foreign exchange 
of the domestic economy. The resultant increase in remittance inflows shifts the 
production possibility frontier upwards vertically from TN to T’N’. By construction,  
the slope of the curve at point B (which lies vertically above point A), is equal to the 
slope of the curve TN at point A. But point B is not an equilibrium because the slope 
of the indifference curve passing through B (not shown) would be lower than the slope 
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 of the indifference curve at point C. In other words, the value placed by the consumers 
on nontradables relative to tradables at point C is higher than at point B.  
The real income of the consumer is higher at point B than at point A. At a higher 
income, the consumer desires to consume more of both tradables and nontradables.  
However, compared to point A, point B has equal amount of nontradables and higher 
amount of  tradables. Thus, point B is not an equilibrium point, provided the 
expenditure elasticity of demand for nontradables is not zero. The consumer 
substitutes nontradables for tradables, moving to the south-east direction from B. The 
new equilibrium occurs at point C, where the highest attainable indifference curve U2 
intersects the possibility frontier T’N’. Thus the increase in demand for the 
nontradables pushes up the relative price of nontradables to tradables, as the slope of 
the tangent Pc is higher than that of the tangent Pa. This, by definition, leads to the 
increase in real exchange rate.  
Remittance inflows can potentially have Dutch disease effects along the similar 
channels to the natural resource boom or capital inflows such as aid or the FDI 
(Adenauer & Vagassky 1998; Bourdet & Falck 2006; Rajan & Subramanian 2011; 
Wijnbergen 1985). The RER appreciation can be more pronounced in the case of a 
restrictive trade regime, the existence of full employment and a limited ability of 
consumers to switch between domestic and imported goods (Gupta et al. 2005). The 
impact on RER appreciation also depends on the exchange rate regime. In a floating 
exchange rate regime, the central bank sells foreign exchange, thus causing nominal 
and RER appreciation. In the fixed exchange rate regime, sustained domestic inflation 
raises the RER, with the higher accommodating government expenditure by the central 
bank (Gupta et al. 2005).  
Remittances can affect the RER mainly through three channels (Lopez et al. 
2007). First, the inflow of remittances increases the net foreign asset position of a 
country, which in turn affects the external equilibrium of the economy. Given that 
remittances are unrequited transfers to households, the impact of remittances and other 
capital inflows is likely to be different. For example, in the case of foreign aid there is 
an associated liability to repay the loan, and this will decrease the net foreign assets. 
Similarly, in case of foreign direct investment (FDI), the repatriation of the profits will 
decrease net foreign assets position.  
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 Second, remittances exert an upward pressure on the price of nontradables due 
to increased demand and also through the potential increase of reservation wage 
(Lopez et al. 2007, pp. 7-8). If an increase in prices in the non-tradable sectors is passed 
on to the consumers (but not in case of tradable sector to maintain competitiveness), 
this can lead to higher productivity in tradable sectors. This Balassa-Samuelson effect 
can cause real appreciation of the domestic currency (Balassa 1964; Samuelson 1964). 
The extent of this real appreciation depends on how remittances are spent in the home 
country. The impact of the RER tends to be higher if the money is spent on consuming 
goods and services, rather than on investments. 
The third channel is the impact on the RER through economic growth. However, 
the impact in this case is ambiguous, due to the offsetting impact of growth on the net 
foreign asset to GDP position, and any internal adjustment due to the Balassa-
Samuelson effect. Higher growth will lower the net foreign asset to GDP ratio, and 
this tends to decrease the RER while the higher internal demand will tend to fuel the 
prices of nontradables, thus causing real appreciation. Therefore, the net impact on the 
RER can be one that is appreciating, depreciating or has zero impact, depending on 
the relative strengths of these effects.  
The RER appreciation effect of remittances and capital inflows is complicated 
by the fact that the central banks often pursue an active policy of avoiding the 
appreciation of domestic currency. Thus, several countries adopt implicit RER 
targeting as a major objective of their monetary policy framework. Central banks often 
intervene in the foreign exchange market for several reasons: to stabilize the exchange 
rate as in exchange rate, e.g. pegs, crawls, or bands; to contain excessive exchange 
rate volatility; to correct any misalignment of the exchange rate which is considered 
inconsistent with the macroeconomic fundamentals of the country; and managing 
foreign exchange reserves (Basu 2014). Thus, the observed real exchange rate 
movement may not be a sufficient indicator of Dutch Disease effects of remittances.  
The theoretical discussion on the Australian model suggests that if the 
assumptions of the models are valid, then remittances inflows will increase the price 
of nontradables in response to an increased demand for both tradables and 
nontradables—that is, RER appreciates in the remittances recipient countries. 
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 3.2.2 Empirical evidence 
The empirical literature can broadly be classified into two groups: at the individual 
country level or at the multi-country or cross-country setting. The literature on the 
individual country studies focuses on the impact of remittance inflow on the real 
exchange rate using cointegrating equations and vector autoregressive models 
(Bourdet and Falck (2006)for Cape Verde; Petri and Saadi-Sedik (2006) in case of 
Jordan; Vargas-Silva (2009) in case of Mexico;Hyder and Mahboob (2006) and 
Makhlouf and Mughal (2013)in case of Pakistan and Edmira et al. (2013 ) in case of 
Albania).  
There are even fewer studies at the multi-country level. These studies often 
utilize a limited number of countries, including developed countries, in their analysis. 
They  find mixed results,  ranging from RER appreciation, to a neutral effect on the 
exchange rate, or even a depreciation effect. Table 3.1summarises the existing 
empirical studies on the impact of remittances and other financial flows to developing 
countries.  
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004) test the impact of workers’ remittances on 
the real exchange rate of 13 Latin American countries using the panel data from 1979 
to 1998. They find that a doubling of the workers’ remittances appreciates the real 
exchange rate by 22 percent. However, they conclude that foreign aid does not have a 
significant impact on the RER. The explanatory variables used in the studies include: 
per capita GDP as a proxy to estimate the Balassa-Samuelson effect; government 
expenditure to capture the impact on the tradable and nontradable sector; terms of 
trade; changes in external financial conditions proxied by US interest rate; and foreign 
aid.  
One of the novelties of the Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004)study is the use 
of instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity of remittances. Since 
remittances depend on the migration patterns, which are partly driven by push factors 
in the home countries (such as low economic growth), this in turn might affect both 
the RER and remittances. In order to control for the endogeneity, they use instrumental 
variables, such as the proportion of illiterate male adults age 15 and above; primary 
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 school enrolment rates; the rate of vaccination of children less than one year; crop 
production; and a livestock index. 
Acosta et al. (2009) examine the effects of remittance inflow on the RER using 
the ratio of tradable-to-nontradable output as dependent variables. They analyse both 
the spending and the resource movement effects of remittance inflows by using the 
real effective exchange rate index and the ratio of tradable output (the sum of 
agriculture and manufacturing output) and nontradable output (services). They find 
that remittances induce both the spending effects leading to real exchange rate 
appreciation and resource movement effects that favour the nontradable sector at the 
expense of tradable goods production. Moreover, they find that the real exchange rate 
appreciation is more pronounced in countries with a fixed exchange rate regime.  
Acosta et al. (2009) use the unbalanced annual panel data set of developing and 
transition countries from 1990 to 2003. Since the more advanced countries are not 
included in the sample, and the actual number of countries is not mentioned in the 
estimation, the generalization of the conclusion may be questioned. The control 
variables used in the study are FDI (as per cent of GDP), government expenditure 
growth, broad money supply (as per cent of GDP), trade openness (total trade to GDP) 
and GDP growth. They also interact the exchange rate dummy (fixed versus flexible) 
exchange rate regime, and employ the generalized method of moments (GMM) 
technique to estimate the equation and to address the endogeneity of remittances. 
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 Table 3.1 Summary of studies on remittances and real effective exchange rate 
 
Study Dependent variable Independent variable Estimator Period  
(country coverage) 
Instruments Findings 
Rajan and 
Subramanian 
(2005) 
Growth rate of value 
added of industry i in 
country j 
Initial industry share, 
financial independence 
interacted with remittance, 
labour share interacted with 
remittance and 
exportability index 
interacted with remittances 
Fixed effects, 
instrumental 
variable 
1980-2000 External 
instrument for 
aid 
Remittances do not 
seem to cause real 
exchange rate 
appreciation, whereas 
aid causes real exchange 
rate appreciation 
Amuedo-
Dorantes and 
Pozo (2004)  
Log of real exchange 
rate 
workers’ remittances, 
foreign aid; GDP per capita 
, terms of trade, 
government expenditure 
and US interest rate (all in 
logs) 
Fixed effects, 
instrumental 
variable 
Panel: 1979-1998. 
13 Latin American 
countries 
 
External Remittances lead to real 
exchange rate 
appreciation 
Lopez, Molina 
and Bussolo 
(2007) 
Change in log of real 
effective exchange 
rate 
Change in remittances (% 
of GDP), per capita GDP 
growth, change in terms of 
trade, government 
consumption (% of GDP), 
US- 6 month interest rate 
Fixed effects and 
Fixed –effects 
instrumental 
variable 
Panel (1990-2003), 
20 mainly Latin 
American countries 
External 
 
Remittances lead to a 
significant real 
exchange rate 
appreciation 
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Table 3.1 Summary of studies on remittances and real effective exchange rate (continued.) 
 
Study Dependent variable Independent variable Estimator Period ( country 
coverage) 
Instruments Findings 
Lopez, Molina 
and Bussolo 
(2007) 
Change in log of real 
effective exchange 
rate 
Change in remittances (% 
of GDP), per capita GDP 
growth, change in terms of 
trade, government 
consumption (% of GDP), 
US- six month interest rate 
Fixed effects and 
Fixed –effects 
instrumental 
variable 
Panel (1990-2003), 
20 mainly Latin 
American countries 
External 
 
Remittances lead to a 
significant real 
exchange rate 
appreciation 
Lartey et al. 
(2012) 
Real effective 
exchange rate 
Remittance(% of GDP) or 
remittance (US $ per 
capita), FDI (% of GDP), 
Non-FDI private inflows 
(% of GDP), government 
expenditure; GDP per 
capita; M2 (% of GDP), 
terms of trade, exports plus 
imports (% of GDP), 
growth of GDP 
System 
Generalized 
Methods of 
Moments 
(SGMM) 
Panel (1992-2003), 
100 developing 
countries 
Internal, 
external 
Remittance lead to real 
exchange rate 
appreciation and the 
effect is stronger under 
fixed nominal exchange 
rate regimes 
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Table 3.1 Summary of studies on remittances and real effective exchange rate (continued.) 
 
Study Dependent variable Independent variable Estimator Period  
(country coverage) 
Instruments Findings 
Barajas et al. 
2010 
Real effective 
exchange rate (log) 
Net foreign assets, 
government consumption to 
GDP, aid to GDP, terms of 
trade (log), real GDP per 
capita, Index of capital 
account liberalization, trade 
restrictions, administered 
agricultural prices; natural 
disaster, fertility.  
Fixed effects-
Instrumental 
variables; 
Dynamic least 
squares with fixed 
effects 
Panel data (1980-
2007), 79 countries 
(16 low-income and 
31 low-and-lower-
middle income)  
External Impact on equilibrium 
exchange rate is small; 
the appreciation results 
can overturn depending 
degree of openness and 
other factors 
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 In contrast, several other studies find that remittances are motivated by 
investment opportunities at home and are procyclical in nature (Lueth & Ruiz-Arranz 
2007). Also, remittances might be spent more on goods and services that utilize 
unemployed unskilled labour, and on imported goods (Rajan & Subramanian 2005, 
pp. 20-1). Thus, an increase in remittances would not lead to an increase in wages, or 
the price of nontradables tempering the impact on real exchange rate. The other reason 
why remittances may not lead to significant RER appreciation is that when the 
exchange rate is overvalued, migrants might not send remittances or prefer to send 
goods instead of cash (Rajan and Subramanian 2005). Since the overvalued currency 
tends to reduce remittances, the Dutch Disease(DD) effect of remittances may not be 
sustained (Rajan and Subramanian 2005). 
The recent comprehensive study by Barajas et al. (2011) analyses the potential 
“Dutch Disease” effect of inflows of remittances by looking at the effects on the 
equilibrium exchange rate of remittances. They use a simple, small open economy 
model to examine the result of an increase in remittance inflows leading to an 
equilibrium real appreciation and the conditions under which the effect could be 
reversed. They argue that due to the complicated macroeconomic effects of 
remittances, a permanent increase in remittances need not lead to an appreciation of 
the exchange similar to large exogenous capital transfers, as suggested by the 
“benchmark” of the standard model. The main reasons for this non-robust result, 
according to the authors are: 1) there is relatively little impact of remittances on highly 
open economies with flexible labour markets in which the factors of production can 
move easily between the traded and non-traded sectors; 2) remittances are 
countercyclical and are partially driven by domestic income. For example, high 
remittances increase domestic income, which in turn tend to exert an opposite effect 
on remittance inflow, thus limiting its long run impact on the equilibrium exchange 
rate; 3) it improved credit worthiness of a country as a result of the remittance inflows 
can consequently cause the deterioration of the net investment position, thus 
mitigating the impact on the long-run equilibrium exchange rate; 4) if the remittances 
are fully spent on traded goods, they would have little effect on the long-run 
equilibrium exchange rate. 
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 Barajas et al. (2011) use the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) with fixed 
effects, employing the data of developing and developed countries from1980 to 2007 
for 79 countries. Moreover, they include other explanatory variables such as capital 
account liberalization deviation, trade restrictions, administered agriculture prices, 
black market premium and natural disasters. They find that the effects of remittances 
on RER is not robust, depending on the specific countries being analysed and on the 
specific set of explanatory variables used in the cointegrating equations. They 
conclude that even when the coefficients of the remittances variable are statistically 
significant, they are very small in magnitude. They also find that there is regional 
differences in the impact, with Middle East/North African countries experiencing the 
greater appreciation. Thus, they conclude that the Dutch Disease effects may not 
materialize in countries with high remittance flows.  
Based on the panel data estimation, Barajas et al. (2011)find the remittance 
effects on the equilibrium exchange rate is not robust and the sign and statistical 
significance depend on the country sample selected, and also on other non-remittance 
variables included in the cointegrating equation. They argue that the appreciation 
effects of remittances are dampened by several factors, depending on the degree of 
openness, flexibility of labour markets, the countercyclical nature of remittance, 
patterns of expenditures on traded and nontraded goods, and the sensitivity of 
country’s risk premium to remittance inflows. They argue that the determination of 
the exchange rate is complicated by several factors, and depends on the country- 
specific situation. They conclude that the Dutch Disease effects seem to have greater 
effect more in richer remittance-receiving countries than less-developed countries, and 
in the latter case, the long run growth may not be compromised.  
In contrast to the majority of cross-country studies, several studies fail to detect 
a statistically significant relationship between remittances and REER, or even find a 
negative relationship between the two. Mongardini and Rayner (2009) estimate the 
effect of remittance on RER of Sub-Saharan countries and conclude that there is no 
appreciative effect of remittances in the long-run. They argue that the non-tradable 
sector in most of the conflict stricken countries in the study possess excess capacity in 
the non-tradable sector. Consequently, remittances are for ‘capacity utilization’ and 
hence there is no upward pressure on the price of nontradables.  
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 Similarly, in a study of six Central American countries for the period (1985-
2004), Izquierdo and Montiel (2006) find mixed evidence, depending on individual 
country. They find that remittances have no influence on RER for Honduras, Jamaica 
and Nicaragua. In case of El Salvador, remittances have a depreciating effect. They 
argue that these conflicting results can be attributed to the consumption behaviour of 
the remittances-recipient country. If the remittances are disproportionally spent on 
traded goods, then there will be no effect on the real exchange rate.  
There is also conflicting literature regarding the size of the impact of remittances 
on the RER. Some studies find that an increase in remittances leads to a significant 
appreciation of RER (Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo 2004; Lopez et al. 2007), while 
others find a small to moderate impact of remittances (Acosta et al. 2009; Barajas et 
al. 2011). The difference on the magnitude of the impact found in these studies may 
be due to the selection of the particular countries and the variables used to estimate 
the model. For example, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004) focus on Latin American 
countries, and do not include any monetary policy related variable as a control 
variable.  
There are very few studies which look into the differential impact of different 
types of capital inflows on the real exchange rate. Remittances differ from capital 
inflows such as aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) in several ways. First, 
remittances are considered to be a more stable source of foreign exchange. Several 
studies point out migrant workers are mainly motivated by altruistic motives and send 
more remittances in times of distress at home. Thus, remittances are countercyclical 
in nature. Second, as remittances are private transfers and accrue to a large number of 
dispersed and diverse households, their impact on domestic demand differs from that 
of large aid financed projects (The World Bank 2006). Thus, the spending patterns of 
the remittances and other capital are likely to be different, which result in differential 
impacts on the RER.  
In one of the earlier studies, Athukorala and Rajapatirana (2003) examine the 
impact of capital inflows on RER of several Asian and Latin American countries 
during the period 1985 to 2000. They emphasize the differential impact of foreign 
direct investment and other capital inflows on the RER. They argue that the impact of 
capital inflows depends on whether the countries belong to the Latin American region 
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 or Asia, and on policy response of those countries. They note, for example, that a surge 
of capital inflows in India and China during the early nineties was accompanied by a 
series of structural reforms and discrete devaluations (Athukorala & Rajapatirana 
2003, p. 620). Thus, despite increases in capital inflows, these countries experienced 
a depreciation rather than an appreciation of their domestic currencies. Thus, major 
capital-importing countries in Asia were better able to manage the capital inflows 
compared to the Latin American countries. 
Combes et al. (2011)analyse the impact of portfolio investment, foreign direct 
investment and private transfers on the real exchange rate. They find that among 
private capital flows, portfolio investments exert the highest appreciation effect, while 
the private transfers have the lowest effect. They argue that the magnitude of real 
appreciation due to FDI and bank loans are less compared to portfolio investment, as 
FDI and bank loans increase the productive capacity of the economy. They find that 
remittance have the least appreciation effect due to their countercyclical nature. Using 
the exchange rate market pressure index as a proxy, the authors find that exchange rate 
flexibility helps to dampen the appreciation of the domestic currency. 
 
3.3 Model 
Based on the theoretical and previous empirical evidence, the reduced form of my 
empirical model is formulated as follows.  
The dependent variable in my model is the real effective exchange rate, and the 
major explanatory variable of interest is the remittance inflows. The model to be 
estimated is given by:  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊𝒕𝒕 +  𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽2 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  ,……………………….(3.1) 
where𝑟𝑟 = 1, 2, … ,𝑁𝑁  𝑟𝑟 = 1, 2, … ,𝑇𝑇 and  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡= real effective exchange rate index of country i at time t ; Remit= remittance 
inflows (as percent of GDP) of country i at time t;  𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the vector of control 
variables including capital flows, among others; 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 is the country-specific fixed 
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 effects; 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 is the year dummy; and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  is the idiosyncratic error; 𝑟𝑟 = 1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁 are the 
number of countries and 𝑟𝑟 = 1, 2, … ,𝑇𝑇 is the number of years.  
The list of control variables in 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 and their expected signs are given below: 
ODA/GDP (in %) Foreign aid to GDP ratio (+/-) 
FDI/GDP (in %) Foreign direct investment to GDP (+/-) 
Trade/GDP (in %) Trade openness (-) 
Government consumption (in %) Government consumption to GDP (+/-) 
TOT  Terms of Trade (+/-) 
Financial openness Chinn-Ito Financial openness index (+) 
GDP per capita GDP per capita (+) 
ER regimes  Exchange rate regimes (+/-) 
Change in reserves    Change in reserves minus gold (-) 
The construction and transformation of the REER and remittances to GDP variables 
are given in Section 3.4.  
This section discusses the rationale for the inclusion of other explanatory 
variables (and their expected signs) in estimating the regressions. The variables 
definitions and sources of data, summary statistics and the correlation coefficients 
among these variables are given in the Appendix 3.1, Appendix 3.5 and Appendix 3.6 
respectively. 
Foreign aid to GDP ratio (+/-): An increase in the inflow of foreign aid leads to 
increased demand for both tradeables and nontradables. Increased demand for 
tradeables manifests itself as increased demand for net imports. For a small economy, 
an increased demand for tradables will have no price impact. However, increased 
demand for nontradables will be met either from unemployed resources, or from the 
tradeable sector—that is, either from export producers or import-competing producers. 
Thus, an inflow of aid will cause both the ‘spending effect’ and ‘resource movement’, 
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 and thus real appreciation. Most empirical studies also find the appreciation impact of 
aid inflows (Rajan & Subramanian 2005, 2011). 
Foreign direct investment (+/-) :The impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
on the real exchange rate depends on the sectoral allocation of the FDI. If the FDI is 
used to favour the tradable sector then it could have depreciative impact on the REER 
as this increases the productivity of the tradable sector. Generally, FDI is focussed on 
the tradable sectors and therefore tends to decrease the price of the tradable sector and 
thus depreciating the domestic currency (Athukorala & Rajapatirana 2003).  
Trade openness (-): This is defined as the average ratio of exports and imports 
to GDP. Openness is often taken as a proxy of trade liberalization, which can 
potentially increase the demand for tradable goods in the domestic economy, and 
decrease their price due to increased competition (Phillips et al. 2014). Thus, openness 
tends to lower the domestic price of tradables leading to a depreciation of the exchange 
rate. In contrast, protection of domestic industries through restrictions on trade (for 
example, tariff and non-tariff measures) leads to higher domestic prices and thus real 
exchange rate appreciation. Consequently, the lifting of trade restrictive measures 
proxied by an increased openness to trade would cause the real exchange rate to 
depreciate.  
Another interpretation of the impact of trade openness on real exchange rate is 
provided by Edwards (1989). When a small country liberalizes trade, it acts as a shock 
to the equilibrium exchange rate. Equilibrium exchange rate, which is consistent with 
both internal and external balance change in response to this shock. Thus, when a small 
economy liberalizes its trade, demand for importables increases and demand for 
nontradables decreases in response to the relative price change (Li 2004). Assuming 
the Marshall-Lerner condition holds, the real exchange rate depreciation is necessary 
in order to switch the demand from tradable goods towards nontradables to restore the 
equilibrium (Edwards 1989). There are some studies which show that a non-credible 
trade liberalization of uncertain duration could lead to a sharp increase in consumption, 
including that of nontradables, and cause real appreciation (Calvo & Drazen 1998).  
However, the theoretical and empirical literature strongly points toward the 
depreciative effect of trade openness (Li 2004).  
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 Government consumption (+/-): This variable is defined as the total government 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The impact of government consumption on the 
RER depends on both the sectoral composition of government consumption and inter-
temporal budget constraint ((Hyder & Mahboob 2006, p. 245; Montiel 1999). If the 
government expenditure largely falls on the nontradables, this leads to higher demand 
for the non-tradable goods. An increased demand for nontradable goods requires an 
increase in the relative price to maintain an internal equilibrium in the non-traded 
sector. The private consumption expenditure is crowded out in the long-run 
equilibrium. However, the reduction in private consumption of non-traded goods is 
smaller than the increase in government consumption. This is because the real 
appreciation induces an increase in the production of non-traded goods, allowing the 
accommodation of an increase in total spending on non-traded goods (Montiel 1999, 
pp. 279-80). For example, if an increase in  public wages is followed by higher demand 
for nontradables compared to tradables, it will appreciate the domestic currency. Froot 
and Rogoff (1995) and Froot and Rogoff (1991) find that for Euro Zone countries, 
government spending is a significant determinant of the real exchange rate. They argue 
that compared to the private sector, government expenditure falls disproportionately 
on the non-traded sector. Therefore, an increase in government expenditure leads to 
an appreciation of the real exchange rate.  
However, it is possible that a large share of government expenditure is spent on 
tradable goods. In that case, this will cause an incipient current account deficit which 
requires a real depreciation to restore the external balance (Montiel 1999, p. 279). As 
a consequence, the private consumption of traded goods falls. However, the increase 
in government spending is higher than the reduction in the private consumption, as 
real depreciation induces an increase in the production of traded goods. This will allow 
for the accommodation of an increase in total expenditure on traded goods.  
Terms of trade (+/-): Terms of trade is defined as the ratio of export prices to 
import prices. The impact of terms of trade on the real exchange rate is theoretically 
ambiguous depending upon the relative income and substitution effects. A rise in the 
terms of trade increases domestic income. Some portion of this additional income is 
spent on the nontradables pushing up the price of nontradables, and hence the domestic 
inflation (Gruen & Dwyer 1995, pp. 6-7). To restore the internal and external balance 
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 following a favourable terms of trade shock, RER has to appreciate in order to switch 
the demand from nontradables toward tradable goods (Edwards 1989). Thus, the 
income effect of an increase in terms of trade tends to appreciate the RER. On the 
other hand, favourable terms of trade, or an increase in the relative price of exportables 
compared to importables, induces substitution in consumption towards importables. 
Thus, an improvement in the terms of trade could potentially lead to a RER 
depreciation. If the substitution effect dominates income effect, then the impact of an 
increase in terms of trade will be negative, and otherwise it will be positive. However, 
the majority of the empirical studies find that the income effect dominates the 
substitution effects (Edwards 1989; Elbadawi 1994).   
Financial openness (+): Financial openness can lead to the development of 
domestic financial sector. A well-developed financial sector produces information ex 
ante about the possible investments and allocates capital; monitors investments and 
exerts corporate governance after providing finance; facilitate trading; diversification 
and management of risk; mobilize and pool savings; and eases the exchange of goods 
and services. Financial development helps to efficiently allocate capital towards the 
most productive sectors and avoid the flows of capital from being channelled into less 
productive sectors such as construction or consumption (Saborowski 2009, p. 5). Thus, 
a less-developed financial sector can shift the resources towards consumption goods 
or away from more productivity enhancing tradable sectors. Thus, the appreciation 
effect of capital inflows tend to be mitigated if the financial markets and institutions 
are well developed (Saborowski 2009).  
Financial liberalization, on the other hand, can also induce excessive risk-taking, 
increase macroeconomic volatility and lead to more frequent crises. Hence, countries 
adopt various policies to restrict the capital account transactions. Accordingly, there 
are several measures of financial or capital account openness (Chinn 2008; Edwards 
2005; Kose et al. 2003). These measures can be broadly classified into two groups: de 
jure and de facto. The de jure indices are usually based on the exchange rate 
classification, and an over 60 different types of control compiled in the Annual Report 
on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions by the IMF. However, 
these measures do not reflect the actual degree of financial openness, as the countries 
often depart significantly from their stated objectives or policies.  
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 In contrast, de facto measures take into account the actual exchange rate and 
capital account liberalization policies implemented by the countries. This study 
utilizes the de jure based Chinn-Ito index indicator of financial openness (Chinn & Ito 
2006).  This is based on the principal component analysis on the four major categories 
of current and capital account restriction measures from the IMF, namely: 1) 
restrictions on the current account; 2) presence of multiple rates; 3) policies regarding 
the surrendering of export proceeds; and 4) restrictions on the capital account 
transactions. The Chinn-Ito index has several advantages over other indicators. First, 
it classifies an economy into several categories and avoids the narrow binary indicator 
of capital account openness such as in (Rodrik 1998). Second, the index is regularly 
updated and freely available. 
 Exchange rate classification: The impact of remittances and capital inflows 
depend on the exchange rate regime. This regime is more complex than the simple 
classification of fixed versus flexible exchange rates as reflected in the de jure and de 
facto classification of exchange rate regimes. However, most previous studies do not 
include this variable as one of the determinants of the RER. The few studies which 
include this variable do so only as a fixed or flexible dummy variable. This study 
incorporates the ‘coarse’ classification of exchange rate, based on six categories on 
exchange rates by (Ilzetzki et al. 2008). In contrast to the IMF classification, the 
Ilzetzki et al. (2008) classification is based on the de facto classification of exchange 
rate regimes. 
In a fixed exchange rate regime, transfers and capital inflows tend to put upward 
pressure on the domestic price level. The impact of these flows on the RER depend on 
whether the flows are driven by autonomous factors or by an increase in domestic 
money demand (Combes et al. 2012; Singer 2010). A surge in remittances can 
potentially fuel a credit boom if the authorities do not sterilize these flows. The higher 
money supply and the consequent demand for goods and services exert an upward 
pressure on the price of nontradables. However, the effectiveness of the sterilized 
intervention to combat the inflationary pressure is debatable. It is often costly to 
sterilize the foreign exchange intervention as it leads to a higher domestic interest rate, 
further increasing the capital inflows and putting upward pressure on the RER (Calvo 
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 1991). Moreover, the central bank incurs a quasi-fiscal cost as the interest rates on 
foreign assets are often lower than the domestic interest rates. 
In a floating exchange rate regime, remittances and capital inflows affect RER 
mainly through nominal exchange rate appreciation. The nominal appreciation shifts 
the consumption away from non-tradable goods to imported goods which now become 
cheaper (Combes et al. 2011). Due to uncertainty in the nominal exchange rate, a more 
flexible exchange rate could discourage the short-term speculative flows (Calvo et al. 
1996; Lopez-Mejia 1999) . Hence, the flexible exchange rate regime tends to decrease 
those capital flows that generate real appreciation most. However, the long term 
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate can deteriorate the competitiveness of the 
economy. 
I also interacted the remittance with the dummy for exchange rate regimes. I 
categorized exchange rate regimes into fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes using 
the defacto classification (Ilzetzki et al. 2008). As most of the developing countries 
adopt the hard or de facto peg and pre-announced crawling peg, to generate enough 
variations in the data, I divided Categories 1 and 2 as a fixed exchange rate regime and 
from categories 3 to 6 as a flexible exchange rate regime (Appendix 3.2). I also 
interacted remittances with this dummy exchange rate regime in order to examine the 
effects of the level of remittances and exchange rate regimes on the REER. 
Per capita GDP (+): Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) argued that long-run 
movements in the exchange rates can be explained by the productivity differentials 
between traded and non-traded goods in economies with freely adjusting wages and 
prices. They observed that more-developed economies have higher prices of 
nontradables relative to tradables, when compared to less developed countries. The 
reason for this pattern is that the productivity growth tends to favour the traded goods 
sector compared to non-traded sector. The higher productivity growth in the traded 
sector bids up the wages in that sector, requiring an increase in relative prices of 
nontraded goods. To the extent that the productivity bias between the traded and 
nontraded sector is greater in developed countries, compared to less developed 
countries, this would cause a higher real exchange rate appreciation in more advanced 
countries.  
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 The empirical evidence for the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis on developing 
countries is mixed. Tica and Druzic (2006) provide a comprehensive review of the 
literature regarding the empirical studies on the Balassa-Samuelson effect. However, 
the divergences of the results may be attributed to the failure to address the key 
assumptions of the hypothesis (Dumrongrittikul 2012). These assumptions include: 1) 
traded goods are homogeneous across countries so that the purchasing power parity 
(PPP) condition is expected to hold in the long run; 2) there is slower productivity 
growth in the labour-intensive non-traded sector relative to that in the traded sector; 
and 3) the labour market clears and labour arbitrage ensures that wages in the traded 
and nontraded sectors are equal in each country.  
To capture the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, I include the GDP per capita term 
as one of the control variables. A more robust indicator would include the productivity 
differentials across various sectors of the economy. However, the data for the sectoral 
decomposition of productivities are not available for most of the developing countries 
for the period under study. I therefore use GDP per capita to capture the effect of 
anticipated bias in productivity in the relatively high income countries. Thus, a 
positive coefficient broadly conforms to the hypothesis.  
Change in reserves minus gold (-): Under an imperfect capital mobility 
assumption, foreign exchange intervention should affect the exchange rate. Central 
banks often intervene in the foreign exchange market to stabilize the exchange rate, as 
in exchange rate pegs, crawls, or bands. They do this to contain excessive exchange 
rate volatility; to correct the misalignment of an exchange rate which is inconsistent 
with the macroeconomic fundamentals of the country; and to manage foreign 
exchange reserves (Basu 2014). Interventions in the foreign exchange market change 
the net foreign assets or the foreign reserves of the central bank. Thus, in order to 
control for this behaviour, change in the international reserves is taken as a proxy for 
foreign exchange intervention.   
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 3.4 Data sources and variable construction 
The sample consists of 105 developing countries from 1980 to 2011 according to UN 
country classification (United Nations 2012).20 The list of 105 countries used in the 
main regression, along with the 10 developed countries included in the robustness 
checks are given in Appendix 3.3 and Appendix 3.4.  
The data for remittances is taken from the World Development Indicators which 
has data for inward remittances from 1970 onwards for a majority of countries. It is 
generally calculated as the sum of two components of the current account of the 
balance of payments: workers’ remittances and compensation of employees; and 
migrants’ transfers in the capital account according to the Fifth Balance of Payments 
manual by the IMF (International Monetary Fund 1993). These data do not include 
remittance from informal channels such as through ‘hundi’ or personal carriage (see 
Shonkwiler et al. (2008) for the compilation issues on remittances).  
Moreover, in contrast to settlement migration, contract and seasonal migration 
have been a feature of many developing countries. The seasonal and short term 
workers who stay less than one year in the destination countries, by definition, would 
not be counted as ‘residents’ of the destination countries according to the IMF’s 
Balance of Payments manual (International Monetary Fund 1993; Rienke 2007). 
Contract migration has been a special feature for the workers working in the Gulf 
countries, primarily from South Asian countries. Thus, the official figures on 
remittances might be underestimated. 
In contrast, Clemens and McKenzie (2014) argue that the recent surge in 
remittances in macro data may actually be overstated, rather than underestimated, 
based on the data on the growth of stocks of migrants and the incomes they earn. 
Assuming the constant proportion of the migrants who actually remit, they find that 
‘many countries have remittance growth rates that vastly exceed their migration 
growth rates, and that there is tremendous heterogeneity across countries in this 
context. Thus, there is a controversy regarding the true value of remittances.  
20 I intended to include 129 developing countries in my sample for the period 1976 to 2011. However, 
owing to the missing data for several variables, I was forced to restrict my sample size and period. 
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 Appendix 3.5 and Appendix 3.6 provide the summary statistics and the 
correlation among the variables respectively. 
3.4.1 Calculation of the real effective exchange rate (REER) 
Before estimating Equation 3.1, I calculate the REER for all the developing and 
developed countries. The RER between a given country and its trading partner country 
i at time t is: 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡× 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗        (3.2) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 is the price level of the home country, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗  is the price level in foreign country 
i, and 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the nominal exchange rate between the currencies of foreign country i and 
the home country, expressed as the number of foreign currency units per home 
currency unit. Nominal exchange rate is defined as the price of domestic currency in 
terms of foreign currency following the IMF’s convention. Thus, an increase in RER 
denotes the real appreciation of domestic currency and a fall in RER denotes the real 
depreciation. 
Taking logarithms of equation (3.2), and dropping the subscript i for simplicity, we 
can write (where the lower case letters denote the logarithms of the variables), 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡= 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡+𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡 − 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡∗        (3.2a) 
Suppose the price index is the geometric average of traded and non-traded prices:  
𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡= α 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝑁 +  (1 − α)𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 
𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡
∗= α∗𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁
∗ +  (1 − α∗)𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇∗  
Thus, 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡+𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇-𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇
∗+ [α (𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁−𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇) − α∗( 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁∗- 𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇∗)]    (3.3) 
or, 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 + [𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡]        (3.3’) 
Equations (3.3) and (3.3’) indicate that the real exchange rate can be expressed 
as the sum of two components: i) the relative price of tradables 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 , and ii) the relative 
price of nontradables in terms of tradables in both  domestic and foreign countries— 
that is, the intercountry relative price of nontradables in terms of tradables in the home 
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 country ω. If we assume that the price of tradables is the same around the world, then 
RER can be interpreted as the ratio of relativeprice indices of tradable goods to non-
tradable goods. Thus, the numerator of the right hand side of Equation 3.2 denotes the 
foreign currency index of tradables, and the denominator denotes the domestic 
currency index of non tradables (Kipici & Kesriyeli 1997; Perkins et al. 2006).  
But, in the real world a country trades with not only a single but also multiple 
countries, and thus in multiple currencies. Therefore, every country is affected by the 
movements of more than one bilateral exchange rate(Ellis 2001; Maciejewski 1983). 
Thus, the multilateral RER is calculated based on weights assigned to each bilateral 
exchange rate:  
                             𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡×𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓)  ,  (3.4) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 is the real effective exchange rate index of the given country estimated 
against the basket of N number of major trading partners, and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 is the domestic price 
index of the country, while 
𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 =  ∏ 𝑆𝑆(𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1   is the nominal effective exchange rate of the country under 
study; it is the geometrically weighted average of S(i), the nominal bilateral exchange 
rate between the country under study and the trading partner i.21Similarly, 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
(𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓) =  ∏ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑟𝑟)𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟=1   is the geometrically weighted average foreign price 
indices of N number of trading partners,  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑟𝑟)𝑡𝑡is the price index of trading partner i, 
while 𝑤𝑤(𝑖𝑖)is the weight of trading partner i, and N is the number of trading partner 
considered (Zsolt 2012). Thus, REER is the weighted average of the bilateral RER of 
major trading partners, that is,  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 =  ∏ 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖=1           ,          (3.5) 
where,  the weights, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖(which are applied to each bilateral real exchange rate, rer) sum 
to one. The RER calculated as mentioned above, reflects in essence, a broad summary 
measure of the prices of one country's goods and services relative to those of another, 
or of a group of countries(Ellis 2001). A rise in the RER index, as defined by Equations 
21 Exchange rate is measured as the foreign currency price of one unit of domestic currency so that an 
increase in the exchange rate implies appreciation and decrease in the exchange rate implies 
depreciation. 
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 3.4 and 3.5, means a real appreciation, or increase in domestic non-traded good prices 
relative to that of traded goods.22 
While calculating the REER a number of choices have to be made. 
These include: the choice of currencies in the basket; selection of the base period; price 
measures; and foreign currencies for computing bilateral real exchange rates. In 
addition, there are different methods for computing weights and aggregating different 
bilateral RERs. REER indices computed with different choices of the above factors 
may give different measures that will move in different paths.  
The different price indices used to calculate the RER are the consumer price 
indices, producer prices, export prices, GDP deflator, the prices of tradable goods or 
output prices, the price of an economy compared to the price of its imports, and relative 
unit labour costs(Chinn 2006; Driver & Westaway 2004; Ellis 2001; Jongwanich & 
Kohpaiboon 2013).  These different price indices do not move together in the short 
run, or even necessarily in the longer run; there is no unique measure of the real 
exchange rate (Driver & Westaway 2004). As a result, the REER indices computed 
based on different price indices give different results. 
This study constructs a new REER index using the GDP deflator as the domestic 
price and the wholesale price indices (WPI) of the trading partners as the foreign price. 
The foreign price index is obtained by total trade weighted geometric mean of the 
trading partners. All previous studies have used the consumer price indices for both 
the domestic price and foreign prices. However, the CPI basket contains a significant 
portion of nontraded components, which makes it less than ideal to represent trading 
partners’ price levels (Ellis 2001). At the same time, it has two main limitations as an 
indicator of the price level in remittance-receiving developing countries. First, being 
a politically sensitive variable, it is often prone to manipulation by the authorities, 
Second, in most developing countries, its coverage is limited only to the capital or 
major cities (Athukorala & Rajapatirana 2003, p. 3).   
22 RER is often taken as an indicator of competitiveness as a nominal depreciation matched by a 
positive inflation differential with trading partners leaves relative prices of domestic and foreign 
goods, expressed in a common currency, unchanged. Similarly, a nominal depreciation matched by a 
rising cost differential gives exporters no additional edge over foreign competitors (Chinn 2008; 
Rajan & Subramanian 2011).  
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 Mindful of these limitations, in this study I use the wholesale price index to 
measure the price levels of trading partner countries (foreign price index) and the GDP 
deflator to measure the price level of the given country (domestic price). In case of the 
foreign price index, by construction, wholesale price index is dominated by the 
tradable component and thus serves as a better proxy for the price of tradables. As 
regards the measurement of domestic price, the GDP deflator, has a wider coverage of 
domestic prices compared to the CPI, as it is derived from national accounts. Also, 
presumably, GDP deflator is less susceptible to manipulation by the authorities. 
Similarly, the weight attached to each of the bilateral exchange rates also affects 
the REER indices. The choice of the currency for the bilateral exchange rate and the 
weight attached to it is usually based on the importance of the foreign country to the 
domestic country’s international trade. Different weights that can be used to calculate 
the REER are import or export, total trade, country shares of GDP, and capital account 
weights (Ellis 2001).  
I use the fixed bilateral trade shares as the weight. This weight is widely used in 
the computation of REER indices and allows us to compare with the indices published 
by the IMF.23 The constant trade weight is used instead of the time varying weight, as 
it better captures the dynamics of movements in the nominal exchange rates or relative 
prices.24 I use all the bilateral exports and imports data available from 1976 to 2011 to 
construct the fixed bilateral trade weight using the World Integrated Trade Solution 
(WITS) database. To maximise the sample, the bilateral export and import data were 
replaced by the mirror data for missing values if the corresponding values were 
available. I then sum the bilateral export and import data for the whole period to obtain 
the total bilateral trade for each country. The trade shares of the bilateral trade are then 
taken as basis for the weights for the country pair. It should be noted that owing to the 
23 Recently, the weights have been calculated to reflect the countries with the potential to be the 
domestic country’s competitor in the third country markets and countries that are important in regional 
trade (Bayoumi et al. 2006).   
24One major problem with the time varying weight is that the REER changes can occur due to changes 
in either bilateral trade with one country, nominal exchange rates or the price differential. For example, 
suppose that the bilateral nominal exchange rate between A and B changes temporarily, but the 
exchange rate between A and C remains fixed for few years. Further, suppose that the bilateral exchange 
rate between A and B returns to the previous level after a few years. If the weights applied in calculating 
the REER changes with time, the REER will not return to the previous level, though the bilateral 
nominal exchange rate has returned to the previous level due to the possible changes in the weights. 
However, if we use a fixed weight such a problem is mitigated (Zsolt 2012).  
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 availability of the data and the trading partners, the actual number of trading partners 
varies country to country. These weights are used to calculate both the nominal 
effective exchange rate (NEER) and the foreign price index.  
The bilateral exchange rate data are taken from Penn World Table (PWT) and 
the World Development Indicators. The former reports the adjusted bilateral exchange 
rate data for the Euro Zone countries after the countries adopted the common currency. 
The bilateral exchange rate is calculated as an annual average, based on monthly 
averages in terms of local currency units relative to the US dollar. To maximise the 
number of observations, I use the bilateral exchange rates data from the World 
Development Indicators when the data is not available in the PWT. I then use the 
geometric means of the trade weighted bilateral nominal exchange rates converted into 
the base year 2007.  
The data on the wholesale prices were not available for all countries. For those 
countries, for which the WPI was missing for some periods, I use the corresponding 
GDP deflator to increase the sample size for estimation. The WPIs, which are used to 
construct the weighted foreign price index, are available for several countries which 
are the major trading partners for most of the countries. To test the total actual total 
trade weight covered by these countries, I estimate the trade shares of the countries in 
the sample and the average total was more than 85 percent. Thus, we can be confident 
that the major trading partners have not been dropped due to missing variables, and 
the computation of the REER index would not differ very much had all the WPI data 
been available. 
3.4.2 Construction of the remittances variable 
Before estimating Model3.1, I perform several operations using the data. Specifically, 
unlike in previous studies, I use the remittances and other capital inflow variables 
(foreign direct investment and official development assistance) into ‘constant dollar’ 
terms. This adjustment is necessary as the magnitude of remittance is affected both by 
the volume of remittance and changes in the nominal exchange rate. I first convert the 
remittance series into current local currency, and then convert it into the constant 
dollar by using the exchange rate of the base year (2007). To construct the remittance-
to-GDP ratio, I then use the real GDP of 2007, so that both the numerator and 
82 
 denominator variables are in real terms. This transformation of remittance and other 
capital inflows variables is a significant departure from the existing literature. 
However, I also use the conventional current remittance-to-GDP variable to check for 
the robustness of the results. 
Figure 3.2 presents the computed REER and the IMF’s REER indices (available 
from International Financial Statistics, and also reported by the World Bank in World 
Development Indicators). The REER thus calculated differs markedly from the REER 
calculated by the IMF.  
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 Figure 3.2 Computed REER vs IMF REER and remittances by country 
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 Figure 3.2 Computed REER Vs IMF REER and remittances by country (contd.) 
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0
2
4
6
8
60
80
100
120
140
160
1980 1990 2000 2010
Egypt
2
4
6
8
10
70
80
90
100
110
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
El Salvador
0
.5
1
1.5
2
100
150
200
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Ethiopia
0
.05
.1
.15
50
100
150
200
250
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Gabon
0
5
10
15
50
100
150
200
250
300
1980 1990 2000 2010
Gambia
4
6
8
10
12
70
80
90
100
110
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Georgia
4
6
8
10
12
100
105
110
115
120
125
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Grenada
0
5
10
15
80
100
120
140
1980 1990 2000 2010
Guatemala
0
.05
.1
.15
.2
35
40
45
50
55
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Guinea-Bissau
2
4
6
8
10
12
50
60
70
80
90
100
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Guyana
Computed REER(left axis) IMF REER(left axis)
Remittance/GDP(right axis)
87 
 Figure 3.2 Computed REER vs IMF REER and remittances by country (contd.) 
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 3.5 Estimation and results 
This study utilizes the fixed effects and system generalized method of moments 
(SGMM) methods to estimate the model. The empirical model is based on the fixed 
effects model. The specification starts with a linear model, 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 +  𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽1 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡   ,       𝑟𝑟 = 1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁   𝑟𝑟 = 1, 2, … ,𝑇𝑇(3.6) 
where𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡is the dependent variable; 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is a (1 × K1) vector of time varying covariates; 
α , β1 are 1+K1 parameters; µi is the country-specific fixed effects; γt are the time or 
year dummies; and ϵit  is the idiosyncratic error. If the µis are correlated with the 𝑿𝑿it, 
the coefficients on the time-varying covariates 𝑿𝑿it can be consistently estimated by a 
regression on the first-differenced data or within-transformed  
data— which is popularly known as the fixed effects model. If the µis are uncorrelated 
with the 𝑿𝑿it, the coefficients on the time-varying covariates can be consistently and 
efficiently estimated using the feasible generalized least squares method— known as 
random-effects regression.  
All of these estimators assume that E[ϵitϵis] = 0 for all s ≠ t. That is, there is no serial 
correlation in the idiosyncratic errors, which would otherwise cause the standard errors 
to be biased and the estimates to be less efficient. 
Table 3.2 presents the results of estimating Equation 3.6 using the full set of 
control variables and using the computed REER index as the dependent variable. The 
results show a positive sign of remittance-to-GDP ratio at a 10 percent level of 
significance. Thus, an increase of one percentage point in the remittance-to-GDP ratio 
will increase the REER index by 0.424 points with respect to the base year. In other 
words, an increase in remittance to GDP ratio by one percentage point, keeping all 
other variables constant, appreciates the real exchange rate index from 100 to 100.424. 
Thus, remittances lead to significant moderate increase in the real exchange rate of the 
recipient countries.  
Regarding capital inflow variables, it is interesting to note that the coefficient of 
foreign direct investment variable is negative and significant at 5 percent level. The 
depreciating impact of FDI may be attributed to its more favourable impact on the 
tradable goods sector. Thus, an increase in the FDI will enhance the productivity of 
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 the tradable sector and hence the price of tradables falls relative to the nontradables, 
which means real depreciation of the domestic currency. This result conforms with the 
earlier findings in case of several Asian and Latin American countries by Athukorala 
and Rajapatirana (2003).  
The impact of official development assistance on the real exchange rate is not 
conclusive. This might be due to the fact that the different components of foreign aid 
might have different impacts on the tradable and non-tradable sectors. Similarly, the 
coefficient of per capita GDP is positive and significant, broadly lending the support 
to the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. Thus, an increase in the per capita GDP by US 
$ 1000, for example, would increase the real effective exchange rate index by about 
4.5 points. However, as remarked earlier, GDP per capita is a crude indicator of 
tradable sector productivity relative to the non-tradable sector across the developing 
and developing countries. The coefficient of trade openness has an expected and 
significant sign. Trade openness is taken as a proxy for trade liberalization, which 
tends to lower the cost of traded goods. Thus an increased openness will lead to the 
depreciation of the real exchange rate. The estimation results show that an increase of 
one percentage point in the total trade to GDP ratio will lead to a decline in the REER 
index by 0.272 points.  
The impact of government expenditure is positive, though the coefficient is not 
significant. Thus, the coefficient tends to support weakly the hypothesis that 
government expenditure largely falls on the non-traded sector in developing countries. 
This increase in expenditure leads to an increase in price in the non-tradable sector, 
and therefore tends to appreciate the domestic currency. The terms of trade coefficient 
is positive and significant, indicating that the income effects dominates the substitution 
effect. An improvement in the terms of trade index by 1 unit increases the real effective 
exchange rate index by 0.158. 
Regarding the policy variable, the ratio of reserve change to GDP has the 
perverse (positive) sign. This might be due to the possible endogeneity of the variable. 
For example, countries are more likely to accumulate reserves at a time when currency 
is already strong, and to lose reserves to defend the weakening currency (Phillips et 
al. 2014). Thus, countries adopt the ‘leaning against the wind’ policy to prevent the 
possible depreciation of the currency and this renders the variable endogenous. 
96 
 Initially, I used the two instruments, 1) broad money supply to GDP to capture the 
crisis prevention motive, and 2) the U.S. real interest rate to capture the exchange rate 
stabilization motive as well as return on the reserves. However, these did not pass the 
weak instrument tests. So instead, I use these variables as control variables to capture 
the different motives for reserve accumulation. The coefficient on reserve 
accumulation becomes significant at the 11 percent level of significance. 
With regard to the capital account openness index, the sign is positive and 
significant at the 10 per cent level. Thus, an increase in the capital account index by 
one unit increases the REER index by 2.40. Regarding the impact of exchange rate 
regime, those countries adopting fixed exchange rate regimes tend to have a more 
appreciated domestic currency. For example, from the estimation, we can interpret that 
countries adopting a fixed exchange rate regime tend to have a ten units higher REER, 
compared to a managed float, or wider exchange rate arrangement. The degree of 
exchange rate impact decreases as the countries move towards greater flexibility of 
exchange rate, as shown by the lower coefficient of 5.89.  
I also interact remittance variable with a flexible exchange rate dummy. The 
coefficient for the exchange rate dummy is again negative and significant, confirming 
the patterns in Column 2. However, the coefficient of the interaction term is small 
compared to the exchange rate dummy, and not significant (though it has the 
anticipated sign).  
The marginal effect of remittances reveals that a one percent increase in the 
remittances to GDP ratio in fixed effects exchange rate regime increases the REER 
index by about 0.47 and the effect is significant at the 5 percent level of significance. 
Similarly, a one percent increase in the remittance to GDP ratio leads to an increase in 
REER index by about 1.08, for countries with flexible exchange rate regimes, and the 
effect is significant at the 5 percent level of significance. Thus, in the case of the 
flexible exchange rate regime countries, since both nominal exchange rate and 
domestic price levels are free to adjust following an increase of remittances, the point 
estimates suggest that REER appreciates more than for those countries with a fixed 
exchange rate regime.   
Table 3.2 Remittances and REER 
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   (1) (2) (3) 
Estimation method Simple FE FE with full controls 
FE with 
interaction 
Remittance /GDP (in %) 0.669*** 0.464* 0.467** 
 (0.248) (0.235) (0.235) 
ODA/GDP (in %) -0.0124 0.0245 0.0214 
 (0.189) (0.157) (0.164) 
FDI/GDP (in %) -0.157 -0.183* -0.161* 
 (0.149) (0.108) (0.100) 
GDP per capita (current ‘000 USD) 5.71*** 4.61*** 4.83*** 
 (1.09) (1.02) (1.07) 
Trade openness (in %)  -0.277*** -0.277*** 
  (0.0645) (0.064) 
Govt. expenditure/GDP (in %)  0.123 0.164 
  (0.282) (0.250) 
Terms of trade 0.093 0.144** 0.139** 
 (0.062) (0.057) (0.0589) 
Real interest rate differential  -0.0345 -0.0374 
  (0.063) (0.056) 
Reserve change/GDP  0.019 0.0188 
  (0.089) (0.089) 
Exchange rate (category 2)  -4.745  
  (4.952)  
Exchange rate (category 3)  -10.55**  
  (4.658)  
Exchange rate (category 4)  -10.20  
  (6.456)  
Exchange rate (category 5)  -14.97***  
  (4.217)  
Exchange rate (category 6)  -3.990  
  (6.268)  
Capital account openness (Chinn-Ito 
index)  2.301* 2.078* 
  (1.045) (1.050) 
Flexible exchange rate dummy (FER)   -9.413*** 
   (2.766) 
Remittance and FER interaction   0.619 
   (0.443) 
Observations 2,117 1,478 1,478 
R-squared 0.198 0.370 0.365 
Number of countries 117 105 105 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
REER (computed) is the dependent variable. The regression include time dummies and a constant. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. FE refers to the fixed effects.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 The significant appreciation result of remittances on REER disappears if the 
REER indices computed by the IMF are used. To compare the results with the 
computed REER and the IMF indices, I re-estimate the regressions with fixed effects 
and full controls. Since the REER indices are available for fewer countries or years 
compared to the computed REER, I use the same sample for the regression with the 
computed REER to ensure the comparability of the results (Table 3.3). 
The first column of the Table 3.3 shows that the impact of remittances on the REER 
computed by the IMF is not significant. The number of countries and observations 
dropped substantially compared to Table 3.3 as the REER data were available for 
fewer countries compared to the computed REER. To ensure the comparability of the 
results, Column 2 of the Table 3.3 shows the coefficients using the same sample as the 
first column. The result, becomes significant and positive if the computed REER is 
used as a dependent variable. The coefficient of remittances to GDP is higher than in 
the estimates using the full sample, which might be due to the smaller selected sample. 
Thus, the results demonstrate the critical importance of the method used to compute 
REER in driving the result for the impact of remittances on the REER.  
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 Table 3.3 Remittances and REER comparison 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 
FE with full controls 
(REER_IMF) 
FE with full controls  
(REER computed) 
Remittance /GDP (in %) 0.0889 0.955*** 
 (0.493) (0.303) 
ODA/GDP (in %) -1.205*** -0.383 
 (0.296) (0.386) 
FDI/GDP (in %) 0.108 -0.422** 
 (0.284) (0.209) 
GDP per capita (current USD) 4.93*** 4.70*** 
 (0.00142) (0.00128) 
Trade openness (in %) -0.201* -0.296*** 
 (0.101) (0.0910) 
Govt. expenditure/GDP (in %) 3.363*** 0.0477 
 (0.692) (0.440) 
Terms of trade 0.0190 0.223*** 
 (0.100) (0.0609) 
Real interest rate differential -0.0481 -0.0753 
 (0.0764) (0.0544) 
Reserve change/GDP 0.355 -0.0625 
 (0.340) (0.177) 
Exchange rate (category 2) -2.909 4.024 
 (4.323) (4.195) 
Exchange rate (category 3) 1.293 -0.614 
 (5.581) (3.931) 
Exchange rate (category 4) -15.80 3.599 
 (15.36) (5.107) 
Exchange rate (category 5) -20.50*** -10.35*** 
 (5.911) (3.854) 
Exchange rate (category 6) -0.348 2.894 
 (18.54) (10.70) 
Capital account openness (Chinn-Ito 
index) 8.039 -0.0489 
 (7.975) (5.266) 
 
Observations 725 725 
R-squared 0.540 0.403 
Number of countries 53 53 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. REER_IMF refers to the REER published by the IMF. 
Exchange rate categories (2-6) refer to the Itzetki et al. (2008) defacto classification of 
exchange rates (seeAppendix 3.3). The regression include time dummies a constant. FE 
refers to fixed effects. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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 3.5.1 A simple decomposition of REER effect 
The impact of remittance inflows on the REER can be decomposed into two 
components: the change in nominal effective exchange rate (NEER); and the change 
in the relative prices of domestic goods to foreign goods (Pw/PD). The relative 
contribution of the REER appreciation can be obtained by separately running the 
regressions, with the logarithms of NEER and the domestic and foreign price indices 
as the dependent variables.  
Table 3.4 presents the simple decomposition of the remittances impact on 
REER. It shows that one percentage point increase in the remittance to GDP ratio is 
associated with an appreciation of the REER by 0.43 percent.25 A rise in the REER is 
accompanied by an increase in the domestic price level by 0.99 percent. It is interesting 
to note that the source of REER appreciation mainly comes from an increase in the 
domestic price level, in contrast to the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. This 
increase more than offsets the decrease in the decrease in the NEER. The contribution 
of the foreign price in the REER appreciation is negligible as expected.  
This result is consistent with the Dutch disease model—that is, an increase in 
remittance inflows increases the price of nontradables which in turn increases the 
domestic price level. However, it is interesting to note that an increase of one 
percentage point in the remittance to GDP ratio leads to a decline in the NEER by 
about 0.62 percent. Thus, this result shows that countries may adopt policies to prevent 
the possible appreciation of the REER by devaluing the currency (also known as the 
‘leaning against the wind’ policy).  
  
25 The actual coefficient is 100*(exp(coefficient)-1) %. 
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 Table 3.4 Simple decomposition of the remittance on REER 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES log(REER) log(NEER) 
log(domestic 
price) 
log(foreign 
price) 
          
Remittance to GDP  0.00430* -0.00618 0.00985** -0.000625 
 (0.00223) (0.00482) (0.00390) (0.00367) 
     
Observations 1,478 1,478 1,478 1,478 
R-squared 0.388 0.131 0.807 0.720 
Number of country  105 105 105 105 
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include all control variables, time 
dummies and a constant (not reported). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
The results of this decomposition are depicted graphically in Figure 3.4. From 
the definition of the REER (Equation 3.2a) it follows that the sum of coefficients of 
the NEER and domestic price, and the negative coefficient of the foreign price should 
be equal to the REER.  
Figure 3.3 Decomposition of impact of remittances on REER 
 
Source: Author based on Table 3.4 in this study 
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 3.6 Robustness check 
This section presents the sensitivity of the results using 1) unit root tests, 2) sample 
containing the developed countries, 2) alternative definition of the RER and, 3) the 
results from the system GMM. First, to check for the stationarity, the pooled data for 
all the remittances and capital inflows variables are tested for the presence of a unit 
root, based on the assumption of trend and also without a trend in the variables. The 
augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillips-Peron unit root tests of all the variables reject 
the null hypothesis that all the panels contain unit roots. I also test for the presence of 
autocorrelation in the transformed variables, using the Wooldridge test (Wooldridge 
2002). This confirms that there is no autocorrelation in the actual data used for the 
estimation.26 
Second, I included the ten developed countries in the sample (see Appendix 3.4 
for the list of developed countries).27 The remittance to GDP ratio for the developed 
countries is much lower than for the developing countries. The estimation results show 
that remittance-to-GDP ratio is positive and significant.). The magnitude of 
remittance-to-GDP variable almost remains same at 0.464 compared to the restricted 
sample consisting of developing countries only. Other relevant variables also broadly 
conform with the sample consisting of developing countries only. 
Third, I employ a different definition of REER, that is, the ratio of tradable to 
nontradable prices. Since the data for these prices are not available, a proxy for the 
ratio of tradable and nontradable output is taken. The tradable output is defined as the 
sum of the manufacturing and agricultural output as a share of GDP, while the share 
of services to GDP is defined as the nontradable output (Lartey et al. 2012). The 
rationale for this choice is that manufacturing and agricultural output may contain a 
sizeable portion of traded goods, whereas services is generally dominated by the 
nontradable component.  
Tables 3.5 presents the regression results including nontradable-to-tradable 
output ratio as the dependent variable. The coefficient of remittance to GDP is 
26 The time series nature of the panel data is less of a concern, as the number of years in the actual 
sample of estimation decreased substantially due to missing observations for several variables.  
27 Though I intended to include all the 32 developed countries in the sample, owing to missing data, 
only 10 developed countries could be added. 
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 significant at one per cent level of significance, though it is higher than the earlier 
estimates. Official development assistance also has a positive impact on the 
nontradable-to-tradable output; however, the coefficient of FDI to GDP is not 
significant. All other explanatory variables have the correct signs (not shown).  
 
Table 3.5 Remittances and nontradables-to-tradables ratio 
 VARIABLES  
    
Remittance /GDP (in %) 0.780*** 
 (0.227) 
ODA/GDP (in %) 0.391** 
 (0.178) 
FDI/GDP (in %) 0.112 
 (0.217) 
GDP per capita (current USD) 1.93** 
 (0.940) 
  
Observations 1,338 
Number of countries 96 
R-squared 0.416 
Country fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The regression 
includes the full set of controls, time dummies and a 
constant (not reported).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
3.6.1 Tackling endogeneity 
The fixed effects estimation results may be biased due to the potential endogeneity 
problems. There can be several sources of bias. The first is the reverse causality 
running from real exchange rate change to remittance inflows. If the remittance 
senders are motivated by altruistic behaviour or investment incentive, then they might 
send more remittances when the exchange rate of the domestic currency depreciates. 
Thus, the remittance receiver will receive a greater amount of local currency. Also, 
the remittance receiver may also convert the foreign currency in anticipation of a 
possible future appreciation of the remittance recipients countries’ currency. 
Moreover, if we assume that remittance is a decreasing function of domestic real 
income, measured in units of traded goods—in this case, a real exchange rate 
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 depreciation reduces domestic real income (by reducing the traded-good value of non-
traded goods production), and increases the level of remittances (Barajas et al. 2011). 
In both of these cases, the reverse causality would cause a downward bias in the 
estimated coefficient of remittance to GDP.  
Moreover, central banks often intervene in the exchange rate market to maintain 
the peg, or to avoid excessive fluctuations in the exchange rate in response to REER 
changes. The change in reserves (included as an explanatory variable) is an imperfect 
measure of central bank intervention as the central banks have different motives 
(Mohanty & Berger 2013).  
Tackling the potential endogeneity bias is not easy. Several studies have used 
instrumental variables for remittances. It is well known that the quality and magnitude 
of the coefficients depend on the types of instruments used, and the results are quite 
sensitive to the choice of the instruments. It is hard to defend the exclusion restriction 
of instruments which cannot be tested. In the absence of a strong and ‘patented’ 
instrument of remittances, I use the system GMM method (Table 3.6). This method 
utilizes the ‘internal’ instruments from the lags of the explanatory variables.  
I assume that only the remittance variable is endogenous, and use all the 
available lags in the estimation. The coefficient of remittance is positive and 
significant, though lower than the fixed effects estimation method. The diagnostic tests 
for the system GMM shows that the model is adequately estimated. The number of 
instruments is lower than the number of groups or the number of countries in our case. 
Similarly, the Hansen test of over-identifying restriction shows that the results are 
robust, as the associated p-value is not too high. The Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in 
the first differences test rejects the null hypothesis that there is no second order serial 
correlation in first differences at the 10 per cent level of significance. The coefficients 
of all other explanatory variables have expected signs and are significant. Thus, 
utilizing the system GMM method does not alter the signs and significance of the 
remittance variables.   
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 Table 3.6 Robustness check including full sample and System GMM 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Full sample SGMM 
      
Remittance /GDP (in %) 0.464* 0.228* 
 (0.234) (0.137) 
ODA/GDP (in %) 0.0198 0.220*** 
 (0.157) (0.0778) 
FDI/GDP (in %) -0.175* -0.131 
 (0.103) (0.102) 
GDP per capita (current ‘000 USD) 4.53*** 1.67*** 
 (-0.945) (-0.602) 
Trade openness (in %) -0.279*** -0.136*** 
 (0.0637) (0.0429) 
Govt. expenditure/GDP (in %) 0.123 0.0327 
 (0.281) (0.215) 
Terms of trade 0.145** 0.185*** 
 (0.0570) (0.0563) 
Real interest rate differential -0.0331 0.00800 
 (0.0625) (0.0645) 
Reserve change/GDP 0.0313 -0.0543 
 (0.0884) (0.0995) 
Exchange rate (category 2) -4.691 -6.001 
 (4.880) (3.649) 
Exchange rate (category 3) -10.24** -13.77*** 
 (4.539) (3.642) 
Exchange rate (category 4) -10.04* -11.58*** 
 (6.208) (4.076) 
Exchange rate (category 5) -14.89*** -20.89*** 
 (4.153) (4.301) 
Exchange rate (category 6) -3.831 -23.65** 
 (6.261) (10.61) 
Capital account openness (Chinn-Ito index) 2.283* 1.592* 
 (1.406) (0.892) 
   
Observations 1,527 1,478 
R-squared 0.370  
Number of countries 115 105 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Number of instruments  85 
Number of groups  105 
Hansen test of over-identification restrictions, p-value  0.578 
AR(2) in first difference p-value   0.126 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include a constant and time 
dummies.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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 3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has undertaken an empirical analysis of the impact of remittances on the 
real exchange rate using the Dutch disease model to derive the estimation equation.  
The empirical analysis is based on a new REER index, which is more theoretically 
consistent compared to the standard IMF index widely used in the previous studies. 
The empirical evidence shows that remittance inflows can lead to significant 
RER appreciation compared to official development assistance whereas foreign direct 
investment leads to depreciation of the RER. However, I do not find an evidence of 
positive impact of remittances on the IMF’s REER series. The estimations suggests 
that a one percentage point increase in remittance to GDP ratio leads to an increase of 
about 0.5 and 1.08 increase in the REER indices for countries adopting the fixed and 
flexible exchange rate respectively. There is some evidence that as countries move 
towards more flexible exchange rate regimes, the magnitude of the impact of 
remittances on REER increases. A further decomposition of the results shows that the 
REER appreciation occurs mainly through nominal exchange rate appreciation for 
countries with flexible exchange rate regimes. However, for countries adopting the 
fixed exchange rate regime, the impact is mainly felt through the increase in domestic 
price.  
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 Appendix 3.1 Variables: definitions and sources 
Variables  Definition Source  
Remittances Sum of workers' remittance, compensation of employees and 
migrants' transfers in the balance of payments account 
World Development Indicators (2014) 
Bilateral exports and imports Bilateral merchandise exports and imports World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) 
database 
Nominal exchange rate  Annual average based on monthly averages in terms of local currency 
units relative to the US dollar 
Penn World Table, Version 8 and World 
Development Indicators (2014)  
GDP deflator The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local 
currency to GDP in constant local currency. 
Author's calculation based on the World 
Development Indicators 
Wholesale price index Wholesale price index refers to a mix of agricultural and industrial 
goods at various stages of production and distribution 
World Development Indicators 
Net official development assistance  Disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of 
repayments of principal) and grants  
World Development Indicators 
Net foreign direct investment Net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest in 
an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. 
This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less 
disinvestment). 
World Development Indicators 
International reserves minus gold Foreign reserves minus gold holdings Lane-Milesi Ferretti database 
GDP per capita Real GDP divided by population World Development Indicators 
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Appendix 3.1 Variables: definitions and source (continued) 
 
Variables  Definition Source  
Government expenditure to GDP General government final consumption expenditure includes all 
government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services  
World Development Indicators 
Exchange rate regimes IMF coarse classification of exchange rate regime Exchange rate regime Ilzetzki et al. (2008) 
classification database 
 
Trade openness Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic product. 
World Development Indicators 
Capital account openness index Chinn-Ito Index Chinn-Ito database 
Real interest rate differential Difference of real interest rate between the country and the US.  Author's calculation based on the World 
Development Indicator 
Manufacturing output Share of manufacturing output in GDP (%) World Development Indicators 
 
Agricultural output Share of agricultural output in GDP (%) World Development Indicators 
 
Services output Share of services output in GDP (%)  World Development Indicators 
 
Terms of trade                                  Percentage ratio of the export unit value indexes to the        World Development Indicators 
     import unit value indexes. 
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Appendix 3.2: Ilzetzki, Rienhart and Rogoff (2008) exchange rate regime 
classification 
 
The 'coarse' classification codes are  
Codes 
      
1  No separate legal tender       
1  Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement     
1  Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%   
1  De facto peg        
2  Pre announced crawling peg       
2  Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%   
2  De factor crawling peg       
2  De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%    
3  Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%    
3  De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%    
3  Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation and  
  depreciation over time)       
3  Managed floating        
4  Freely floating        
5  Freely falling        
6  Dual market in which parallel market data is missing.     
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Appendix 3.3 Coverage of remittance data 
Country  Year coverage  Country  Year coverage  
Afghanistan 2008-2010 Lao PDR 1986-2010 
Albania 1992-2010 Lebanon 2002-2010 
Algeria 1970-2010 Liberia 2004-2010 
Angola 2008-2010 Libya 2000-2006 
Antigua and Barbuda 1986-2010 Macedonia, FYR 1996-2010 
Argentina 1990-2010 Madagascar 1974-2005 
Armenia 1995-2010 Malaysia 1975-2010 
Azerbaijan 1995-2010 Maldives 1983-2006 
Bangladesh 1976-2010 Mali 1975-2010 
Belarus 1993-2010 Malta 1971-2010 
Belize 1984-2010 Mauritania 1975-1998 
Bhutan 2006-2010 Mauritius 1994-2010 
Bolivia 1985-2010 Mexico 1985-2010 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998-2010 Moldova 1995-2010 
Botswana 1975-2010 Mongolia 1998-2010 
Brazil 1993-2010 Morocco 1975-2010 
Burkina Faso 1974-2010 Mozambique 1987-2010 
Burundi 2004-2006 Namibia 1990-2010 
Cabo Verde 1977-2010 Nepal 1993-2010 
Cambodia 1992-2010 Nicaragua 1992-2010 
Cameroon 1979-2010 Nigeria 1987-2010 
Central African Republic 1980-1993 Oman 1980-2010 
Chile 1983-2009 Pakistan 1976-2010 
China 1982-2010 Panama 1977-2010 
Colombia 1976-2010 Papua New Guinea 1976-2010 
Comoros 1980-1995 Paraguay 1975-2010 
Costa Rica 1977-2010 Peru 1990-2010 
Cote d'Ivoire 1975-2010 Philippines 1977-2010 
Croatia 1993-2010 Russian Federation 1994-2010 
Djibouti 1991-2010 Samoa 1977-2010 
Dominica 1976-2010 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 1997-2010 
Dominican Republic 1970-2010 Saudi Arabia 2005-2010 
Ecuador 1976-2010 Senegal 1974-2010 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1977-2010 Seychelles 1989-2010 
El Salvador 1976-2010 Sierra Leone 1987-2006 
Eritrea 1998-2000 Solomon Islands 1999-2010 
Ethiopia 1977-2010 South Africa 1970-2010 
Gabon 1978-2005 Sri Lanka 1975-2010 
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Appendix 3.3  Coverage of remittances data (continued) 
Country  Year coverage  Country  Year coverage  
Gambia, The 1978-2010 St. Kitts and Nevis 1980-2006 
Georgia 1997-2010 St. Lucia 1983-2010 
Grenada 1986-2010 Sudan 1985-2010 
Guatemala 1977-2010 Suriname 1994-2010 
Guinea-Bissau 1991-2006 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 1977-2010 
Guyana 1982-2010 Tajikistan 2002-2010 
Honduras 1974-2010 Tanzania 1978-2010 
Hong Kong SAR, China 1998-2010 Thailand 1975-2010 
Iceland 1976-2010 Tonga 1975-2010 
India 1975-2010 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 1975-2010 
Indonesia 1983-2010 Tunisia 1976-2010 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 1993-2010 Turkey 1992-2010 
Iraq 2005-2010 Turkmenistan 1996-1996 
Israel 1983-2010 Uganda 1999-2010 
Jamaica 1976-2010 Ukraine 1996-2010 
Jordan 1972-2010 Uruguay 2001-2010 
Kazakhstan 1995-2010 Vanuatu 1982-2006 
Kenya 1970-2010 Venezuela, RB 1989-2010 
Korea, Rep. 1976-2010 Vietnam 2000-2010 
Kuwait 2010-2010 Yemen, Rep. 1990-2010 
Kyrgyz Republic 1993-2010 Zambia 2003-2010 
Lesotho 1994-2006   
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Appendix 3.4 List of countries in the regression sample 
Developing countries Developed countries 
Albania Guyana Russia Bulgaria 
Algeria Honduras Saint Kitts and Nevis Cyprus 
Angola Hong Kong Saint Lucia Czech Republic 
Antigua and Barbuda India 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines Estonia 
Argentina Indonesia Sao Tome and Principe Hungary 
Armenia Iran Senegal Latvia 
Azerbaijan Israel Sierra Leone Lithuania 
Bangladesh Jamaica Solomon Islands Poland 
Belarus Jordan South Africa Slovakia 
Belize Kenya Sri Lanka Slovenia 
Bhutan Korea, South Suriname  
Bolivia Kyrgyzstan Syria  
Bosnia and Herzegovina Lebanon Tajikistan  
Botswana Lesotho Tanzania  
Brazil Liberia Thailand  
Burkina Faso Libya Tonga  
Burundi Macedonia Trinidad and Tobago  
Cameroon Madagascar Tunisia  
Cape Verde Malaysia Uganda  
Central African Republic Maldives Ukraine  
Chile Mali Uruguay  
China, People's Republic 
of Malta Venezuela  
Colombia Mauritania Vietnam  
Costa Rica Mauritius Yemen  
Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) Mexico Zambia  
Croatia Moldova   
Djibouti Mongolia   
Dominica Morocco   
Dominican Republic Mozambique   
Ecuador Namibia   
Egypt Nepal   
El Salvador Nicaragua   
Ethiopia Nigeria   
Gabon Oman   
Gambia, The Pakistan   
Georgia Panama   
Ghana 
Papua New 
Guinea   
Grenada Paraguay   
Guatemala Peru   
Guinea-Bissau Philippines   
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Appendix 3.5 Summary statistics of variables 
Variable  Mean Std.          
Dev. 
      Min         
Max 
Real effective exchange rate overall 101.90 20.92 35.43 219.10 
 between  17.17 47.30 161.25 
 within  14.73 46.86 200.09 
Net remittance/GDP overall 3.93 6.54 0.00 51.99 
 between  6.79 0.00 30.29 
 within  3.08 -20.41 26.41 
Net ODA/GDP overall 3.14 8.17 -2.10 160.17 
 between  9.54 0.00 83.53 
 within  4.32 -44.77 79.78 
Net FDI/GDP overall 3.04 5.29 -12.19 59.27 
 between  4.66 -1.37 23.15 
 within  3.59 -17.48 41.46 
GDP per capita overall 2771 3462 110 25809 
 between  3973 141 25065 
 within  1369 -3343 12635 
Trade openness overall 76.47 39.17 10.95 364.59 
 between  40.22 23.70 289.13 
 within  13.86 9.72 151.94 
Government expenditure/ GDP overall 14.08 5.46 3.22 45.96 
 between  5.36 4.90 34.60 
 within  2.67 2.46 42.02 
Terms of trade index overall 102.34 31.27 24.98 323.31 
 between  26.65 54.44 287.60 
 within  15.70 44.71 206.97 
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Appendix 3.5 Summary statistics of variables (actual sample), continued 
 
Variable  Mean Std.        
Dev. 
       Min         
Max 
Real interest rate differential overall 3.47 11.32 -55.97 90.82 
 between  7.40 -14.95 43.20 
 within  8.76 -66.63 75.66 
Change in reserves/GDP overall 2.00 4.31 -17.11 43.33 
 between  2.59 -0.45 18.24 
 within  3.70 -18.72 37.88 
Capital account openness Index overall 0.43 0.33 0.00 1.00 
(normalized) between  0.30 0.00 1.00 
 within  0.19 -0.31 1.11 
Capital account openness Index overall -0.02 1.40 -1.88 2.42 
 between  1.31 -1.88 2.42 
 within  0.80 -3.19 2.90 
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Appendix 3.6 Correlation coefficients among major explanatory variables 
 
  
REER 
Remitt
ance 
/GDP 
(in %) 
ODA/GDP 
(in %) 
FDI/GDP 
(in %) 
GDP per 
capita 
(current 
USD) 
Trade 
openness 
(in %) 
Govt. 
expenditure/
GDP (in %) 
Terms 
of 
trade 
Real 
interest 
rate 
differential 
Reserve 
change/GD
P 
 Capital 
account 
openness 
index 
REER 1.00           
Remittance /GDP (in %) 0.01 1.00          
ODA/GDP (in %) 0.05
* 0.20*** 1.00         
FDI/GDP (in %) 0.06
* 0.25*** 0.45*** 1.00        
GDP per capita (current USD) 0.15
*** -0.07** -0.18*** 0.21*** 1.00       
Trade openness (in %) -0.08
*** 0.16*** 0.07** 0.31*** 0.31*** 1.00      
Govt. expenditure/GDP (in %) -0.02 0.05
* 0.09*** 0.05* 0.10*** 0.28*** 1.00     
Terms of trade 0.34
*** 0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 1.00    
Real interest rate differential 0.05
* 0.03 0.07** 0.03 -0.02 -0.09*** 0.02 -0.08** 1.00   
Reserve change/GDP -0.07
** 0.09*** 0.05* 0.12*** 0.07** 0.16*** 0.06* -0.05* -0.12 1.00  
Capital account openness index 0.08
*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.24*** -0.03 -0.08** 0.19*** 0.03 1.00 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001          
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Chapter 4 
Are expenditure patterns different for households 
receiving international remittances? Evidence from 
Nepal 
Abstract  
This paper examines differences in patterns of consumption expenditure between 
households who receive remittances and those who do not.  The analysis is based 
on a panel dataset culled from three rounds of nationally representative 
household surveys of Nepal. The estimations take into account the possible 
endogeneity of remittances using an instrumental variable approach. The 
findings suggest that remittances reshape household demand in ways that are 
independent of total consumption, and remittances- receiving households devote 
a higher share of total consumption on education and health compared to non-
remittances-receiving households. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Nepal is one of the top five remittance-receiving countries in the world, measured as 
a percentage of GDP (World Bank 2014). The ratio of remittances to GDP has been 
more than 10 percent of GDP since 2001 and exceeded more than 20 percent in recent 
years and are a major source of income for many households. The Nepal Living 
Standard Survey (NLSS) 2011 estimates that around 56 percent of households receive 
either internal or external remittances. Among the remittances- receiving households, 
around 80 percent of the remittance inflows come from abroad (Central Bureau of 
Statistics 2011). Apart from the macroeconomic impact of the remittances, they have 
contributed to a substantial decrease in poverty (Acharya & Leon-Gonzalez 2012; 
Lokshin et al. 2007).  
Despite the importance of remittances in Nepalese economy, the literature on 
the microeconomic impact of remittances is scant. The role in reducing poverty and 
increasing welfare crucially depends on how remittances affect the consumption 
behaviour of households. Though the role of remittances in reducing poverty has been 
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recognized, there is also a general perception that remittances are being frittered away 
in unproductive consumption such as luxury imported items. Moreover, theory 
suggests that remittances might induce behavioural changes in households, and this 
may impact consumption. This study attempts to analyse the impact of international 
remittances on the expenditure patterns of households in Nepal, utilizing the country’s 
most comprehensive household survey data.  
The contribution of this study is threefold. It presents the first causal evidence 
of the impact of remittances on consumption patterns in Nepal. I use the instrumental 
variable approach to address the possible endogeneity between remittances and 
consumption patterns. Second, the study attempts to construct a panel dataset of all 
three rounds of the Nepal Living Standard Surveys (NLSS) conducted in 1995, 2003 
and 2010.28 Third, I construct the consumption aggregates of major expenditure items 
in each survey round.  
Three key findings emerge from the study. First, international remittances exert 
a multifarious impact on household consumption patterns and induce behavioural 
change in the households. Thus, remittances reshape consumption pattern which is 
independent of the total household consumption. Second, the study finds some 
evidence that remittances-receiving households spend a higher share of total 
consumption on education, durable goods and health. This finding suggests that 
remittances are not used, on average, on ostentatious goods as previously perceived. 
This also supports the view that remittances play an important role in human capital 
formation at the household levels. Third, remittances are often an outcome of joint 
decisions of a household to send its members as a migrant, and therefore, it is an 
endogenous choice. I use the instrumental variable approach to identify the effects of 
remittances from unobservable households’ decisions which can both impact 
consumption and remittances behaviour. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a 
brief background of international labour migration and remittances in Nepal. Section 
4.3 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of remittances on 
household consumption and expenditure. Section 4.4 discusses the empirical model 
28 However, panel components are only available for the two consecutive rounds in the survey.  
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followed by the data sources in Section 4.5. Section 4.4.56 presents the estimation 
method for the empirical model. Section 4.7 discusses the empirical results, followed 
by several robustness checks in Section 4.8. Finally, Section 4.9 concludes. 
4.2 Background 
The history of labour migration in Nepal dates back more than two centuries when 
Nepalese went to Lahore to join the army of the Sikh ruler Ranjeet Singh (Seddon et 
al. 2002). However, the first recruitment of the Nepalese Gurkhas in the British Army 
in 1815-1816 marks the formal beginning of regular migration (Seddon et al. 2002). 
Due to the geographical proximity, and economic and cultural ties, large numbers of 
Nepalese go to India for seasonal as well as long-term employment. However, with 
the advent of globalization more Nepalese are going to other destinations primarily 
the Gulf countries, Malaysia and other developed countries.  
While Nepal has a long tradition of overseas employment, other factors have 
contributed to an increase in labour migration in recent years. Starting in the early 19th 
century, Nepalese have served in various armies in pre-colonial and colonial India. 
This tradition continues and Nepalese continue to be employed in the Indian and 
British armed forces. Earnings and pensions from these soldiers form a sizeable 
portion of remittances. 
Despite the long history of migration, the data on the number of Nepalese 
working abroad are patchy. The number is harder to estimate in the case of Nepalese 
going to India due to the open and porous border. Seddon et al. (2002), citing several 
other studies and based on their own research, argue that official statistics grossly 
underestimate the number of migrants and remittances received by the country, mainly 
due to illegal migration and remittances sent through informal channels. Moreover, 
the population censuses of Nepal have also underestimated the number of migrants 
due to an inaccuracy in accounting for the seasonal migration (The World Bank 2011a, 
p. 3).  
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Table 4.1 shows the migrant (the absentee population29) according to various 
population censuses.  
 
Table 4.1 Foreign migrant workers (absentee population) in Nepal (1942-2001) 
Year Total 
population 
Migrants 
 
Migrants 
(% of total) 
Male Female 
1942 628,3649 87,722 1.4   
1952/54 847,3478 198,120 2.3 173,619 24,501 
1961 974,1466 328,470 3.4   
1981 15,425,816 402,977 2.6 328,448 74,529 
1991 19,149,387 658,290 3.4 548,002 118,288 
2001 23,499,115 762,181 3.2 679,489 82,712 
Source:World Bank (2011) 
The migration received a further impetus after the 1990s when a large number 
of Nepalese started going to the Middle East and Malaysia, following the high labour 
demand in these countries. This was also prompted by the Nepalese Maoist 
insurgency, sluggish economic growth and reduced opportunities for employment 
domestically. Consequently, the amount of remittance inflows to Nepal has increased 
steadily over the last two decades. These remittances provided a cushion and help 
maintain the macroeconomic stability (The World Bank 2011a).  
As a result of rapid population and labour force expansion along with inadequate 
growth, the absorptive capacity of the domestic economy has been stretched. With 
limited arable land, landlessness is pervasive and the number of landless households 
has steadily increased in the agricultural sector. In the non-agricultural sector, the 
slowdown in growth (especially since 2000/01) due to the insurgency and exogenous 
shocks has further retarded the pace of employment creation. The armed conflict has 
also created difficult living and security conditions, especially in the rural areas 
(Adhikari 2011; Pant 2008).  
29 An absentee person is defined as an individual who stayed away more than six months during the 
previous year of the respective surveys.  
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An increasingly larger share of remittances now comes from countries other than 
India, reflecting changing migration patterns and accompanied by the higher wages in 
these countries. Moreover, the composition of skills of the labour flows is different for 
each destination. While migrants to the Middle East are employed mostly as security 
personnel, chauffeurs, and construction workers, the demand from South East Asian 
countries is in industrial enterprises. Monthly earnings for these workers are higher 
than those of Nepalese workers in India(Pant 2008).  
The inflow of foreign remittances (or international remittances)— that is, 
remittances sent home by Nepalese working abroad— has been a major contributor to 
maintaining the positive current account balance, as well as the overall balance of 
payments position (Figure 4.1).30 The ratio of foreign remittances to GDP reached 
around 23 percent, making Nepal one of the top five countries in the world.  
Figure 4.1 Remittance inflows in Nepal 
30 The comparable series for remittances in Nepal are available only from the year 2000 and onwards. 
The inward remittances figures in Nepal is taken from the balance of payment (BOP) statistics published by 
Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) which compiles data based on the balance of payments fifth manual by the IMF. The 
compilation of the BOP statistics is based on the concept of ‘residents’  defined as people who come to an 
economy and stay there, or are expected to stay, for a year or more. This poses problems when accounting for the 
seasonal and short-term migrants from Nepal who go to India and elsewhere and would not be defined as 
migrants. Moreover, due to the open and porous border with India, a significant number of Nepalese who go to 
India bring back remittances informally (NRB 2008). While the NRB makes some adjustment for the remittances 
that potentially are sent through informal channels (such as personal carriage and ‘hundi’) the remittances figure 
may well understate the true remittance figure. 
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International remittances are a major source of income for many households in 
Nepal. (Table 4.2).International remittances are increasing much faster than the 
domestic remittances or the remittances sent by the family members working inside 
Nepal (domestic remittances). Among the remittances-receiving households, the share 
of remittances from international or foreign sources contributed more than 80 percent 
of total remittances. For comparison purposes, Table 4.2 also presents the summary 
statistics for domestic remittances and remittances from India, which is the destination 
for the largest number of migrants from Nepal.  
Among the remittances-receiving households, these are a major source of non-
farm income. About 12 percent of the poorest quintile households receive remittances, 
whereas for the richest quintile, the figure is around 31 per cent. The share of 
remittance income among the bottom and top quintile is around 29 percent and 35 
percent respectively (Central Bureau of Statistics 2011, p. 84).  
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Table 4.2 Summary statistics of external and internal remittances in Nepal 
Description Nepal Living Standards Surveys 
1995/96 2003/04 2010/11 
Total remittance received (million NRs) 12,957.8 46,365.5 259,088.5 
Percent of all households receiving remittances 23.4 31.9 55.8 
Average remittances per recipient household (NRs) 15,160 34,698 80,436 
Share of remittances in total household income  26.6 35.4 30.9 
Source-country composition of remittances    
India 32.9 23.2 11.3 
within Nepal 44.7 23.5 19.6 
    Other countries 22.4 53.3 69.1 
Notes: Values in Nepalese rupees (NRs). Source: Compiled from NepalCentral Bureau of Statistics (CBS),  
Nepal Standard Living Survey 2010/11, Statistical volume II, p.80 
4.3 The impact of remittances on household consumption 
and expenditure: Theory and empirical evidence 
The impact of the remittances on the domestic economy crucially depends on the use 
of remittances by the households. The New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) 
emphasizes the role of joint household decisions in migration and consequently the 
decision to send remittances (Stark & Blackwell 1991; Stark & Bloom 1985). There 
is a conflicting view regarding how the remittances are spent. It is sometimes argued 
that remittances are frittered away in conspicuous consumption and ostentatious 
imported goods in the economy. However, some researchers show that remittances are 
used for human capital formation. Thus, the use of remittances by migrant households 
is an empirical issue.  
There are generally three strands of thought regarding the use of remittances by 
the households (Adams & Cuecuecha 2010). The first and the most prevalent view 
based on the behavioural assumption of microeconomic theory is that remittances are 
fungible (Christiaensen & Pan 2012). Thus, households do not distinguish between 
different sources of income. In other words, a household pools together all the sources 
of income and makes decisions on expenditure based on the total income, rather than 
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different sources of income. Thus, the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is 
independent of the sources of income.  
The second and more recent view, based on cognitive psychology, holds that the 
receipt of remittances causes behavioural changes at the household level (Adams & 
Cuecuecha 2010; Christiaensen & Pan 2012). This view contends that individuals and 
households compartmentalize different sources of income and use mental accounting 
when spending their income. The mental accounting approach also helps to clarify the 
seemingly irrational spending behaviour of household consumption. A review of 
literature by (Christiaensen & Pan 2012) reports various reasons for the use of mental 
accounting such as the ‘flypaper’ or ‘labelling’ effect, assignment of different MPCs 
as a self-control device and the level of effort exerted in obtaining the income. In 
particular they study the effect of earned and unearned income on consumption 
patterns in China and Tanzania. They find that people tend to spend the unearned 
income on less basic consumption items such as tobacco, non-staple items and other 
expenses, in contrast to spending earned income on more basic consumption items and 
education. Similarly, using the mental accounting approach to study the impact of 
remittances on household consumption behaviour in Malawi, Davies et al. (2009) find 
that remittance income exhibits a lower MPC than other income sources, and 
remittances are used more to fund education.  
The differential impact of remittances and other sources of income on household 
behaviours can arise due to the moral hazard problem between the remittance senders 
and recipients (Barham & Boucher 1998; Chami et al. 2003). First, recipient 
households might lower their work effort due to the transfers sent by the migrant 
household member. Second, recipient members substitute remittances for other 
sources of income.  
The third and more recent view is based on permanent income hypothesis which 
postulates that as remittances represent a transitory type of income, households tend 
to spend the remittance income more at the margin on human and physical capital 
investment (Adams & Cuecuecha 2010; Friedman 1957; Modigliani & Brumberg 
1954). Citing several studies, these authors argue that spending behaviour of 
remittances depends on the complex interplay between households’ socio-economic 
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characteristics and the emotional feelings invoked due to the level of efforts, as a self-
controlling device and demonstration effects. 
Remittances can also affect household expenditure through several channels, 
such as information from migration, uncertainty, and risk aversion and preferences. If 
the households receive information from migrants sending remittances, this might 
affect expenditure behaviour. For example, households might expand their 
consumption basket, which in turn generates demand for new goods, or through the 
adoption of better technologies of producing goods or services at home. Remittances 
received may also relax credit constraints on household production and influence 
investment and reallocate expenditure.  
Chami et al. (2003), citing several other studies, argue that there are three 
stylized facts to be gleaned from the literature. First, a significant amount (or majority) 
of the remittance is spent on consumption. Second, a significant, though smaller, 
amount of the remittance is saved or invested. Finally, the household savings and 
investment may not be productive to the economy. Therefore, he argues, remittances 
are used to finance a family’s consumption and increase their stock of wealth, but not 
necessarily that of the overall economy. Similarly, De Haas (2007) reviews several 
studies which conclude that a significant share of remittance income is spent on 
consumption only and, therefore, has a detrimental effect on the economic growth of 
the recipient countries.  
Barajas et al. (2009) argue that, in their impact on household expenditure 
patterns remittances are different from other private capital flows. They note that even 
though remittances might ease the credit constraints and provide macroeconomic 
stability for capital accumulation, these effects may not materialize, and even if they 
do it need not be a positive effect. The paper contends that since remittances are 
compensatory in nature, households with a higher marginal propensity to consume are 
more likely to receive remittances, and hence they may not invest significantly. 
Second, if the households perceive remittances as a permanent source of income, they 
tend to increase consumption rather than investment, despite the presence of credit 
constraints. Third, if the recipient country’s financial markets are developed and well 
integrated with the world financial markets, this might obviate the role of remittances 
in easing credit constraints and may not stimulate investment. Moreover, remittances 
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are spent in ways similar to other sources of income, based on the hierarchy of needs 
and mainly used for consumption (OECD 2005). Thus, Lowell and de la Garza (2000) 
argue that households spend their income based on the hierarchy of needs whatever 
the sources of income, and until the households reach a certain threshold of income, 
they exhibit similar expenditure pattern.  
In contrast, Adams and Cuecuecha (2010) and Edwards and Ureta (2003)argue 
that remittances can increase human and physical capital in the recipient households. 
Adams and Cuecuecha (2010) find that households receiving remittances in 
Guatemala spend less at the margin on key consumption goods such as food, compared 
to households who do not receive remittances. They also conclude that the remittance-
receiving households spend more on ‘investment’ goods such as education and 
housing. Similarly, Edwards and Ureta (2003) find that remittances receiving 
households in El Salvador spend their income differently from other sources of income 
and it has positive impact on school attendance and retention rates.  
To support this view, Yang (2008) utilizes a novel natural experiment using the 
East Asian financial crisis of 1997 to discern the impact of remittances on household 
expenditure behaviour. He finds that the favourable exchange rate shock stimulates 
spending on education significantly, and increases the likelihood of enrolment in 
schools. Several other studies based on household surveys of individual countries also 
find that remittances are saved and invested on productive assets (Adams Jr 1998; 
Mollini 2007; Osili 2007). Rapoport and Docquier (2005) cite several studies which 
show that remittances are crucial to achieving consumption smoothing, easing 
liquidity constraints and acting as mutual insurance. 
Any comparative analysis of expenditure shares of households with and without 
remittances needs to take into account the selection of migrants. Households receiving 
remittances might be different from households without, due to unobserved and hard-
to-measure characteristics: e.g. the former might have more motivated or more skilled 
members. Surveying the literature in the case of Mexican migrants to the US, 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) report that there are conflicting results regarding the 
selectivity of migrants in terms of education skills. 
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There is a very scant empirical literature related to remittances in Nepal—to my 
knowledge, there is no study on the impact of remittances on different categories of 
household expenditures in Nepal. There are a few studies which focus on the impact 
of remittances on particular aspects, such as poverty and inequality (Acharya & Leon-
Gonzalez 2012; Bohra-Mishra 2011; Lokshin et al. 2007), and on gender and school 
enrolment (Pivovarova 2011). These studies all utilize only the first two rounds of the 
Nepal Living Standard Surveys (NLSS) data. Bansak et al. (2015) examine the effects 
of household expenditures on human capital investment in Nepal using the third round 
of the Nepal Living Standard Survey (2010). They find that internal remittances 
contribute more to human capital investment compared to external remittances. 
Similarly, Vogel and Korinek (2012) using the second round of the Nepal Living 
Standard Survey (2003-04) find that remittances are spent disproportionately on boys 
education than girls’. 
4.4 The model 
Most household expenditure models are based on the assumption that a household 
allocates its budget across various expenditure categories in order to maximize the 
utility derived from the consumption of goods or services. In the standard consumer 
model, the total budget is generally assumed to be fixed, or it may be determined 
endogenously according to the labour allocation and/or production choices found in 
the agricultural household model (Singh et al. 1986). 
The first set of regressions estimates the impact of remittances on consumption. 
Since those household receiving foreign remittances are expected to have more per 
capita consumption after controlling for household characteristics and other relevant 
variables impacting on per capita consumption, the impact of remittances-recipient 
households on per capita expenditure is estimated using the following equation: 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔
𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡
= 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽ℎ + ∅𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑡𝑡 ,    (4.1) 
 
where, 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡
= logarithm of per capita expenditure in category x of household h at 
time t, while 𝛼𝛼0 = constant intercept, 𝛽𝛽ℎ=unobserved individual household fixed 
effect, 𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑡𝑡=household characteristics and regional dummy variables, 𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑡𝑡=dummy 
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variable for remittance (that is, whether or not the household receives remittances), 
𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡= period dummies and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑡𝑡 = idiosyncratic error terms.  
The main model consists of the modified version of the Engel’s curve, known 
as the Working-Leser model. Prais and Houthakkar (1971) wrote a comprehensive 
review and performed estimations of the following forms: linear, hyperbolic, semi-
logarithmic, double logarithmic, and logarithmic reciprocal. All these forms have been 
shown to have some advantages over the alternative forms for some of the goods or 
for part of the range of the relationship. Prais and Houthakkar (1971) conclude that 
the widely used double logarithmic and the semi-logarithmic forms perform better 
than the others in terms of goodness of fit. The choice of the functional form should 
not only be based on the practical criteria of goodness of fit, but also on the principles 
of demand theory. ne functional form that satisfies adding-up condition, and that is 
able to represent closely consumer behaviour, was originally proposed by Working 
(1943), elaborated on by Leser (1963), and widely used following the seminal work 
of Deaton and Muelbauer (1980). This form is known as the Working-Leser model, 
and relates the commodity budget shares to the logarithm of per capita expenditure: 
ybaw iii ln+=        (4.1a) 
      
This form satisfies the adding-up condition provided that the sum of the 
parameters ai estimated over all commodities in the household budget is equal to one, 
and that the sum of the parameters biis equal to zero. It allows for luxuries, necessities 
and inferior goods, and for elasticities to vary with income. Finally, the form is linear 
in the logarithm of expenditure, and is easily estimated by ordinary least square (OLS), 
with the adding-up restrictions being automatically satisfied. 
The Working-Leser model can be extended to include the binary variable 𝑅𝑅ℎ to 
capture whether or not the household receives remittances.   
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟 + 𝜑𝜑𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔 𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑟𝑟 + ∅𝑟𝑟𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑟𝑟 + 𝜀𝜀𝑟𝑟ℎ𝑟𝑟  ,    (4.2) 
 
where,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑡𝑡=share of expenditure of item i for household h(which ranges from 0 to 1) 
in round t of the survey (where t ranges from 1 to 3) while𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑡𝑡 = total expenditure for 
household h in round t, and𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑡𝑡= number of people in the household h in round t. In 
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other words, 𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑡𝑡
 = per capita expenditure of household h in round t, and𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑡𝑡 = vector 
of household characteristics and other variables that might affect the expenditure 
behaviour of the household, 𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑡𝑡= dummy variable representing whether the household 
receives remittances or not and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑡𝑡=idiosyncratic error term.31 
I use the actual per capita consumption rather than the income used in earlier 
studies, as consumption is more reliable than households’ self-reported income.  The 
control variables which affect the expenditure patterns include individual and 
household characteristics, as well as socioeconomic and geographic location. These 
variables can be grouped into household demographic characteristics, human capital 
variables and a proxy for wealth.  
The household demographic variables include the household size, age of the 
household head, average age of the household members, number of children of 
different ages and working-age adults. Accordingly, the age composition of the 
household members also influence their needs and the expenditure amount and needs. 
For example, a household with more small children needs to allocate less for 
consumption items such as food, and more for health expenditure. Similarly, the age 
of the household head indicates the composition of household members. For example, 
household which has an older head age tends to have a higher number of children who 
are born with a greater age difference between them, compared to other household 
with similar characteristics.  
Education of household head, measured as the number of years of schooling, is 
included as the human capital variable. The rationale for including this is twofold. 
First, the education level of the household head affects the earning potential of the 
members. A household with a higher per capita income allows the members more 
flexibility when spending their income. Consequently, households with higher per 
capita income tend to allocate their expenditure more on capital goods or other 
investments, as their basic consumption needs are met. Second, the education level 
31 I also use the actual value of remittances instead of the dummy in robustness check, since the 
related coefficients for remittances variables are very small and impacts are similar across different 
regressions, I focus mainly on the impact of the remittances dummy.  
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might be positively correlated with age, and this influences earning potential (as 
described above).  
Finally, the level of wealth needs to be included as a regressor. Even though an 
asset might be held in an illiquid form, it can indicate a prior high level of savings or 
social networks that confers gifts or income transfers. As an indicator of level of 
wealth, I include the per capita consumption and agricultural land possession and 
whether the household has a loan or not. This is due to the fact in developing countries 
like Nepal, poverty is highly correlated with landlessness and indebtedness.  
I also include the five regional dummies and a rural-urban dummy as the 
locational factors also affect the consumption behaviour.32 These dummies are also 
expected to pick up some of the spatial price differences of the consumption items. In 
addition, I have included the destination dummy for migrants in India. Due to 
geographical proximity, open border, economic and cultural ties a large number of 
Nepalese go to India for seasonal as well as long term employment. Therefore, 
migrants going to India are likely to differ from migrants elsewhere (Acharya & Leon-
Gonzalez 2012).  
4.5 Data 
The data come from three rounds of living standard surveys undertaken by the Central 
Bureau of Statistics of Nepal with the technical assistance from the World Bank. These 
surveys are based on a multistage sampling design and are nationally representative 
surveys which cover broad areas of demographic composition, housing, consumption 
expenditure, income by source, and employment. The first, second and third rounds 
of the survey were taken during the years 1995-1996, 2003-2004 and 2010-2011. The 
surveys consist of a cross-section of households and a small proportion of those are 
panel households. The number of cross section and panel households are given in 
Table 4.3.  
 
 
Table 4.3 Sample size of the Nepal Living Standard Surveys 
32The ecological region is divided into five major ‘development regions’ in Nepal. 
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Survey rounds Sample size Cross-section Panel 
First round (1995-96) 3370   
Second round (2003-04) 3912 2950 962 (first and second 
round) 
Third round (2010-11) 6961 5988 973 (second and third 
round) 
All three rounds   446 (first, second and 
third rounds) 
Source: Author based on (Central Bureau of Statistics 1996, 2004, 2011).  
The first comprehensive part of the exercise consists of estimating the 
consumption aggregates of the households in three rounds of the survey. The 
consumption items are grouped together into eight major items: food, tobacco and 
other non-food, consumption of durables, education, fuel, utilities, rental and health 
expenses. The consumption of food items are also broken down into four major 
categories (Table 4.4). The detailed estimation of the consumption aggregate and the 
relevant sections in the NLSS data are given in Appendix 4.1 and Appendix 4.2.  
Remittances in the NLSSs are defined as transfer in cash or kind received by a 
household over the period of last twelve months of the respective surveys. The amount 
of foreign (or international) remittances are the transfers received by a household from 
sender working or living abroad, while domestic remittances refer to transfers received 
within Nepal. Table 4.5 shows the summary statistics of the variables categorized 
under three types of household and according to the three rounds of the survey: those 
which receive 1) no remittances, 2) domestic remittances and, 3) foreign remittances. 
There was a small proportion of household (less than 4 percent of the remittance-
receiving households) which received both domestic and foreign remittances. These 
households have been assigned to the foreign remittances category.  
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Table 4.4 Components of major consumption categories 
Major items Components Detailed breakdown 
Food items Staple foods Grains and cereals, pulses and 
lentils 
Vegetables Eggs and milk products, 
vegetables, fruits and nuts 
Meat Fish and meat 
Other foods Cooking oils, spices and 
condiments, sweets and 
confectionary, non-alcoholic 
and alcoholic beverages, 
miscellaneous food products 
including meals taken from 
outside 
Non-food Tobacco  Tobacco and tobacco related 
items 
 Consumption of durables Inventory of durable items 
 Education Education and related costs 
 Fuel Fuel for cooking 
 Utilities Electricity, telephone, garbage 
collection 
 Health  Health and related expenditure 
Housing Rental value Rent or imputed rent if  
owner- occupied 
Table 4.5 shows that the proportion of households receiving foreign remittances 
increased substantially from around 11 per cent to about 30 per cent from round 1 to 
round 3 of the survey. Although size of foreign remittances-receiving households 
looks smaller than that of households not receiving remittances, they might be bigger 
as the absentees are not counted as the household members in the surveys.  
The value of average remittances has also increased significantly in the rounds 
2 and 3. Interestingly though, the per capita consumption of household receiving 
foreign remittances is lower compared to the households with no remittances or 
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domestic remittances. Similarly, the average education of the household receiving 
foreign remittances is lower than that of the non-remittance-receiving households. 
This suggests that the households which receive foreign remittances might be 
negatively selected or on average poorer.   
Regarding the demographic characteristics, the average age of the household 
head’s age, and the average age of the households receiving remittances, are lower 
than the household with no remittances; this conforms New Economics of Labour 
Migration (NELM) theory’s prediction. The number of children below six years of 
age, and between 6–12 years, seems to be higher, suggesting that there are more 
dependent age children in the foreign remittance receiving households. The number 
of adults above 15 years of age is higher in the first two rounds of the survey, but lower 
the third round.  
The proportion of households with loans is higher for remittance-receiving 
households except in the first round of the survey. Similarly, the proportion of 
households owning agricultural land is higher among those households. The 
proportion of households engaging in nonfarm activities is smaller among the foreign 
remittances households.  
For household consumption composition, the major portion of expenditure 
incurred is for food items, followed by non-food and tobacco items. Though the share 
of expenditure on food is declining in subsequent rounds, it still accounts for more 
than 55 percent of household consumption. However, there does not seem to appear a 
significant difference between the consumption share of food items among different 
categories of households. The share of non-food and tobacco items on total 
consumption is marginally higher in the first two rounds, though the difference is not 
significant. Households receiving foreign remittances seem to spend a marginally 
higher proportion of their consumption on education in the last two rounds of the 
survey, though the difference, again, is not statistically significant. Similarly, the share 
of durables consumption is marginally higher in foreign remittances-receiving 
households. With regard to the health expenditure share, this is higher compared to 
non-remittance receiving households except in the first round.  
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Table 4.5 Summary statistics 
 Round 1  Round 2 Round 3 
Description 
No 
remittance 
Domestic 
remittance 
Foreign 
remittance 
No 
remittance 
Domestic 
remittance 
Foreign 
remittance 
No 
remittance 
Domestic 
remittance 
Foreign 
remittance 
Sample size (in %) 76.59 12.69 10.71 68.08 14.06 17.85 44.24 25.72 30.04 
Per capita nominal consumption (Rupees) 7018 7717 6726 15444 15700 14476 41422 41960 40790 
Remittance (Rupees) 0 12326 18842 0 16800 48796 0 63063 124827 
Household size 5.815 5.364 5.282 5.449 4.507 5.213 5.014 4.544 4.876 
Household head education (number of 
years of schooling) 6.266 6.548 6.042 6.818 6.752 6.654 6.967 7.157 6.573 
Household head's age 44.23 46.22 45.71 44.82 48.73 46.08 46 46.68 46.61 
Average age of household 25.06 27.08 25.33 26.36 30.55 25.4 29.16 30.61 27.71 
Average number of children (below 6 yrs) 1.018 1.018 1.1 0.847 0.69 1.019 0.602 0.554 0.728 
Average number of children (6-12 yrs) 1.193 1.1 1.21 0.736 0.642 0.708 0.663 0.535 0.68 
Average number of adults (above 15 yrs) 3.388 3.752 3.758 3.307 3.197 3.465 3.102 2.875 2.843 
Household with loan (in %) 62.1 60.5 55.7 69.3 62.1 72.1 62.8 63.4 69.7 
Household with agricultural land (in %) 81.8 83 82.4 75.5 76.1 82.3 74 77.9 81 
Household engaged in nonfarm activities 
(in %) 22.5 21.3 14.5 30.2 21 13.4 38.1 32 26.5 
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Table 4.5 Summary statistics (continued) 
 Round 1  Round 2 Round 3 
Description 
No 
remittance 
Domestic 
remittance 
Foreign 
remittance 
No 
remittance 
Domestic 
remittance 
Foreign 
remittance 
No 
remittance 
Domestic 
remittance 
Foreign 
remittance 
Share of food in total consumption (wf1) 0.6943 0.6928 0.6992 0.605 0.6072 0.6093 0.5786 0.5695 0.5671 
Share of staple food  0.405 0.387 0.407 0.289 0.28 0.291 0.241 0.227 0.233 
Share of meat 0.0536 0.0558 0.0462 0.063 0.0662 0.0643 0.0833 0.0895 0.0861 
Share of vegetables 0.0897 0.106 0.099 0.106 0.117 0.11 0.0983 0.104 0.105 
Share of other food 0.146 0.144 0.147 0.147 0.144 0.144 0.156 0.149 0.143 
Share of non-food and tobacco (wf2) 0.148 0.137 0.147 0.173 0.164 0.171 0.145 0.147 0.148 
Share of rental income (wf3) 0.0891 0.1 0.0942 0.105 0.111 0.0947 0.101 0.103 0.091 
Share of education (wf4) 0.0416 0.0449 0.03 0.0567 0.0571 0.0607 0.0555 0.0569 0.0581 
Share of durables (wf5) 0.00692 0.00835 0.00622 0.0115 0.0088 0.011 0.0311 0.0289 0.0357 
Share of fuel (wf6) 0.014 0.0134 0.0149 0.019 0.02 0.0171 0.0159 0.0144 0.0127 
Share of utilities (wf7) 0.00337 0.00379 0.00121 0.0108 0.0103 0.00907 0.0242 0.0228 0.0267 
Share of health (wf8) 0.0356 0.0339 0.0342 0.0391 0.0443 0.0461 0.0496 0.0574 0.0608 
Source: Author’s calculation based on NLSS data. Figures are the weighted average at the household levels.  
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4.6 Estimation method 
The estimation method used are: 1) pooled OLS, 2) seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) in the context of unbalanced panel data and, 3) pooled OLS with the 
instrumental variables approach. Due to the highly unbalanced nature of the panel data 
and the very low number of households in the panel component, pooled OLS can 
provide a reasonable estimation. The coefficients from the pooled OLS and SUR 
models are used to compare the estimates from the instrumental variable regression 
method. The instrumental variable approach employs the data from only the second 
and third round of the survey, as the proposed instrument was available only for these 
rounds.  
The SUR estimation method is used because the error terms in the separate 
regressions can be correlated. The correlations among the error terms arise as the 
expenditure shares are related to each other and hence the coefficients from the 
separate regressions must sum to zero. In particular, an increase in the expenditure 
share of one group of expenditure category must be accompanied by fall in the 
expenditure share of one or more remaining categories. Thus the standard errors of the 
pooled OLS need to be adjusted to account for the correlations among the separate 
regressions.  
The SUR method is used to adjust the standard errors if there are correlations 
among the regressions (Cameron and Trivedi 2010, pp.165-166). I re-estimate the 
regressions using the panel SUR method, using random effect estimators based on 
Biørn (2004). This method uses a multi-step algorithm using generalized least squares 
and the maximum likelihood procedures in the context of unbalanced panel data 
(Nguyen 2010).33 
Generally, the fixed effects model is preferred rather than random effects, as the 
former takes into account the correlation between the unobserved fixed effects and the 
explanatory variables. However, there are two reasons why I employ the random 
effects model instead of fixed effects. First, decomposition of all the variables used in 
the estimations show that most of the variability in the data comes from ‘between 
variation’ and not ‘within variation’ (Appendix 4.3). In many cases, there is no 
33 The method is implemented using the Stata routine ‘XTSUR’ developed by Nguyen (2010).  
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temporal variation in the explanatory variables in the sample. As a result, it is difficult 
to identify the effect of remittances on expenditure patterns using the fixed effects 
approach. Thus, due to the very low within-variability of variables, the standard errors 
from fixed effects models may be too large to tolerate (Allison 2009). Second, due to 
very low number of observations in the panel component of the data, the fixed effects 
estimation results in the substantial loss of observations. Thus, due to substantial panel 
attrition, fixed effects may not produce reliable estimates.34 
4.6.1 Tackling endogeneity 
The pooled OLS estimations assume that remittances are exogenous to expenditure 
shares. However, decision to send family member to migration and hence remittances 
can be endogeneous to this process. Migrants are selective group of individuals who 
might differ from other households in both the observed and unobserved 
characteristics. For example, household with highly motivated household age may 
prefer to send family member for migration and simultaneously cut their expenditure 
on food or other items to finance the migration process. This suggests that migration 
and consequently remittances, are not predetermined. Rather it is an endogenous 
process shaped by some observed or unobserved characteristics which might influence 
the expenditure behaviours of households.  
Moreover, there can be other sources of endogeneity arising mainly from 
omitted variable bias. For example, decision to migrate and allocation of expenditure 
may be made simultaneously. The final objective is to identify how the migration 
decision affects the expenditure shares, the outcome variable of interest in this paper. 
But migration and remittance may also potentially react to the increase in expenditure 
shares of essential items may be due to a rise in prices. Thus, the household may decide 
to send a member abroad for work in order to finance higher expenses on food. The 
second reason endogeneity can arise is due to unobserved characteristics of migrant 
such as the risk averse nature, or motivation, of an individual which affects decision 
to migrate and also the expenditure patterns. The third source of endogeneity can arise 
due to consumer preference bias, which is defined as a household’s tendency to prefer 
34I estimated the model using fixed effects estimation. The coefficients have similar signs and 
magnitude but the standard errors are large, rendering most the coefficients insignificant. 
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certain types of commodities. This change in preference is distinct from the associated 
change in proportions spent on different goods due to the increase in total expenditure.   
Most of the studies in the literature use the instrumental variable method to 
identify the causal relationship between the remittances and expenditure behaviour of 
the recipient households. There have been various instruments used in the literature of 
migration and remittances. The choice of these instruments depends on the outcome 
of interest and on data availability. For example, the instruments which are valid to 
analyse the impact of migrants living abroad may not be a valid instrument when used 
to analyse the impact on households left behind. The instruments that have been used 
in the literature can be grouped into four categories: 1) economic shock, 2) cultural, 
historical, community and political factors, 3) distance, 4) natural shocks (McKenzie 
& Rapoport 2007). The cleanest strategy is to use a natural experiment or the external 
shock which impacts on migration or remittances, but not an outcome of interest.  
Yang (2008) uses the financial crisis of 1997 to construct the IV which affected 
the remittances flow but not the outcome variables. However, such natural 
experiments are hard to find in practice. Other researchers have used historical 
migration rates for current migration pattern and its effects on child health 
(Hilderbrandt & McKenzie 2005). Several other researchers have used historical 
migration networks at the village or household levels to identify the impact of 
migration, arguing that it affects the current migration and remittance patterns but do 
not affect education and food expenditure (Acosta 2006; Hanson & Woodruff 2002; 
Mansuri 2006; Woodruff & Zenteno 2007; Calero et al. 2009). Specifically, due to 
paucity of information in the rural areas about the job prospects abroad, the decision 
to migrate for work may be partly driven by the number of past migrants from the area 
and their experiences. In other words, the assumption is historical migration rates are 
exogenous, and it affects current migration and hence remittances, but does not affect 
current consumption pattern. This is justified because historical migration networks 
promote future migration (Calero et al. 2009; Munshi 2003). Specifically, as rural 
areas often lack information about job opportunities outside the area, the decision to 
migratefor work may be partly driven by the success stories of returning migrant 
workers that have benefitted from the higher salaries offered in cities. However, 
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historical migration rates are exogenous; they are in the past and, therefore, should not 
affect current expenditure. 
To address the endogeneity of remittances and expenditure shares, I use the 
instrumental variable approach. The instrumental variable used is the migrant network 
at the district level. The proportion of absentee population (defined as people who 
stayed more than six months outside of their usual residence during the previous year 
of the survey) in each district was extracted from the population censuses of 2001 and 
2010, conducted just before the NLSS rounds two and three respectively. The data on 
the absentee population were available only for the second and third rounds of the 
survey. The identifying assumption is that a past migration networks affect remittances 
through migration only, but it is uncorrelated with the expenditure behaviour of the 
households. 
A valid instrumental variable should be correlated with the endogenous variable 
(remittances) and should affect the dependent variable only through it impact on the 
endogenous variable. However, it is a well-established fact that the estimation results 
from the instrumental variable approach crucially rely on both the validity and strength 
of the instruments. A potential threat to the validity of this instrument is that not all 
the migrants send remittances, especially if they have migrated in the same year as the 
survey was conducted. When they arrive at the new place, it takes time and money to 
settle before they are able to send money back home. Moreover, the particular district 
might possess the characteristics which might affect both the remittances behaviour 
and the expenditure habits of the people living there. The unobservable household 
characteristics also can affect the expenditure patterns. To account for the regional 
differences in the consumption patterns, I have included both the regional and urban 
or rural area dummies in the estimation. The standard errors are clustered at the district 
level to account for validity of the instrumental variable at the district level only.  
With the above caveats and the chosen instrument, it is difficult to measure 
precisely the magnitude of the regression coefficients. Nevertheless, the district level 
instrumental variable can provide the broad direction of the impact of remittances on 
expenditure patterns.  
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4.7 Results 
This section first presents the empirical results relating to the impact of foreign 
remittances on per capita household consumption, controlling for other household 
characteristics. Then I present the results for the main model relating to the remittances 
and consumption shares using the pooled OLS, seemingly unrelated regressions and 
the instrumental variable method.  
Table 4.6 shows the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and the second column 
shows the random effects estimations of the impact of foreign remittances on total 
household consumption. The first two columns use the foreign remittance dummy 
variable, whereas Columns 3 and 4 use foreign remittance amount (in Rupees ten 
thousand) as an explanatory variable.  
Table 4.6 shows that households receiving foreign remittances spend about 15.3 
percent more on consumption compared to households without remittances (Table 4.6, 
Column 1).35 In terms of amount, an increase in remittances by ten thousand Rupees 
increases per capita consumption by about 0.4 per cent. Since the regressions do not 
control for the income variable, the effects of remittances on consumption could 
actually be much smaller.  
The size of the household has a negative relationship with per capita 
consumption. This can be due to a greater economy of scale in food preparation, 
minimising wastage and higher food price elasticity (Deaton & Paxson 1998). The 
education level of the household head exerts positive impact on per capita 
consumption in the pooled OLS estimation, but the coefficient is not significant in the 
fixed effects estimation. A priori, it is not clear whether the level of education of the 
household’s head encourages more consumption or saving.  
Similarly, the age of the household head and the number of children below 12 
years seem to be negatively associated with per capita consumption. The number of 
adults aged 15 years and above has positive association with per capita consumption. 
A household which has incurred loan has less per capita consumption. However, the 
35 The dependent variable is in natural logarithms, therefore the actual coefficient would be e0.143 -
1=0.154, I ignore the difference.  
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households with agricultural land seem to consume less, which is counter intuitive. 
One possible explanation is that the households which own agricultural lands might 
have under-reported their actual consumption of food items compared to households 
which do not own land, and hence the need to purchase food items. Households which 
engage in nonfarm activities seem to have a higher per capita consumption than those 
which do not engage in nonfarm activities. 
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Table 4.6 The impact of remittance on per capita consumption 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Estimator OLS RE OLS RE 
     
Remittance dummy 0.149*** 0.139***   
 (0.016) (0.016)   
Remittances (in Rupees ten 
thousand)   0.004*** 0.004*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Household size -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.093*** -0.091*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Household head education  0.067*** 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.064*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Household head's age -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Average age of household 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of children < 6 years -0.070*** -0.067*** -0.066*** -0.063*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Number of children age 6-12 years -0.002 -0.003 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Number of children > 15 years 0.063*** 0.061*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Household has a loan? -0.110*** -0.104*** -0.105*** -0.099*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Household owns agricultural land? -0.253*** -0.244*** -0.252*** -0.243*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Household has nonfarm activities? 0.167*** 0.159*** 0.163*** 0.156*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Destination India? -0.189*** -0.174*** -0.098*** -0.089*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) 
     
Constant 9.264*** 10.078*** 9.266*** 10.089*** 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.037) (0.040) 
     
Observations 8,541 8,541 8,541 8,541 
R-squared 0.722  0.724  
Number of households   7,774   7,774 
Notes. Dependent variable is log of per capita consumption. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
OLS refers to ‘ordinary least squares’ and RE refers to ‘random effects’. The regressions contains the 
dummies for three rounds of the survey, and regional dummies for five ‘Development Regions’.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
The second sets of results present the disaggregated effects of foreign 
remittances on the expenditure patterns of households, using the model from Equation 
4.2. Table 4.7 shows the pooled OLS estimation of the effect of the remittance dummy 
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and other household characteristics on the consumption shares of eight major 
consumption categories (Table 4.4). As the total consumption shares of the different 
categories sum to one, the sum of the coefficients of the remittances dummy across 
the estimations would be equal to zero.  
The results in Table 4.7 show that remittances receiving households spend more 
of their consumption shares on education, durables, utilities and on health expenses 
compared to their non-remittances-receiving counterparts. In particular,  
remittances- receiving households allocate 0.4 percent more of their total consumption 
on education and about 0.5 percent share more on durable goods. Also, these 
households spend greater share on utilities and health expenditures though the latter is 
not statistically significant. Similarly, these households spend a smaller share of 
consumption on food, fuel and rental, though the last is not statistically significant. 
This suggests that international remittances help to improve the education and health 
condition, both crucial determinants of human capital formation.  
With regard to other explanatory variables, they are in broad confirmation with 
the expected signs of the coefficients. For example, an increase in total per capita 
consumption by one percent will lead a decrease in food consumption share by about 
0.0015 percentage point. This conforms to Engel’s Law, which states that the share of 
food expenditure declines as income increases. 
Table 4.7 shows that the households that have loans spend more of their 
consumption share on non-food items and health. This suggests that households 
borrow money for the consumption of these items. Similarly, households which own 
agricultural land consume a higher proportion of consumption shares on food, non-
food and on health. These households allocate less of their consumption shares on 
rental consumption, educational expenses, fuel and utilities. Finally, households which 
engage in non-farm activities spend less of their expenditure shares on food and health, 
and increase their expenditure shares of the remaining items. 
There is a negative correlation between the household size and the share of 
consumption on food items. Several other studies have also found a negative 
relationship between household size and calorie intake per capita, suggesting that 
larger households tend to consume less calories per capita compared to smaller 
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households (Abdulai & Aubert 2004; Gibson & Rozelle 2002; Mollini 2007). Deaton 
and Paxson (1998) also found that in many countries, per capita demand for food 
decreases with household size.        
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Table 4.7 Determinants of household consumption shares: Pooled OLS estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Food 
Non-food 
and 
tobacco Rental Education Durables Fuel Utilities Health 
                  
Remittance dummy -0.013*** -0.001 -0.001 0.004** 0.005*** -0.001** 0.004*** 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Per capita consumption (logs) -0.139*** 0.018*** 0.042*** 0.022*** 0.028*** -0.003*** 0.011*** 0.021*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household size -0.011*** -0.000 -0.001 0.010*** 0.002*** -0.002*** -0.000 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Household head education  -0.004*** -0.001** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.000** 0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household head's age -0.000** -0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000** 0.000** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Average age of household 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of children < 6 years 0.011*** 0.001 0.005*** -0.027*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Number of children aged 6-12 years 0.006*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.002*** 0.001** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Number of children > 15 years 0.001 0.003*** -0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 0.001** 0.001* -0.003*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Household has a loan?  0.003 0.004** -0.015*** 0.002 -0.002** -0.002*** -0.001** 0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
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Table 4.7 Determinants of household consumption shares: Pooled OLS estimates(continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Food 
Non-food 
and 
tobacco Rental Education Durables Fuel Utilities Health 
Household own agricultural land? 0.029*** 0.005** -0.017*** -0.003* -0.000 -0.010*** -0.008*** 0.004* 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household has nonfarm activities? -0.012*** 0.002 0.007*** -0.003** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.003* 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Destination India? 0.007 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.005*** -0.000 -0.003*** 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
         
         
         
Observations 8,541 8,541 8,500 8,541 8,541 8,538 8,541 8,541 
R-squared 0.624 0.058 0.391 0.296 0.31 0.263 0.391 0.052 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The regressions include the regional, urban and round dummies and a constant.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Food items constitute a major proportion of expenditure shares of households 
with average shares of around 70 percent, 61 percent and 57 percent of total 
consumption for remittances receiving households in the three rounds of survey 
respectively (Table 4.5). Hence, a further disaggregation of food items is performed 
in terms of four major categories of food items: staples, vegetables, meat and other 
foods. Table 4.8 presents the impact of foreign remittances on the consumption of 
major categories of food items. The results show that the consumption shares of staples 
and other foods decline for remittance-receiving households. As many households in 
Nepal depend on subsistence farming, the absence of a male member might reduce the 
agricultural production and the remaining household members are forced to consume 
a smaller proportion of food items (Adhikari 2011). Though the total consumption of 
food shares is lower for remittance-receiving households, the shares of ‘superior’ food 
items such as meat and vegetables tend to increase. Thus, there might be some 
substitution of food items occurring from the staple and other items into more rich 
foods.  
Table 4.8 Determinants of household consumption: Decomposition of food 
consumption shares 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Share of 
staple 
Share of 
vegetables 
Share of 
meat 
Share of 
other food 
          
Remittances 
dummy  0.0068*** 0.0021 0.0037*** 0.0121*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
     
Observations 8,541 8,541 8,541 8,541 
R-squared 0.67066 0.07990 0.12646 0.10138 
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The regressions contain all the explanatory 
variables, round dummies and a constant.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Table 4.9 shows that the regression coefficients using the random effect SUR 
method. Compared to the pooled OLS, the signs of the coefficients are similar, though 
the impact of foreign remittances is now higher. Specifically, the coefficients for food, 
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education and durables are higher than the pooled estimates. Also, the impact of 
remittances on health expenditure share is also now positive and significant. Thus, the 
estimations confirms the findings that remittances-receiving households devote a 
higher proportion of their consumption to education, durable goods and health, and 
reduce the consumption share of food items. Regarding the coefficients of other 
explanatory variables, they are broadly in confirmation with the estimates from the 
pooled OLS.  
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Table 4.9 Determinants of household consumption shares: SUR estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Food 
Non-food 
and 
tobacco Rental Education Durables Fuel Utilities Health 
Remittance dummy -0.0412*** 0.0010 0.0011 0.0087* 0.0061* -0.0015 0.0051 0.0074*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.010) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
Per capita consumption (logs) 0.0657*** 0.0190*** 0.0082** 0.0056*** 0.0021 0.0023* 0.0002 0.0010*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Household size 0.0142*** -0.0017 -0.0057 0.0097*** -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0016 0.0007 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Household head education  -0.0118*** 0.0002 0.0022** 0.0025*** 0.0026*** -0.0003 0.0012*** -0.0011*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household head's age -0.0006*** -0.0003** 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Average age of household 0.0003*** -0.0005*** 0.0014** -0.0023*** -0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of children < 6 years 0.0350*** 0.0034 0.0015 -0.0333*** -0.0023 0.0018 -0.0001 0.0043*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
Number of children aged 6-12 years 0.0087*** -0.0002 0.0024 -0.0033 -0.0032 0.0007 0.0002 -0.0026*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
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Table 4.9 Determinants of household consumption shares: SUR estimates (contd.) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Food 
Non-food 
and 
tobacco Rental Education Durables Fuel Utilities Health 
Number of children > 15 years -0.0162*** 0.0015 (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
 (0.001) (0.002) -0.0108 0.0021 -0.0031 -0.0010 -0.0018 0.0106*** 
Household has a loan?  0.0046*** 0.0075*** (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
 (0.001) (0.002) -0.0122 -0.0026 -0.0037 -0.0087*** -0.0072** 0.0034*** 
Household own agricultural land? 0.0356*** 0.0073*** (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
 (0.001) (0.002) 0.0045 -0.0036 0.0067 0.0006 0.0016 0.0002 
Household has nonfarm activities? -0.0242*** 0.0048** (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
 (0.001) (0.002) 0.0850** 0.0343* 0.0187 0.0092 0.0195 0.0013 
Urban dummy -0.1951*** -0.0221* (0.037) (0.018) (0.025) (0.013) (0.012) (0.004) 
 (0.005) (0.012) -0.0055 0.0002 -0.0079 0.0002 -0.0042 -0.0013 
Destination India? 0.0250*** 0.0057 (0.021) (0.012) (0.015) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) 
 (0.003) (0.006)       
         
Observations 8,497 8,497 8,497 8,497 8,497 8,497 8,497 8,497 
Notes.Standard errors in parentheses. The regressions contain regional and round dummies.      
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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The results in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show that the coefficients, though statistically 
significant, are modest in magnitudes. I also estimate a separate system of regressions 
using the actual remittances amount (in ten thousand Nepalese rupees) instead of the 
remittances dummy as an explanatory variable (Appendix 4.4). The coefficients of 
remittances amount aresimilar in signs and significance compared with the remittances 
dummy as an explanatory variable, except for the coefficient on the consumption of 
fuel. A comparison of the results indicates that the impact of an increment of foreign 
remittances on expenditure patterns is less pronounced than the estimations using the 
remittance dummy. The coefficients are very small when using the actual amount of 
remittances. Thus, though the coefficients are statistically significant, they do not have 
much economic significance. In other words, given the households receiving foreign 
remittances, an increase in the amount transferred does not affect the expenditure 
patterns. 
Table 4.10 shows that the impact of remittances on expenditure shares using the 
instrumental variable. The instrumental variables are available for only the second and 
thirds rounds of the survey, and therefore the estimation is performed only for these 
rounds. For the instrumental variable regressions to be estimable, it must be identified. 
The necessary and sufficient condition for identification is that the ‘order condition’ 
and the ‘rank condition’ both should be satisfied (Baum 2006). The first stage 
regressions show that the instrumental variable has the correct sign and is significant. 
Moreover, for the coefficients to be unbiased, the instrumental variable should be 
strong, that is, it should not be correlated with other explanatory variables. Since the 
standard errors are clustered at the district level, the Kleibergen-Paap rk F-statistic is 
the appropriate statistic to detect the weak instrument (Baum 2006). The resultant 
statistic is 21.56, which is much higher than the rule of thumb of 10, which indicates 
to indicate that the instrument is not weak (Stock & Watson 2006, p. 441).  
Table 4.10 shows that the coefficients of the remittances dummy are similar in 
sign to the pooled OLS.36 The coefficients and the standard errors are now higher than 
the pooled OLS, which is expected as the variations in remittances come from the 
instrumental variable at the district level. The IV estimation shows that remittances 
36 Since the instrumental variable estimation is performed using only the second and third rounds of 
the survey, to make the results comparable, Appendix 4.5 reports the results of the random effects 
estimation using only the second and third rounds of the survey.  
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receiving households spend higher proportion of their consumption on education and 
durables compared to the non-remittances receiving counterparts. This result suggests 
remittances play an important role in increasing human capital formation. Similarly, 
the impact of other explanatory variables on expenditure shares are in line with OLS 
results though the magnitude of the coefficients are higher.  
These results conform to the earlier findings that households with remittances 
spent more at the margin on education in case of Guatemala and Ecuador respectively 
(Adams 2005; Calero et al. 2009). Edwards and Ureta (2003) also found that 
remittances lower school dropout rates in El Salvador. Similarly, consistent with 
earlier findings by Adams(2005) study on Guatemala, Taylor et al. (1996), Zarate‐
Hoyos (2004) and Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2009) studies for Mexico, I find 
evidence that remittances receiving household devote higher proportion of total 
consumption on health expenses. However, the impact on housing was not found to 
be significant. The latter might be due to the fact that housing represents the fixed 
costs and it may not increase proportionately with the increase in income.  
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Table 4.10 Determinants of consumption shares using an instrumental variable 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Food 
Non-food 
and 
tobacco Rental Education Durables Fuel Utilities Health 
Remittance dummy -0.089** -0.014 -0.043** 0.049*** 0.043*** -0.020** 0.048*** 0.027 
 (0.040) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019) (0.012) (0.008) (0.014) (0.026) 
Per capita consumption (logs) -0.133*** 0.021*** 0.049*** 0.016*** 0.022*** -0.001 0.007*** 0.019*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) 
Household size -0.012*** -0.001 -0.003** 0.012*** 0.003*** -0.002*** 0.001 0.003** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household head education  -0.004*** -0.001** 0.001* 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household head’s age 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Average age of household 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of children < 6 years 0.017*** 0.003 0.012*** -0.034*** -0.003** 0.002*** -0.002* 0.005** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Number of children aged 6-12 years 0.006** -0.002 0.004* -0.005*** -0.003** 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Number of children > 15 years 0.001 0.004** 0.002 -0.004*** 0.001 0.001** 0.000 -0.003** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household has a loan ?  0.002 0.005** -0.012*** 0.002 -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
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          …..contd 
Table 4.10 Determinants of consumption shares using an instrumental variable(continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Food 
Non-food 
and 
tobacco Rental Education Durables Fuel Utilities Health 
Household owns agricultural land? 0.030*** 0.005* -0.012*** -0.005** -0.001 -0.010*** -0.009*** 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Household has nonfarm activities? -0.017*** -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.010*** 0.000 0.006*** -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Urban dummy  -0.076*** -0.022*** 0.055*** 0.025*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.015*** -0.014*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Destination India? 0.077** 0.021 0.049* -0.047** -0.056*** 0.011** -0.034*** -0.021 
 (0.037) (0.021) (0.025) (0.020) (0.016) (0.005) (0.010) (0.026) 
         
Observations 6,857 6,857 6,857 6,857 6,857 6,857 6,857 6,857 
R-squared 0.554 0.037 0.277 0.094 -0.131 0.147 -0.020 0.011 
F-statistics  21.56 21.56 21.56 21.56 21.56 21.56 21.56 21.56 
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at district levels. Standard errors in parentheses. The regressions contain the regional dummies, round 
dummies and a constant.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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4.8 Robustness check 
This section discusses several robustness checks relating to the different sample size, 
possible outliers and the effect of domestic remittances on expenditure patterns.  
In particular, separate sets of estimations are performed using rounds two and 
three for the pooled OLS. The results show that the coefficients of variables have 
similar signs and magnitudes compared with the full sample. However, due to the 
panel attrition and small number of observations, the panel component is not fully 
representative of the whole pooled cross-sections (Central Bureau of Statisitics 2006). 
The number of households with at least two observations is 483, and with observations 
in all three rounds only 142.37 
Similarly, the pooled OLS regressions are re-estimated using the domestic 
instead of international remittances ( Table 4.11). However, the coefficients of the 
domestic remittances dummy are different from the international remittances dummy, 
and are not significant in most cases. Specifically, the coefficients of food share are 
not significant, whereas the share on durables have a negative sign. However, the share 
on the health expenditure is positive and significant. It might be speculated that due to 
the close proximity of the domestic migrants, they are able to take better care of the 
health of their families. The impact of domestic remittances on the education share is 
similar to international remittances though the coefficient is slightly smaller. It might 
be then be argued that international remittances induces behavioural changes at the 
household expenditure patterns which might be absent in the case of domestic 
remittances recipient households. 
 
37 Nevertheless, I re-estimated the results using the panel sample only; however the coefficients have 
similar signs, but are not statistically significant. 
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 Table 4.11 Determinants of consumption shares and domestic remittances: pooled OLS estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Food 
Non-food 
and 
tobacco Rental Education Durables Fuel Utilities Health 
                  
Domestic remittance dummy -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.003* -0.004*** -0.001** -0.000 0.006*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Per capita consumption (logs) -0.139*** 0.017*** 0.044*** 0.021*** 0.026*** -0.003*** 0.011*** 0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) 
Household size -0.010*** -0.001 -0.000 0.010*** 0.002*** -0.002*** -0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Household head education  -0.003*** -0.001** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000** 0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household head's age -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Average age of household 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of children < 6 years 0.011*** 0.001 0.003** -0.026*** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Number of children aged 6-12 years 0.005** -0.000 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.001* 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Number of children > 15 years 0.000 0.002** -0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Household has a loan?  0.003 0.005*** -0.014*** -0.001 -0.002** -0.002*** -0.001** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household own agricultural land? 0.026*** 0.006*** -0.016*** -0.003* -0.000 -0.010*** -0.008*** 0.005** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
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Table 4.11 Determinants of consumption shares and domestic remittances: pooled OLS estimates(continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Food 
Non-food 
and 
tobacco Rental Education Durables Fuel Utilities Health 
Household has nonfarm activities? -0.017*** 0.004** 0.008*** -0.002 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.003* 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Urban dummy -0.073*** -0.020*** 0.061*** 0.019*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.014*** -0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
         
Observations 8,412 8,412 8,366 8,412 8,412 8,408 8,412 8,412 
R-squared 0.613 0.057 0.377 0.285 0.302 0.255 0.368 0.048 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The regressions contain regional dummies, round dummies and a constant. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.9 Conclusion 
Remittances play an important role in the Nepalese economy and also in shaping the 
expenditure patterns of Nepalese households. I constructed data on consumption 
expenditure disaggregated into eight categories from the three rounds of the Nepal 
Living Standard Surveys. An empirical model is estimated to quantify the differences 
in the expenditure demands between the households who receive international 
remittances and those who do not. The modelling approach addresses the possible 
endogeneity of remittances using an instrumental variable approach. The findings 
suggest that remittances reshape household demand in ways that are independent of 
total consumption. Three main findings emerge from the study.  
First, remittances lead to higher consumption after controlling for household 
characteristics. Remittances have complex effects on household expenditures. Apart 
from augmenting the household income, remittances link households with 
international markets and cultures which might induce behavioural changes in 
consumption patterns including the substitution of purchased goods for own-produced 
goods. They might also change the households’ information set and the perceptions 
which alter the preferences, and hence the marginal utilities of consumption and 
investment.  
Second, remittances induce changes in the expenditure patterns. The results 
suggest remittances-receiving households devote a lower share of their total 
consumption of food items, holding total consumption and other household 
characteristics constant. Further decomposition of the impact of remittances on shares 
of food items shows that remittances-receiving households allocate a higher share of 
consumption on meat and other food (which includes meals consumed in restaurants), 
thus decreasing the share of staple food items.  
Third, an important inference of the study is that the argument—often made in 
Nepalese context—that remittances is frittered away on imported goods and 
unproductive consumption may not be true. While remittances-receiving households 
consume more than non-remittances-receiving ones, this study finds weak evidence 
that remittances-receiving households devote a higher share of remittances to 
investment goods, such as education, and to durable goods when compared to those 
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which are non-remittances receiving. Moreover, the results suggest that the 
households spend a greater expenditure share on meat and vegetables, which are more 
important sources of nutrition compared to staples and other foods. Moreover, the 
paper also finds some evidence to suggest that households receiving international 
remittances have different expenditure patterns compared to domestic  
remittances- receiving households.  
This study also finds that remittances significantly reshape expenditure patterns, 
but in different ways than the past studies have suggested. In particular, the propensity 
to invest more on education and heath seems to be considerably higher. In practice, it 
is difficult to disentangle the effects of remittances on expenditure patterns of 
households due to intra-household bargaining power, the preference of households for 
different consumption goods and prices prevailing in the market. No attempt is made 
to incorporate these in this study in the absence of the information about remittance 
senders in the surveys. Remittances might also induce several other behavioural 
changes at the household level including the labour supply and change in the 
expenditure allocation, due to changes in the household head gender, which all affects 
the expenditure shares of the households. A further analysis of these issues is an 
important avenue for future research.  
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Appendix 4.1 Computation of consumption aggregates 
The computation of consumption aggregates is based on the methodology described 
in the Nepal Living Standard Surveys reports (Central Bureau of Statistics 1996, 2004, 
2011). The consumption aggregates for all three rounds of surveys are computed by 
adding the consumption of goods and services by a household over a period of 12 
months. The consumption items are broadly classified into three groups: food, non-
food and housing. The detailed breakdown of the consumption aggregates used to 
calculate the shares of each of these categories is given in Table4.4 and the 
computation of each of the broad items is briefly described below.  
Consumption of food items 
Consumption of food items is the major component of expenditure for households, 
and is calculated based on the consumption of food items of around 70 items grouped 
under 12 categories. It is calculated as the sum of three components: food purchases, 
home production and receipt in-kind.38 The food items are broadly classified into four 
sub-groups: staples, vegetables, meat and other food items. Staples mainly consist of 
rice and cereals and pulses, the major staple food items in Nepal. Consumption of meat 
and fish items are considered to be ‘superior’ food items in Nepal. Similarly, the 
vegetables sub-groups consist of the vegetables, eggs and dairy products. The 
remaining food items are categorized under ‘other food’ items, including meals taken 
outside home. Consumption of tobacco and tobacco related items is excluded from the 
food items and categorized under non-food items.  
Consumption of non-food items 
Non-food items are broadly classified into expenditure on frequent and non-frequent 
items. The frequent items are categorized into fuels, apparels, personal care items and 
other frequent expenses. Non-frequent items are categorized into infrequent expenses, 
miscellaneous expenses and durable goods. According to the methodology developed 
38The annual consumption of food items is computed based on the consumption of each item using a 
‘typical month’ criterion which could induce a potential recall bias in the responses. All the three 
rounds of the survey have similar questions in the food categories, though under the “Miscellaneous 
food products” in category 13, there are more sub-items in the third round of the survey.  
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by the Nepal Living Standard Survey Reports, the following items of non-food 
expenditure are excluded when computing the total non-food expenditure:  
1) ‘Firewood’, due to difficulty in imputation and non-standard metrics. 
2) ‘Education’, the expenditure in this category is calculated separately comparing 
with the separate module on education.  
3) ‘Repair and maintenance and home construction and improvements’ are excluded 
as they represent an investment and also pose the risk of double counting 
4) Expenditure on ‘taxes and fines’ are excluded 
5) ‘Marriages, dowries, funerals, charity and other religious functions’ due to the 
lumpiness and short time horizon reflecting the household welfare 
 6) ‘Durable goods’, due to lumpiness of the investment and separately calculated as 
the consumption of durables reflecting the flow of services from durable goods. 
Consumption of non-food items consists both ‘frequent’ expenditure (such as apparel 
and personal care items, transportation and fuel) and ‘infrequent’ expenses. The 
depreciation rate is calculated for each durable item using the purchase cost in current 
prices, and year of purchase, in order to impute the annual flow of services provided 
by the items owned by the households.  
Expenditure on frequent non-food items 
The questionnaires on the consumption of non-food items ask both the monthly and 
annual consumption of these items. The annual expenditure on these items is first 
categorized into ‘regular’ and ‘non-regular’ groups. For the regular items, the annual 
expenses are computed by multiplying the monthly expenses by 12, whereas for the 
‘non-regular’ items the reported annual consumption is used.  
Expenditure on durable goods 
The expenditure on durable goods is calculated based on the flow of services provided 
by these goods, and on the year of purchase, the price of purchase and the household’s 
estimate of the current value of the item. The current price of the item is estimated 
based on the annual rate of consumer price inflation over the past 30 years. A rate of 
depreciation for each item is obtained using the formula, 
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𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 = �1 − �𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0� 1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖� , 
where 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓= current value per item, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖0 = purchase value per item and Ai= age of the 
item.  
The median depreciation is then computed for each item and converted to the current 
value, scaled back to the previous year to obtain the imputed flow of services provided 
by the durable goods.  
Consumption of utilities 
The annual expenditure of households on electricity, telephone and garbage collection 
were added to get the consumption of utilities. Expenditure on water is excluded from 
consumption aggregate.  
Consumption on education 
The consumption on education is calculated using the expenditure on tuition fees, 
uniforms, textbooks and supplies, transportation for each of the members of 
households attending schools. The value of scholarship received, if any, was also 
added.  
Consumption of housing 
The annual consumption of housing is calculated based on the monthly rents paid by 
the households; then this is multiplied by 12 to get the annual rent expenses. For the 
owner-occupied houses, or when the rent is free, the questionnaire asks the estimated 
cost of the dwelling. Despite this question, several observations on the rental values 
were missing for each of the three rounds of the survey. Moreover, some of the 
reported values were not reliable due to the very small or very large reported rent. The 
minimum cut-off points for all the rounds are kept at rupees 100 per month and the 
maximum permissible rent for the three rounds is Rupees 25,000 for first two rounds 
and Rupees 30,000 for the third round. In order to maximise the number of 
observations for further analysis, I estimate the rent for these households using the 
hedonic pricing model (Table 4.12).   
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Table 4.12 Hedonic pricing coefficients 
    
VARIABLES         Round I        Round II     Round III  
    
Log of area  0.111*** 0.205*** 0.158*** 
 (0.026) (0.022) (0.019) 
Number of rooms 0.108*** 0.103*** 0.114*** 
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) 
Has Kitchen 0.294*** 0.222*** 0.206*** 
 (0.035) (0.025) (0.024) 
Cement wall 0.023 0.281*** 0.272*** 
 (0.058) (0.043) (0.040) 
Cement foundation -0.481*** -0.367*** 0.213*** 
 (0.071) (0.048) (0.039) 
Roof material 0.179*** 0.238*** 0.180*** 
 (0.051) (0.031) (0.026) 
Windows  0.152*** 0.166*** 0.224*** 
 (0.040) (0.028) (0.026) 
Has piped water  0.007 0.089*** -0.088*** 
 (0.041) (0.028) (0.030) 
Piped inside 0.172*** -0.021 0.187*** 
 (0.062) (0.040) (0.033) 
Garbage 0.295*** 0.234*** 0.157*** 
 (0.079) (0.054) (0.044) 
Municipal sewage 0.164** 0.355*** 0.178*** 
 (0.080) (0.057) (0.054) 
Electricity 0.492*** 0.219*** 0.174*** 
 (0.059) (0.031) (0.027) 
Telephone 0.176* 0.471*** 0.270*** 
 (0.096) (0.052) (0.034) 
Road next to household 0.130* 0.217*** 0.397*** 
 (0.066) (0.043) (0.034) 
Log of assets 0.149*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) 
Constant 3.350*** 3.499*** 3.886*** 
 (0.197) (0.144) (0.126) 
    
Observations 2,075 3,547 5,913 
R-squared 0.672 0.701 0.622 
Adjusted R-squared 0.669 0.700 0.620 
Notes. Dependent variable is log of rent. Standard errors in parentheses. Round I, 
II and III refer to the three NLSS rounds respectively. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Appendix 4.2 Computation of consumption aggregate (relevant sections of the 
questionnaires) 
 
Major 
items 
Components Detailed 
breakdown 
NLSS I NLSS II NLSS III 
Food 
items 
Staple food Grains and 
cereals, pulses 
and lentils 
Section 5 
(1 and 2) 
Section 5 
(1 and 2) 
Section 5 
(010, 020) 
Vegetables Eggs and milk 
products, 
vegetables 
Section 5 
( 3 and 
5) 
Section 3 
and 5) 
Section 5 
(030, 050) 
Meat Fish and meat, 
fruits and nuts 
Section 5 
(6 and 7) 
Section 5 
(6 and 7) 
Section 5 
(060, 070) 
Other foods Cooking oils, 
spices and 
condiments, 
sweets and 
confectionary, 
non-alcoholic 
and alcoholic 
beverages, 
miscellaneous 
food products 
including meals 
taken outside the 
home 
Section 5 
(4, 8, 9, 
10, 11, 
13) 
Section 5 
(4, 8, 9, 
10, 11, 
13) 
Section 5 
(040, 080, 
090, 100, 
110, 130) 
Non-
food 
Tobacco  Tobacco and 
tobacco related 
items 
Section 5 
(12) 
Section 5 
(12) 
Section 5 
(120) 
 Consumption of 
durables 
Inventory of 
durable items 
Section 6 
(c) 
Section 6 
(c)  
Section 6 
(c) 
 Education Education and 
related costs 
Section 7 
(c), 
section 6 
(A) 
Section 7 
(c), 
section 
6(A) 
Section 7, 
Section 6 
(a) 
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Appendix 4.2 Computation of consumption aggregate (relevant sections of the 
questionnaires),continued 
Major 
items 
Components Detail 
breakdown 
NLSS I NLSS II NLSS III 
 Fuel Fuels for 
cooking 
Section 6 
(A) 
 Section 6 
(a)  
 Utilities Electricity, 
telephone, 
garbage 
collection 
Section 2 
(C),  
Section 2 
(C),  
Section 2  
Housing Rental value Rents or imputed 
rent if owner 
occupied 
Section 
3, section 
6 (c), 
sections 
2 (A and 
B) 
Section 
3, section 
6 (c), 
sections 
2 (A and 
B) 
Section 3, 
Section 6 
(c), section 
2 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (1996, 2004, 2011). NLSS I, NLSS II and NLSS III refer to the 
first, second and third rounds of the NLSS respectively. 
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Appendix 4.3 Summary statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
       
Share of food (wf1) in total consumption overall 0.532 0.176 0.037 0.955 N =6857 
 between  0.175 0.037 0.955 n =    6472 
 within  0.024 0.220 0.844 T-bar = 1.06 
       
Share of non-food and tobacco (wf2) overall 0.159 0.078 0.013 0.875 N =    6857 
 between  0.077 0.013 0.767 n =    6472 
 within  0.018 -0.228 0.546 T-bar = 1.06 
       
Share of rental income (wf3) overall 0.126 0.110 0.003 0.836 N =    6857 
 between  0.108 0.003 0.836 n =    6472 
 within  0.021 -0.170 0.422 T-bar = 1.06 
       
Share of education (wf4) overall 0.057 0.070 0.000 0.819 N =    6857 
 between  0.070 0.000 0.819 n =    6472 
 within  0.013 -0.112 0.226 T-bar = 1.06 
       
Share of durables (wf5) overall 0.034 0.051 0.000 0.610 N =    6857 
 between  0.051 0.000 0.610 n =    6472 
 within  0.011 -0.146 0.213 T-bar = 1.06 
       
Share of fuel (wf6) overall 0.019 0.019 0.000 0.228 N =    6857 
 between  0.019 0.000 0.228 n =    6472 
 within  0.003 -0.031 0.070 T-bar = 1.06 
       
Share of utilities (wf7) overall 0.027 0.032 0.000 0.401 N =    6857 
 between  0.032 0.000 0.401 n =    6472 
 within  0.006 -0.114 0.168 T-bar = 1.06 
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Appendix 4.3 Summary statistics (continued) 
 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Share of health (wf8) overall 0.046 0.078 0.000 0.873 N =    6857 
 between  0.077 0.000 0.873 n =    6472 
 within  0.018 -0.244 0.336 T-bar = 1.06 
       
Foreign remittances (Rs) overall 32764 137043 0.000 3600500 N =    6857 
 between  138590 0.000 3600500 n =    6472 
 within  18894 -449736 515264 T-bar = 1.06 
       
Log of per capita consumption overall 10.168 0.882 7.479 13.502 N =    6857 
 between  0.873 7.479 13.502 n =    6472 
 within  0.178 9.010 11.327 T-bar = 1.06 
       
Household size overall 5.387 2.485 1.000 32.000 N =    6857 
 between  2.453 1.000 32.000 n =    6472 
 within  0.412 -1.613 12.387 T-bar = 1.06 
       
Household head education (number of years of 
schooling) overall 7.204 3.741 0.000 16.000 N =    6857 
 between  3.725 0.000 16.000 n =    6472 
 within  0.464 1.704 12.704 T-bar = 1.06 
       
Household head's age overall 46.013 13.371 16.000 93.000 N =    6857 
 between  13.286 16.000 93.000 n =    6472 
 within  2.177 17.513 74.513 T-bar = 1.06 
       
Average age of household overall 27.646 9.907 8.667 85.000 N =    6857 
 between  9.851 8.667 85.000 n =    6472 
 within  1.611 7.146 48.146 T-bar = 1.06 
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Appendix 4.3 Summary statistics (continued) 
 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Average number of children<6 years overall 0.704 0.935 0.000 10.000 N =    6857 
 between  0.922 0.000 10.000 n =    6472 
 within  0.200 -1.796 3.204 T-bar = 1.06 
       
Average number of children aged 6–12 years overall 0.634 0.831 0.000 6.000 N =    6857 
 between  0.819 0.000 6.000 n =    6472 
 within  0.188 -0.866 2.134 T-bar = 1.06 
       
Average number of children>15 years overall 3.493 1.682 1.000 21.000 N =    6857 
 between  1.667 1.000 21.000 n =    6472 
 within  0.281 -0.007 6.993 T-bar = 1.06 
       
Household has a loan (in %) overall 0.631 0.483 0.000 1.000 N =    6857 
 between  0.477 0.000 1.000 n =    6472 
 within  0.100 0.131 1.131 T-bar = 1.06 
       
Household has agricultural land (in %) overall 0.706 0.455 0.000 1.000 N =    6857 
 between  0.454 0.000 1.000 n =    6472 
 within  0.061 0.206 1.206 T-bar = 1.06 
       
Household has nonfarm activities (in %) overall 0.370 0.483 0.000 1.000 N =    6857 
 between  0.479 0.000 1.000 n =    6472 
 within  0.083 -0.130 0.870 T-bar = 1.06 
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Appendix 4.4 Determinants of consumption shares using remittance values: SUR estimates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Food 
Non-food 
and 
tobacco Rental Education Durables Fuel Utilities Health 
Remittance dummy 0.0008*** 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002** 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001* -0.0000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Per capita consumption (logs) 0.0654*** 0.0190*** 0.0081** 0.0056*** 0.0021 0.0023* 0.0002 0.0012*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Household size 0.0158*** -0.0018 -0.0059 0.0094*** -0.0015 -0.0009 -0.0018 0.0005 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Household head education  0.0120*** 0.0002 0.0023** 0.0026*** 0.0027*** -0.0003 0.0012*** -0.0012*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household head's age 0.0007*** -0.0003** 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Average age of household 0.0003*** -0.0005*** 0.0014** -0.0023*** -0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of children < 6 years  0.0325*** 0.0037 0.0015 -0.0330*** -0.0021 0.0018 0.0001 0.0050*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
Number of children aged 6-12 years  0.0077*** -0.0001 0.0026 -0.0030 -0.0031 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0027*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
169 
  
Appendix 4.4 Determinants of consumption shares using remittance values: SUR estimates(continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Food 
Non-food 
and 
tobacco Rental Education Durables Fuel Utilities Health 
Number of children > 15 years 0.0167*** 0.0015 0.0042 -0.0022 0.0037 0.0001 0.0017 -0.0018** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Household has a loan?  0.0066*** 0.0076*** -0.0118 0.0019 -0.0033 -0.0010 -0.0018 0.0104*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
Household own agricultural land? 0.0357*** 0.0070*** -0.0118 -0.0025 -0.0036 -0.0087*** -0.0071** 0.0029*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
Household has nonfarm activities? 0.0221*** 0.0049** 0.0043 -0.0040 0.0065 0.0007 0.0014 -0.0006 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
Urban dummy  0.1906*** -0.0222* 0.0839** 0.0336* 0.0182 0.0092 0.0192 0.0007 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.036) (0.018) (0.025) (0.013) (0.012) (0.004) 
Destination India? 0.0170*** 0.0061 -0.0093 0.0033 -0.0060 -0.0006 -0.0021 0.0002 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.021) (0.012) (0.015) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) 
         
Observations 8,497 8,497 8,497 8,497 8,497 8,497 8,497 8,497 
Standard errors in parentheses. The regressions contain regional and round dummies.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
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Appendix 4.5 Determinants of consumption shares on Rounds 2 and 3: Pooled OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Food 
Non-food 
and 
tobacco Rental Education Durables Fuel Utilities Health 
                  
Remittance dummy -0.0183** -0.0042 0.0059 0.0022 0.0059* -0.0023* 0.0060*** 0.0060 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) 
Per capita consumption (logs) -0.1424*** 0.0121*** 0.0452*** 0.0205*** 0.0256*** -0.0024** 0.0106*** 0.0331*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) 
Household size -0.0107*** 0.0002 0.0025 0.0091*** -0.0010 -0.0010* 0.0001 0.0012 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Household head education  -0.0030*** -0.0031*** 0.0032*** 0.0021*** 0.0022*** 0.0004*** 0.0010*** -0.0026*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Household head's age 0.0004 -0.0004* -0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001* 0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Average age of household 0.0003 -0.0006 0.0018*** -0.0021*** -0.0003 0.0000 0.0002 0.0006* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of children < 6  0.0080 -0.0013 0.0035 -0.0272*** 0.0039* -0.0002 0.0011 0.0107*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Number of children age 6-12  0.0082 -0.0042 -0.0062 -0.0035 0.0031 0.0004 -0.0005 0.0023 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Number of children > 15 -0.0010 0.0045 -0.0069* -0.0013 0.0030* -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0012 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
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Appendix 4.5  Determinants of consumption shares on Rounds 2 and 3: Pooled OLS (continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Food 
Non-food 
and 
tobacco Rental Education Durables Fuel Utilities Health 
Household has a loan?  0.0005 0.0010 -0.0143** 0.0028 -0.0039 0.0003 -0.0014 0.0112** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) 
Household own agricultural land? 0.0213** 0.0081 -0.0093 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0066*** -0.0082*** -0.0049 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) 
Household has nonfarm activities? -0.0204*** -0.0018 0.0125** 0.0031 0.0094*** 0.0025** 0.0031* -0.0044 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) 
Urban dummy  -0.1014*** -0.0210*** 0.0907*** 0.0243*** -0.0000 0.0115*** 0.0189*** -0.0259*** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) 
Destination India? 0.0184 -0.0002 -0.0123 0.0030 -0.0046 0.0009 -0.0021 -0.0013 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
         
Observations 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 
Number of households 713 713 713 713 713 713 713 713 
Standard errors in parentheses. The regressions contain regional and round dummies and a constant.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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Chapter 5  
Conclusion 
 
In this concluding chapter, the key findings of the three studies are summarized and 
some suggestions for further research are offered. 
The thesis consists of three core chapters dealing with the impact of workers’ 
remittances inflows on economic growth; the implications on real exchange rate of 
domestic currency; and the consumption patterns of households in Nepal. The three 
chapters are based on the application of modern econometric techniques, with 
appropriate sensitivity testing, to newly-constructed multi-country and household 
panel data sets. 
The empirical analysis of Chapter 2 suggests that the overall effect of 
remittances on growth is not statistically significant.  However, there is some, albeit 
weak, evidence that there is a diminishing impact of remittances on growth after 
remittances surpass a threshold of about 7–9 percent.  The results are robust to 
alternative specifications and different sample periods. In particular, the impact of 
remittances is not affected by the past level of remittances, nor the current level of 
financial deepening and education levels. 
The findings of Chapter 3 demonstrate that, when controlled for the other 
relevant factors, remittance inflows results in an appreciation of the exchange rate as 
predicted by the Dutch disease theory. In contrast to the real exchange rate indices 
constructed by the International Monetary Fund, I construct a new real effective 
exchange rate series based on wholesale price index and GDP deflator and long-run 
trade weights, compared to the CPI-based index of earlier studies. I find that the 
estimated REER indices differ substantially for many countries compared to the  
CPI- based measure. The outcome is that the magnitude and significance of the impact 
of remittances on the real exchange rate depends crucially on the choice of an 
appropriate REER index. 
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The findings of Chapter 3 also suggest that remittances lead to a higher degree 
of RER appreciation compared to official development assistance, whereas foreign 
direct investment leads to a depreciation of the RER. There is some weak evidence to 
suggest that magnitude of the impact, depends on the exchange rate regimes. In 
particular, the impact of remittances on the REER on the countries adopting a flexible 
exchange rate regime tend to be higher than fixed exchange rate regime countries.  
According to the findings of the Nepalese case study in Chapter 4, foreign 
remittances enables remittance-receiving household maintain higher levels of 
consumption compared to non-remittance receiving households, after controlling for 
household characteristics. There is also evidence that that remittance-receiving 
household have modestly different expenditure patterns compared to non-remittances 
receiving households. The findings of this chapter suggest that these households spend 
higher proportion of their incomes on education, durable goods and health and lower 
proportion on food items. However, within food categories they allocate higher shares 
of consumption on meat and other foods (which includes meal consumed in 
restaurants). However, there is no evidence to suggest that domestic remittance-
receiving households have different expenditure patterns compared to non-remittance 
receiving households. 
These findings are contrary to the popular perception that remittances are mostly 
frittered away in conspicuous consumption. This chapter provides the first empirical 
evidence that remittances contributes positively to education and health outcomes in 
the context of Nepal. This finding also helps to reinforce the results of the earlier 
chapters that remittances are mixed blessings. 
Limitations and Directions for Further Research 
Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis are based on cross-country panel regressions. The 
empirical literature on economic growth is vast compared to the remittance growth 
literature. The very nature of panel data analysis is that it estimates the ‘average’ 
effects of a particular variable of interest across all countries covered. Individual 
country experiences can vary from this average, due to country specific structural 
peculiarities not modelled in the estimation. As argued by (Rodrik 2007), it is 
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necessary to undertake country-specific case-studies to supplement the cross-country 
analysisin order to ensure informed policy making in the individual country context.  
A recurring theme of all the empirical studies is the tackling of the endogeneity 
issue. So far the search for to find a strong and uncontroversial external instrument has 
remained elusive. It is hard to find a valid instrument: it should be highly correlated 
with remittances but should affect growth or real exchange rate only via remittances. 
The search for the valid instrument for remittances is now focussed on the 
microeconomic variable, such as the cost of sending remittance (Barajas et al. 2009). 
However, due to data unavailability for many countries, an empirical analysis could 
not be conducted using the external instrument.  
A caveat is in order about using the dynamic panel data method using the system 
GMM technique. System GMM is sensitive to choice of lag length and also to the 
options of how one chooses different types of instruments (Roodman 2009b). 
Moreover, there is no test available within the System GMM framework to test for the 
internally generated instruments (Bazzi & Clemens 2013).   
Chapter 4 examines whether the remittance-receiving households have different 
consumption patterns compared to households which do not receive remittances. 
Apart from augmenting the household income through remittances, international 
labour migration also link households with international markets and cultures, which 
might induce behavioural changes in consumption patterns, including the substitution 
of purchased goods for own-produced goods. It is, therefore, necessary to conduct in-
depth surveys of migrant households focussing on characteristics of migrant workers 
such as their education and skill levels, overseas employment status, and destination 
countries in the surveys. Moreover, the panel data analysis of the study suffers from 
the shorter time period and the presence of gaps in the data series. There is also room 
to improve the analysis using better instrumental variables depending on data 
availability. 
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